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Full-scale natural language processing systems require lots of information on
thousands of words. This is especially true for systems handling the meanings of
words and phrases, and it seems especially true for the verbs of a language: at first
glance at least, and when viewed as if they were argument-taking functions, verbs
seem to have highly individual requirements—along at least two dimensions. 1)
They vary in the range of arguments they take (further complicated by polysemy,
i. e. the proliferation of their senses). And to a significant extent 2) they vary in
the way in which those arguments are realized in syntax. Since arbitrary informa-
tion must be stored anyway—such as the particular concept pairing with the sound
and/or spelling of a word—it seems reasonable to expect to store other potentially
idiosyncratic information, including what might be needed for polysemy and argu-
ment realization. But once the meanings of words are stored, it isn’t completely
clear how much else really needs to be stored, in principle. With a significant degree
of patterning in polysemy, and in argument realization, real speakers extrapolate
from known senses and realizations. To fully model the processing of natural lan-
guage, there must be at least some automatic production, and/or verification, of
polysemy and argument realization, from the semantics.
Since there are two phenomena here (polysemy and argument realization), the
interaction between them could be crucial; and indeed particular instances of this
interaction appear again and again in theoretical studies of syntax and meaning.
Yet the real extent of the interaction has not itself been properly investigated. To
do so, we supply, for the argument-taking configurations of 3000 English verbs, the
typical kind of semantic specification—on the roles of their arguments—but do a
kind of high-level analysis of the resulting patterns. The results suggest a rule of co-
occurrences: divergences in argument realization are in fact rigorously accompanied
by divergences in polysemy or argument optionality. We argue that this implies the
existence of highly productive mechanisms for polysemy and argument realization,
thus setting some crucial groundwork for their eventual production by automated
means.
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Mapping concepts ‘into language’
A glance at the present work will suggest that it is all about language—and in
unusual detail, for those of us whose core interests fall in another field, such as
artificial intelligence (AI). But one of the traditional areas of AI, of course, is natural
language processing (NLP); and one area of NLP seems rather fundamental, in fact,
to the concerns of AI: that part of NLP that deals with the question of how concepts
should be encoded. By ‘concepts’, we simply mean the stuff that we ‘put into
words’ when we refer to (for instance) things that, depending on the case, might be
concrete or abstract, or concern events (so-and-so read that paper very carefully), or
states (so-and-so knows all about the problem now, that being an expression of the
apparent current state of so-and-so’s knowledge). Jackendoff (1983) argues for the
psychological reality of what he calls conceptual structures: words (he argues) are
stored in our minds attached to pieces of conceptual structure (lexical conceptual
structures), and these lexical conceptual structures (partly) determine how the words
can combine into larger phrases. In a rather broad way, we will effectively be (first)
assuming, then (later) offering some evidence, that something like that is true.
The following is an example of how the sorts of things we are interested in here
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can impinge on the sorts of things one might want to accomplish in AI. Suppose
you had a robot that could respond appropriately to commands like the following.1
A simple command might be something like:
(1) *Go over there, behind the bookcases.
If you want the robot to be robust in its interactions with the general English-
speaking populace, it’ll probably need to recognize paraphrases of the command; a
seemingly trivial one is:
(2) *Move over there, behind the bookcases.
Perhaps the robot can also handle commands like:
(3) *Move the box over there, under the table.
All things being equal, you may also want the robot to learn things from its ex-
periences, including new ways of saying things. Go and move are at least roughly
interchangeable in the first two commands (1 and 2), and have other somewhat
1There’s a complication here already: commands express neither states nor events nor things.
But they can be directly related to an event or state, thinking of them in particular as a request
or an order to bring some event or state into being: saying to someone (or some robot) to close
the door means that you want (or are sounding as if you want) to see come into being the event
expressible as someone (or some robot) closed the door. Speech acts like questions can also be
converted into expressions of events or states in a roughly similar way, while other speech acts
like greetings can be quite different. Except for these initial examples using commands, we will
be dealing almost exclusively with the expression of events and states, or other elements that are
embedded in the expression of events and states.
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similar uses in common (Go! Move! ). But they aren’t even close to interchangeable
in other cases (e. g. 3, the following putative go variant being ungrammatical, hence
marked *):
(4) *Go the box over there, behind the table.
Perhaps the robot should be very reluctant, then, to use words outside the contexts
they are attested in. Or is there some hidden semantic difference that might explain
the difference between move and go? I. e., perhaps the lexical conceptual structures
of move and go differ, such that they can sometimes combine with other words
to express more or less the same concept (1, 2), but not always. Perhaps go in
some way encodes the causer of the event, and the thing moved, such that an
additional ‘thing moved’ can’t be as easily specified (as in 4); perhaps go expresses
an inherently internally caused event (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995). Hidden
semantic distinctions behind the diverging behaviors of move and go might then
make things problematic for a truly conservative language device, and do so in a
number of ways, in fact. To see this, consider the next 9 or 10 examples, related to
another apparent property of language—the existence of ‘one-shot innovations’, as
Pinker (1989) calls them: the occasional use of a verb in a syntactic context that is
almost, but not quite, grammatical for that verb. Examples that Pinker collected
include:
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(5) *He corresponded the stages to the training sets.
(I. e., made them correspond with the training sets)
(6) *She pierced needles under her fingernails.
(Pierced i. e. the skin under her nails with needles)
(7) *Can germs harbor in these things?
(I. e., can these things harbor germs?)
(Pinker 1989, p. 154-157)
Pinker argues that there are functionally distinct broad-range and narrow range se-
mantic requirements that determine which verbs can use which constructions; the
above examples exist (Pinker argues) because they meet the broad-range require-
ments (which makes the utterances understandable) but violate the narrow-range
requirements—which makes the utterances substandard.
Certain examples that Levin and Rappaport Hovav like to give are of a different
kind, but will also help show how these phenomena challenge the language processing
device. These other examples have a more literary flavor, which might take a bit of
thought to understand; but they ultimately seem more-or-less grammatical. One of
Levin and Rappaort Hovav’s examples (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005, p. 227):
(8) Clea eggbeatered the covers into a knot ... 2
To make sense of the sentence, some thought about what an eggbeater does might
be useful; further thought might turn it into a really nice sentence if one is familiar
2from Irene Marcuse, 2000, The Death of an Amiable Child, Walker and Co., New York, NY.
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with the use of the term eggbeatering to describe a way of moving one’s legs while
in the water (or by extension, not in the water, as in the above example).
Meanwhile, a common way in English to tell someone to use x to do something
is to simply say Use the x; but one can often also say X it (as in Eggbeater it).
Imagine a (much more literal) exchange like the following:
(9) —Why don’t you eggbeater it into ...
—How ’bout I just wooden-spoon it into ...
A more careful speech generator (artificial or human) might say How about if I
just use a wooden spoon rather than wooden-spoon it. But the response as given
(9) may be the more natural one, given that it echoes the syntactic structure of
the utterance it is answering (and given that people do in fact do such echoing of
syntactic structure, Bock 1986).
So there are at least two broad issues here. Robust language processors will
need to be able to process and understand the ‘one-shot innovations’, as well as
the equally novel utterances that are more grammatical but more ‘literary’. And
the last example shows that in some cases it would even be good to generate such
utterances, even if they’re somewhat odd. Given that
6
(i) It’s generally attractive (for the engineer as well as the user) to
have a machine be able to learn things on its own,
(ii) There’s a possible semantic basis underlying the peculiarities of
the behaviors of different verbs (of which we’ll give many more
examples in the pages that follow),
(iii) And at least some language-processing devices are going to need
to know the meaning of the utterances they process anyway
—it seems much more attractive, then, if it all can be worked out, to have a language
learner that isn’t conservative; it should be ready to use verbs in novel constructions,
when something about those constructions makes it seem appropriate, and/or the
context (as above in 9) makes it seem especially natural to do so. It seems unlikely,
in fact, that a language device would be able to handle the interactions between
meaning and the form of utterances without the ability (in principle at least) to be
highly productive in the utterances it generates, too.
Unfortunately, there exists no agreement yet on exactly how much regularity
is present in the lexicons of languages. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) even
suggest that there are certain causative uses of verbs that are like Pinker’s ‘one-shot
innovations’, except these happen to find a toe-hold in language, somehow; they
give as an example bleed and burp:
7
(10) The doctor bled the patient.
(11) The father burped the baby.
(12) The patient bled.
(13) The baby burped.
(The first two examples are causative—there’s a separate entity, i. e., a doctor or a
father, causing the event to take place. The other two example are non-causative.)
Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s suggest that these causative uses are like one-shot
innovations because there are semantically similar verbs that lack such causative
uses: cf. belch, blush, hiccup, sneeze, yawn, breathe, cough, drool , puke, spit , drip,
foam, gush, leak , ooze, or shed—verbs that Levin (1993) classifies with bleed and
burp. These other verbs have only paraphrastic causatives: the long day made him
yawn, but not *the long day yawned him. If Levin and Rappaport Hovav are correct
that bleed and burp’s causatives are merely idiosyncratic, then this is yet another
problem for the language learner: some of those unprincipled ‘one-shot innovations’
nonetheless can be considered grammatical.
Thus, there’s a real question of the extent to which a system just has to store
lots of idiosyncrasies anyway, and the extent to which the regularities in language
can be relied upon by a system to extend its behavior beyond the frequently at-
tested cases. In spite of problems like that, though, we will be arguing that there
are in fact interactions between the encodings of concepts and their expression in
language, and that the patterns in language are thus big clues to the way that
8
work in AI should proceed in this area—something that is too often overlooked,
unfortunately. Perhaps that shouldn’t be too surprising: linguists not only offer
what we take as discouraging views (sometimes) about the possible regularities of
language; they also have shown that there is still a lot of work left to build up a
theory that actually explains the interactions that we just alluded to (as discussed
in Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005, p. 234 and earlier). This might make it a bit
more understandable when the corresponding language phenomena (as the linguis-
tics would take them to be) are largely ignored in the more AI-centered systems,
such as those building on Schank (1975) or Schank and Riesbeck (1981).
We will be attempting, then, to narrow this gap between these two fields. To
determine certain essential constraints on the way concepts are encoded—at least
at the point that such encodings interact with the human language facility—we will
look at a set of more than 3000 English verbs—the ‘Levin verbs’ (Levin 1993). The
main issue for us is the way the behaviors of those verbs (with respect to other
verbs in the same set), seem to rampantly diverge. At first glance—and even later,
possibly after lots of consideration—the divergences will in fact appear to give the
language-learner a potentially endless stream of idiosyncrasies (bounded only by the
number of verbs, or verb senses); they (seemingly) will simply have to be learned
verb by verb. We will argue against this, however—or at least, we will argue that
there is much more to it than that; we’ll attempt to provide evidence that the
seemingly irregular structure of the lexicon most likely follows from hidden system-
aticities; these happen to cause words to take on a complicated range of behaviors

















(iα) The children poured marbles into the bowl.
*The children filled marbles into the bowl.
β) The children filled the bowl with marbles.
*The children poured the bowl with marbles.
⇓
(iiα) Marbles completely fill the bowl.
β) *Marbles completely pour the bowl.
Figure 1.1: Our study concerns an apparently general feature of the relationship
between two facts of language. i) Different verbs express similar concepts differently:
above, pour and fill , used to describe the event pictured on the left, both express a
core element of the event (the movement of the marbles into the bowl) but diverge
in how their (logical) arguments (here, the marbles and the bowl) are realized
(iα vs. iβ). Furthermore, ii) different verbs express different clusters of related
concepts: only fill can express a state—here, the apparent end state of the event
(as in iiα; iiβ is ungrammatical, hence marked with *). Our hypothesis: modulo
some general caveats and complications (the precise statement of the hypothesis is
on p. 172), divergences of the first type (i) are always accompanied by divergences
of the second type (ii). We call this the ‘Rule of Co-occurrences’.
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be developing. We will see that, crucially (for the computer scientist, among oth-
ers), these systematicities seem to allow real speakers to automatically extrapolate
from the attested properties of words; computational systems that depend merely
on a list of such properties, stipulated on a word-by-word basis, won’t be able to
replicate that behavior.
1.1 An example
The apparent idiosyncrasies of language, nonetheless, are so wide-spread that it
is hard not to stumble upon a variety of potential counterexamples to purported
systematicities. Several different contrastive pairs of words will prove particularly
apt for our exposition; we’ve introduced move vs. go and pour vs. fill ; there were
also several implicit contrasting pairs in our discussion of bleed and burp (p. 8): bleed
and burp vs. drool and hiccup, respectively, and so on. The next contrastive pair is
rob and steal . Someone acquiring this pair has to learn that, though they can be
used to express more or less the same thing, they too can’t be used interchangeably
in the same sentences—
(14) *They robbed the bank of $1,000,000.
(15) *They stole the bank of $1,000,000.
(16) *They stole $1,000,000 from the bank.
(17) *They robbed $1,000,000 from the bank.
—the starred sentences, again, begin ungrammatical. (One of them, 15, is highly
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ungrammatical, the other at least problematic for many speakers, though similar
uses have in fact been attested for centuries).3 Thus right away we see a concept
being expressed in two different ways, with no appropriately semantic distinction
that could explain the difference in syntax (i. e. in the specific syntactic configura-
tions in which the words rob and steal appear). (The meaning of ‘no appropriately
semantic distinction’ will become clearer as we develop our way of representing the
semantics.)
Many similar syntactic distinctions seem to lie in waiting ready to trip up
the language-learner—especially those learning a foreign language (and dictionaries
can be surprisingly unhelpful here); we’ll supply some actual numbers to partly
quantify this later, for English (chs. 3 and 4).4 And though individual, and dialectal,
3The Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson and Weiner 1989) cites Dryden (1697) They them-
selves contrive To Rob the Honey, and subvert the Hive and G. B. Shaw (1919) I should rob all the
money back from Mangan. Of course, what we really want to know is what the general usages of
the word are, rather than the artful instances from its most creative users (who furthermore might
be intentionally playing with dialectal divergences). As of July 2007, http://www.google.com was
returning a few hundred cached cases each of robbed from the rich and of robbed it from, etc.,
i.e. the ungrammatical forms. One can find similar numbers for many of the other cases of sup-
posed ungrammaticalities that we will give here, however. In Pinker’s (1989) discussions of these
subgrammatical attestations, he argues that their speakers will tend to recognize them as ungram-
matical when their attention is drawn to them later. (He appears to be merely speaking from
personal experience, however.) For things like this, without a detailed theory of which of these be-
haviors we should expect speakers to have (and which ungrammaticalities they might nonetheless
regularly produce, with Pinker’s broad and narrow rules an attempt in that direction) and without
a variety of ways of testing that theory, other than just counting up attestations, it’s hard to be
sure of the true bounds of grammaticality.
4For a time, Longman published a dictionary (Procter 1978) that was exceptional with re-
spect to these subtle distinctions, and written especially for learners of English; it drew some
attention for its potential use by computational linguistists in the construction of artificial lexi-
12
differences will remain evident, language learners, in the course of their exposure to a
language, if they are young enough, eventually come to apparently strong agreement
with their language communities on these (seemingly) finicky requirements—enough,
at least, to make those dialectal differences quite noticeable.
The seemingly intuitive sense native speakers have of what is or isn’t gram-
matical in a language doesn’t leave the computer scientist who wants to replicate
the behavior of the native speaker much room for error. A natural first response,
again, is to encode, for each of the thousands of words like rob and steal that exist
in the native speaker’s lexicon, the precise syntactic requirements of those words.
Thus, if these distinctions really are idiosyncratic, and really do just have to be
learned word by word—and if that’s all there is to it—then the problem for the
computer scientist reduces more-or-less to a question of database management and
data acquisition. And in fact, much of the computational linguistics work of recent
years has focused on taking advantage of the great amount of data now available
in digital form—in the form of raw corpora, or in the form of the large gold stan-
dards (Marcus et al. 1993) for statistical and other analyses—a way to get the large
databases without a huge amount of person-hour input per word.
And clearly, the problem of learning the idiosyncrasies exists in any case: one
must learn that certain activities can be described, for instance, as thieves robbing
(people), or stealing (things)—i e. robbing, stealing, thievery, etc., are the labels
the language gives arbitrarily to the expression of those concepts in English, when
cons (Boguraev and Briscoe 1987, Boguraev and Briscoe 1989, Carroll and Grover 1989). Unfor-
tunately, later editions of the dictionary dropped the relevant information.
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more or less any other combination of sounds would serve just as well (Saussure
1916).5,6 Another obvious example of idiosyncrasy in some languages is the existence
of irregular word forms, such as for the past tense form in English, the normal suffix
(written ed, as above in robbed) being blocked by irregular forms for some verbs
(such as steal—steal ’s past tense form being stole, not *stealed). And similarly for
other suffixes, such as the English plural (two mice, not two mouses).
Certain phrases, or skeletal phrases, must be memorized, too: they’re idioms
(Jackendoff 1997, Nunberg et al. 1994). The standard example is to kick the bucket,
meaning to die. Its meaning isn’t compositional—it isn’t predictable from its parts
(i. e. the words and their arrangement). In other ways, though, an idiomatic phrase
may act the way a non-idiomatic phrase of the same sorts of words would act: in the
case above, the verb inside the idiom (kick) is still the place where the past tense is
marked (we say he kicked the bucket, not he kick-the-bucketed).7
Thus there are lots of arbitrary things that clearly just have to be stored in the
5Adopted words can’t literally have ‘any combinations of sounds’, of course; some sounds will
be too foreign to a particular language community, and even familiar sounds will be reshaped
to match the language in question. The word dorobō, with a long final o—it’s a way of saying
‘thief’ in Japanese—would differ systematically in its pronunciation if it were adopted by English
speakers, just as the hundreds of English words adopted by the Japanese do. (Building appears in
Japanese as something closer to biruding or just biru.)
6That the mapping from sound to meaning is arbitrary has even been considered a design
feature (Hockett 1960), and argued to have a learning advantage (Gasser 2004), as discussed in
Monaghan and Christiansen (2006), along with some recent experimental results on important
qualifications to the idea.
7See Jackendoff (1997) and citations therein for comments on how common idioms are, and for
the ways in which they blend in with the rest of the language apparatus.
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lexicon. From that, it may appear quite reasonable to think that language learners
when learning to associate the word rob with a certain event just happen to associate
steal with the same kind of event, and easily learn the distinct syntactic structures for
each word in the meantime—because it’s just part of the language-learning process
to treat such structures as one of the many (potential) idiosyncrasies that seem to
exist and have to be learned. (Culicover and Jackendoff (2005, p. 148) make the
same sort of argument: “If one can learn tens of thousands of lexical items, a few
dozen or even a few hundred idiosyncratic syntactic patterns would not seem to be
such a problem.”)
But is this really ‘all there is to it’? There are other bodies of work on what
does or does not need to be stored in the lexicon, such as that which builds on
Pinker’s contrast between words and rules (Pinker 1999, Pinker and Ullman 2002).
There are rules, in Pinker’s formulation, to account for things like the English past
tense suffix ed ; and there’s something quite different (in Pinker’s view), some sort
of associative mechanism, to account for the arbitrary association between irregu-
lar verbs and their (irregular) past tense forms, and also—crucially—to allow for
some semi-regular patterns among these irregular forms. (From Pinker 1999, p. 75:
the pattern ring-rang-rung extends to sing-sang-sung, and similarly for pring, drink,
shrink, sink, stink ; but not cling, fling, sling, sting, string, swing, wring, stick, which
are missing the middle form—*flang, *slang ...) From that alone, we can already
see that there’s more to these things that ‘just’ putting the appropriate stuff in the
lexicon; though it is sometimes said that the irregular things ‘just have to be stored’,
we still need to deal with the patterns that are at least semi-regular. In fact, certain
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critiques from the linguistic side (Embick and Marantz 2005, Halle 2000) evidently
see the words and rules distinction as leaving behind too much hand-waving on the
‘words’ side of things; Halle (2000) argues that such semi-irregularities, as found in
the German plural, require that Pinker’s rules be applied to attached lists of words;
‘[t]he modified theory, however, differs little from that of’ Chomsky and Halle (1968)—
i. e. the purely rule-based system which Pinker intended to contrast with the ‘words
half’ of his words-and-rules system.
So “that’s all there is to it”, and “it’s all just idiosyncratic” aren’t very good
responses to the data. We’ll call an approach based on such responses a ‘less-
than-associative’ approach, contrasting it with ‘associative approaches’, the latter
being the sort of thing Pinker has argued might be appropriate for capturing the
semi-regular patterns of the irregular verbs and plurals. But in fact there’s a much
deeper problem that will probably affect either approaches. For the phenomena
we will focus on here, both approaches seem to ignore certain apparent regulari-
ties of language that probably constrain in some strong ways the store of possible
syntactic configurations in which a word can appear; a theory such as Hale and
Keyer’s (Hale and Keyser 2002) attempts to reduce, in fact, these configurations to
structures already seen in the area of syntax.
We will be developing an argument here of a rather indirect sort that there is
indeed additional structure behind these phenomena. As introduced in Fig. 1.1, p.
10, our essential piece of evidence makes use of the following: it’s not only the case
that a concept will tend to have more than one way of being expressed, as we just
saw with rob and steal ; the spoken form of a word will also tend to map to more
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than one concept, sometimes in ways that are hard to notice because the concepts
are almost identical. (In Fig. 1.1, the contrast is between stative and non-stative
senses of the verbs.) In the central section of this work (Ch. 5) we will show that
there’s an apparent relation between these two phenomena, apparently overlooked
until now, that will lead us to conclude that there’s more systematicity here, and
less idiosyncrasy, than is commonly believed.
Incidentally, on the connection between language and thought, we don’t intend
to argue a Whorfian stance here (Whorf 1956), i. e. that language influences thought.
Some very recent work supports a kind of Whorfianism, sometimes in an extremely
limited, though concrete way (Gilbert et al. 2006, Drivonikou et al. 2007). We tend
however to think that we’re giving roughly the opposite of a Whorfian argument.
We’re saying—and it might be our interest in AI that is influencing us here—
that certain encodings that are part of the mechanism of thought probably in-
fluence language, so we should get to those encodings by looking closer at lan-
guage. The door may be opened to a more Whorfian stance, however, to the
extent that some of these encodings may differ cross-linguistically. Consider re-
cent psychological studies (among others, Matlock et al. 2003, Bergen et al. 2003,
Glenberg and Kaschak 2002) on the apparent use of spatial constructions in non-
spatial uses, building on earlier, more linguistically theoretical work (Jackendoff 1983,
Gruber 1965), or more directly on Talmy’s (1983, 1996) notion of ‘fictive motion’;
the linguistic work is very much related to the present study. (Section 4.1, pp. 121–
148, builds directly on Jackendoff.) Jackendoff makes much of the fact that certain
constructions that seem in some ‘canonical’ way to be associated with location or
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displacement also get used for non-locational meanings. Compare
(18) The children ran from the second to the fourth floor, where they
were caught by their teacher.
(19) The stairway ran from the second to the fourth floor, until it
was blocked off at the third.
(20) The light went from red to green, and then everyone took off.
The frame from ... to ..., common to all three sentences, is used for locational
displacement (18), extent through space (19, with the same verb as 18) or a change of
state (20). Jackendoff would call the latter (20) and instance of a different semantic
field in use: Identificational rather than Locational. Other fields that he defines,
and that we will occasionally refer to here, include the Possessional, for verbs like
give, in which the thing being ‘moved’ is, in general, going from begin ‘in’ one
person’s possession to begin ‘in’ another’s; and the Circumstantial field, with which
Jackendoff asserts a similarity between the following:
(21) Louise kept him in the attic.
(22) Louise kept him composing quartets.
(adapted from Jackendoff 1983, p. 198)
—the first (21) being Locational, the second (22) Circumstantial.
Perhaps, though, a language may have some freedom in whether it emphasizes
the spatial (i. e. Locational) nature of an event or not. Perhaps steal is English’s
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example of treating the underlying concept as a kind of removal (i. e. an event spatial
in nature); it fits the pattern of other putative verbs of removal (Levin 1993, for some
of these):
(23) *They took/stole/removed/extracted/withdrew/... $1,000,000.
Rob on the other hand patterns like a different set of verbs that have an argument
naming something that is affected by the event the verb is used to express:
(24) *They harmed/victimized/robbed/terrorized/... their neighbors.
We are going to focus purely on a broad-scale approach to English, so we will not
be considering in any significant way the degrees to which languages differ in their
patterns of argument expression. But they do differ, and sometimes in substantial
ways (though apparently there are also broad agreements, Kim et al. 1999). Baker
(1988), citing Kimenyi (1980), gives the following example from Kinyarwanda, a
Bantu language:
(25a) Umwaana y-a-taa-ye igitabo mu maazi.
b) child has-thrown book in water
(26a) Umwaana y-a-taa-ye-mo amaazi igitabo.
b) child has-thrown water book
‘The child has thrown the book into the water.’
The words meaning ‘book’ and ‘water’ have swapped positions.8 This alternation of
8This example seems to be another case of two different ways of expressing the same arguments
(as with rob and steal), but the English example that follows shows differences in meaning, as is
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the verb’s argument realizations is comparable, as Baker notes, to something that
appears in English:
(27a) The child threw the book into the water.
b) (*)The child threw the water the book.
(28a) The child threw the book to his friend.
b) The child threw his friend the book.
Here one sentence (27b) is not acceptable without some special interpretation. (The
sentence might be made acceptable by thinking of the water as an animate being to
which something can be thrown, for instance.) But for other verbs, such as say, the
alternation never works:










Thus a child may throw something to a friend, or say something to a friend, and throw
a friend something, but not *say a friend something. The greater restrictiveness that
English puts on such patterns, compared to Kinyarwanda, and many other cross-
language divergences of a similar sort, show that languages differ in their patterns
of argument realization. Since only one of the rob and steal verbs looks spatial, it
might be the case that a concept that seems to have ‘spatialized’ its argument in
more often the case. Note the additional suffix -mo on the Kinyarwanda verb (26); which might
make this more closely related, in a certain way, to a different kind of construction in English—the
passive, which we’ll discuss later.
20
one language might not do so in another.
1.2 ‘Argumentation’
To get a better handle on these issues, we’ll start by looking at some potential
encodings of the meaning of our initial contrasting word pair, i. e. rob and steal. We
recognize that, having made an extremely brief mention of associative approaches
to certain kinds of things, some might expect that an encoding of the meaning of
a word would be exactly the kind of thing such an approach could be applied to—
given the fuzzy mass of connotations that may seem to (indeed) associate with a
word. We sympathize with that reasoning; nonetheless, we will be presenting an old-
fashioned ‘symbolic’ approach for the possible encodings of rob and steal ; at first,
it will look, to computer scientists, like forms of Prolog (a computer programming
language that just happens to have grown out of a natural language processing
project in question-answering, see Kowalski 1988). We claim this is appropriate
because, however associative the cloud of connotations of a word may be, language
also has a clearly discrete nature, in the way that utterances are made up of words
that can be moved around and combined only in very particular ways. This will
become clearer, we hope, by the end of this thesis.
So the question with rob and steal, then, concerns this: should we think, as a
question of how concepts get realized in words, that expressions using rob or steal
both stem from a similar form? I. e., we should consider whether there is a legitimate
reason for thinking that both expressions can be seen as being generated in some
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way from some common encoding in our minds. As a rough first step we might start
with something simple, say
(30) take improperly(Loot, Victim, Thief)
with rob and steal just happening to choose different ways of realizing their ar-
guments—i. e. the Thief, Loot, and Victim. Recall that the Loot and Victim swap
positions between rob and steal (old examples 14 and 16):
(31=14) They robbed the bank
︸ ︷︷ ︸










Giving both verbs the same representation, one will need to add information to each
verb’s entry in the lexicon to further describe its chosen realization—and similarly
for all the other pairs of words that differ in their argument expression—of which
some such pair might exist for nearly every verb in the lexicon, as we shall see.
Or: perhaps rob and steal are in some deeper way encoded differently. As we
suggested earlier, perhaps steal is just a special case of a verb like remove; for the
sake of the exposition, we might encode it with something along the lines of
(33) remove from(Source, Theme, Agent)
taking the Source as the traditional name for the location from which something is
taken, the Theme as the entity being moved (as used in Jackendoff 1983, following
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Gruber 1965), and the Agent as the entity acting to bring about this event; these are
the possible thematic roles, or θ-roles, for any verb whose semantic representation
might be based on this remove from form. There are in fact quite a few such verbs:
Levin (1993) lists a few dozen such words, such as extract, withdraw, (one sense of)
pull, etc. (mostly in Levin 1993, sect. 10.1). Perhaps the encoding should be broken
down further to something like
(34) cause(go from(Source, Theme), Agent)
which brings it closer to the sort of form Jackendoff (1983) has proposed (he’d
further decompose the go from form, these questions of alternate decompositions
being, in fact, the kinds of things that Jackendoff has wrestled with over many
years—Jackendoff 1976, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1996).
The verb rob, meanwhile, taken as a variant of the many verbs that take an
affected object, encoded as the θ-role Patient, might be represented with
(35) act on(Patient, Agent)
Something would have to be added to specify the actual action taken upon the
Patient, i. e. one that involves taking something (the Theme, not shown) from the
Patient; as is, the representation would probably suffice only for something more
like
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(36) His last girlfriend
︸ ︷︷ ︸




i. e. for a statement that says little or nothing about the kind of effect. Of course,
the previous form (34) needs to be extended in the same way, receiving something
to specify that the movement of the (there specified) Theme from the Source is not
just any movement, but one that victimizes the Source, etc.
Note the choice here: one can encode these verbs the same way, and add
realization information: or encode them differently, and hope that some sort of rules
of realization can be found to handle the realizations without further, verb-specific
specification; the decompositions of the act on and remove from forms, which we’ll
give in a moment, will suggest how they might provide the correct, though diverging,
realizations for rob’s and steal ’s arguments. Either way, though, from the computer
scientist’s view, verb-specific encodings have to be made—in the representation, or
in explicit realization stipulations (i. e. specifying a subcategorization frame—the
category of these words being verb, the subcategorization specifying the number
and the realizations of their arguments). So the question is, can anything be gained
from richer semantics that can’t be gained from just stipulating all the details of
realization, etc.? We’ll be arguing strongly in the affirmative here, for reasons that
will become more apparent in the next chapter. But our remarks about patterns
among the irregular verbs, and novel language use by real users, should suggest
already the reason for preferring the richer semantics; if the patterns in argument
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realization are dependent on the semantics, then to the extent that people can
extrapolate using those patterns to handle new words or new contexts, then we’ll
want our artificial systems to have this richer, more syntax-affecting semantics, too.
1.2.1 Argument types
Meanwhile, these Prolog-style examples should make it clear that we are in fact
dealing with a kind of mystery of argument realization, rob and steal (14–17, 31–32)
exhibiting a clear case of argument realization divergence—the argument realization
proceeding differently for the Loot and Victim arguments, if one thinks in terms
of the take improperly predicate; or for the Theme and Source arguments, if you
take things all the way down to the remove from or go from predicates; or for
the Theme and Patient arguments, taking things down to the act on predicate.
We call this a ‘clear case’ of argument divergence because no matter how finely
you try to define the semantics, rob and steal are probably going to look the same
at least in terms of the semantic roles their arguments play: through successive
refinements (getting more specific in the semantic role at each step), the arguments
might be described as {Agent, Source, Theme}, or {Agent, Source/Victim, Theme},
or {Perpetrator, Source/Victim, Goods}, or {Thief, Source/Victim, Loot}—
regardless of the refinements, the designated roles apply as much rob as to steal.
(We’ll give this a more thorough defense later, p. 75.)
If all divergences were like rob and steal, then we might in fact end up resigning
ourselves to filling the lexicon with a lot of stipulations. But let’s move (finally) to a
different contrastive pair of words; things will turn out slightly different with them.
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The next pair is put and fill (cf. pour and fill , Fig. 1.1).
(37) *Suzy put clothes in(to) the bags.
(38) *Suzy filled clothes into the bags.
(39) *Suzy put the bags with clothes.
(Intended to mean the same as 37.)
(40) *Suzy filled the bags with clothes.
Here were have a swapping of arguments (clothes and bags) similar to that of rob and
steal ’s swapping of Loot and Victim. But it probably doesn’t seem surprising that
put (39) can’t behave like fill (40), since its meaning evidently lacks the component
meaning in; unless you explicitly supply the word in, put isn’t going to come very
close to meaning fill . One the other hand, why can’t fill (38) act like a use of
put that does include in (37)? The apparent redundancy of the explicit in paired
with fill (38) isn’t necessarily a problem; insert , which would seem to have the in
component as much as fill , nonetheless sides with put , not fill :
(41) *Suzy inserted the cards into the slots.
(42) *Suzy inserted the slots with the cards.
(Intended to mean the same as 41.)
So the presense or absence of an in component does not by itself seem relevant.
A first attempt to encode put ’s meaning might be something like:
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(43) move to(Goal, Theme, Agent)
giving the traditional name Goal to the argument to which the Theme is being
moved. One might be tempted to also think of this as the underlying encoding of
fill , minus the extra piece of meaning that suggests that in the end of the event
expressed by fill , not only does the entity expressed by the Goal argument contain
that expressed by the Theme argument, but in some way it can be taken to be full
of the Theme; and, of course, it (43) is also still missing the actual component for in.
But put ’s argument isn’t just the entity to which the Theme goes, but an expression
of a position in some spatial relation with the Goal entity (in the bags, in the above
example, Jackendoff 1983). So though put and fill diverge in their expression of their
Goal and Theme arguments, it also looks like put ’s Goal is more than just a Goal,
so the divergence could have something to do with that. In terms of some more
finely tailored argument descriptions, this wouldn’t be a divergence at all. Thus,
in Jackendoff’s (1983) explication of things, conceptual structures (his variants on
semantic predicates) may have slots that need to be filled with additional conceptual
structures of differing types, in this case, of one type for a simple fill -type Goal, and
of a different type for the put-type Goal. Jackendoff gives his pieces of conceptual
structure types such as Event, Thing, Path, Position; following Jackendoff’s general
use of [X Y] to designate an element Y of type X, we can take an operator
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(44) in : Thing→ Position




Thinking of these as the type designations (44, 45) of in and bag, respectively, we
then get the type (46), and the sanctioning of the construction, of the phrase in the
bag (ignoring the difference between bag and the bag for expository convenience).
We can continue and build up the entire sentence
(47≈37) *Suzy put clothes in the bag.
according to the following chart, where each element in the first column applies to
the element in the second column, giving an element in the next row—the first or
second column, according to the arrows.
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(48) to : Position→ Path [Position in(bag)]
↓
(49) go : Path→ (Thing→ Event) [Path to(in(bag))]
ւ
(50) go(to(in(bag))) : Thing→ Event [Thing clothes]
↓



































The result (49, right-hand column) of the application in the first row (48) can be
considered the representation for (at least one sense of) into (the) bag. The word into
seems to have been built from the standard mathematical process of composition:
(to(in(x) = (to ◦in)(x)), thus making into the word with which we express to◦in
(with a similar decomposition derivable for onto; compare Jackendoff (1983)).9
9For the reader who might have been wondering about the orderings of Agent, Source, Theme,
etc. in the some of the above forms (30, 33, 34, 35, 43), we can defend those now. (Why Goal,
Theme, Agent (43) and not Agent, Theme, Goal? the latter matching the ordering of at least some
English sentences, e. g. 37, as well as the ordering in Jackendoff’s representations.) In a nutshell,
we are currying the forms (Curry 1961, Schönfinkel 1924); for instance, we treat a function of a
pair of arguments not as a function that is applied directly to that pair, say f(x, y), but as a
function whose value on the first argument f(x) is itself a function which can then be applied
to the second argument. Thus, in the programming language Haskell, (x+)y is a valid way of
writing x + y; (x+) designates a function (a ‘section’) that adds x to the value of the argument
it’s applied to. (Curry 1963, p. 33: forms like f(x, y) are “in the spirit of ordinary mathematics”
while something like (fx)y is more suggestive of the procedure “usually followed in linguistics”.
Heim and Kratzer (1998) use currying in their exposition of semantics and syntactic phenomena;
categorial grammar thoroughly relies on it (e. g. Steedman 2000).) So the application of go as
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Given the above form for (at least one sense of) go (49, left-hand side), after a
couple of applications the result is a form (51, right-hand side) that can be considered
the representation for something like
(54) The clothes went into the bag.
(Clearly, we’re ignoring tense distinctions: the clothes went into the bag vs. the
clothes go into the bag, etc.) The result of the last application (i. e. 52) could be the
sentence
(55) Suzy caused clothes to go into the bag.
or, finally, our target sentence
(56=47) * Suzy put clothes in the bag,
for which we can subtract the representations for Suzy, clothes, and in the bag to
get the form for put :
(57) [Event cause(go(to([position ]), [Thing ]), [Thing ])]
(Note then, that a language may offer multiple ways of cutting up a structure, i. e.
defined here (49) results in a value of type Thing → Event, i. e. another function. Thus, these
pieces of conceptual structure, and their compositions, align with actual words in interesting ways.
The cause operator as we’ve defined it (51, left hand side), composed with the result of the
application shown above (50, left hand side), i. e. cause ◦ go(to(in(bag))), might be considered
the representation for the verb bag as used in something like Finally, the shopkeeper bagged our
groceries.
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the various pieces of conceptual matter in 53 can be composed to produce 55 or
47. Thus the larger issue is for us not just how a verb’s arguments are realized, but
how the concept one is expressing is cut up into predicate and arguments. That’s
why we chose to play on the word ‘argumentation’ in giving a title to the current
parent section (1.2), the standard label ‘argument realization’ suggesting too narrow
a focus.)10 At a minimum, the conceptual structure for fill would be closer to:
(58) [Event cause(go(to(in([Thing ])), [Thing ]), [Thing ])]
but we’ve already seen that the in component—the only thing added here—is not
the essential element (insert behaving more like put , though put requires the in
component to be ‘spoken’); and of course the form above fails to capture the notion
that the first Thing is full of the second Thing (by some heavily context-dependent
criteria), and not merely containing some arbitrary amount of the second. So a
decomposition of this sort still leaves a lot unexplained.
Note, too, for rob and steal , how little the amount of semantics is that is
added to the concepts expressed by of and from (prepositions, so called because
10Our decompositions are not intended to minimize Fodor’s (1970) warnings against decon-
structing kill as cause to die; but see Jackendoff’s own sketch of a rejoinder (Jackendoff 1990,
p. 150–151).
One might also try to give (*)clothes entered the bag instead of clothes went into the bag (for
51, right-hand side), taking enter as the expression of the composition go ◦ to ◦ in, where (go ◦
to ◦ in)(x) = go(to(in(x))). For a first attempt at explaining the ‘(*)’, one might consider the
argument for enter as something like AnimateTheme rather than Theme. (Though that isn’t quite
right either; it probably has something to do with the Theme being able to move on its own.) As
Jackendoff mentions in his discussion of Fodor, it isn’t unusual for (what we will think of as) the
composed form to be much more specialized than the uncomposed form.
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they’re preposed relative to their argument). On the one hand, these verbs have
three arguments, so there has to be some way of distinguishing the two that come
after the verb; but in other cases the ordering after the verb is itself available to

















(We’ve given give’s second argument the traditional name Recipient, rather than
Goal, to distinguish the argument with preposed to (in the other construction give
appears in) from those that take a variety of prepositions; the sentence above (59)
is paraphrasable as
(61) The neghbors gave some cake to/*on/*in/*under the stranger,
while for a verb like put there are a variety of prepositions available to introduce
the Goal argument—but not the preposition to:

























So we are using the different prepositional requirements (61 vs. 62) to justify distinct
argument types Recipient and Goal, and assuming the two uses of give above (59
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and 61) can be used to justify giving the same role names to those two cases. Similar
arguments can be made for Beneficiary, given the following paraphrase (of 60):
(63) The neighbors baked a cake for the stranger.
This in turn shows that for and to are also taking on semantic roles that otherwise
can simply be performed by the syntax.)
So it might not only be insert that has an apparent redundancy (the required
into before one of its arguments). Steal and rob’s prepositional requirements can
seem close to redundant, too. So why do they have to be there? One might think,
first of all, that we have here another complication in argument realization, thus
more evidence, perhaps, of idiosyncrasy, contrary to our stated goals. But these
may also be clues to constraints on surface forms hidden in the mechanisms of
syntax or semantic representation.
1.2.2 Linking
Our immediate response to the decompositions of the previous section, however, is
that they aren’t completely helpful (at least, not yet) in trying to determine how the
constituents of those structures (as attached to the words that express them) are
realized; again, if insert ’s inherent in component is nonetheless realized again by
its argument, why isn’t fill ’s? The structures don’t by themselves show us what the
link is between syntax and semantics, e. g. they don’t help us yet with the ‘linking’
of elements of the concept to the elements of syntax (Carter 1988), i. e. argument
realization; all that we can conclude so far is that, if there is indeed a strong link
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between these things, we should consider giving put and fill different semantic rep-
resentations, just as we suggested for rob and steal. Jackendoff, among many others,
has attempted to come to terms with some of these problems (Jackendoff 1990, ch.
11); we’ll return to him later (p. 159).
Meanwhile, we can note that, of all the general argument types for the above
predicates (i. e. the arguments Agent, Goal, Source, Theme, Patient, ignoring the
highly specialized argument types Loot, Victim, Thief) only an Agent is, in general,
largely unproblematic in the way it is realized. As a first step to getting closer to
some of the possible issues here, one can look at the problem in a way that roughly
complements that of the previous section; there, we tried to break up the apparent
semantic components of the concept, closely following Jackendoff (1983), but with
an ordering of the concepts that was somewhat different. (We chose, contra Jack-
endoff, to order things to maximize the ease of representation of composition in the
mathematical sense, and of function currying.) Meanwhile, the traditional approach
of the syntactician (at least in generative tradition, the more-or-less Chomskyan tra-
dition, starting back with Chomsky 1957) has been, in part, to start with a known
order (the order in which words appear in natural speech) and then to look for ev-
idence of particular groupings of the words—and, where seemingly appropriate, to
look for evidence that different arrangements of those groupings may have existed
in some way in speakers’ minds before the string of words are given their final shape
and uttered.
So, to use a very simple example, a string like
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(64) They robbed the bank
can be built up of its constituent phrases, as in:
(65a) They robbed the bank
↓
b) They robbed [the bank]
↓
c) They [robbed [the bank]]
↓
d) [They [robbed [the bank]]]
A complete explication of the way that words seem to group into phrases would
include discussion of things like the possibility of substituting pronouns (she, he,
it, etc.) for phrases, and the way that a sentence can seemingly be transformed by
moving parts of it around; there are a number of complications, in fact. Santorini
and Kroch (2007) give the following examples, to which we’ve added brackets:
(66) *Did [the dog] chase [the cat]?
(67) *Did she chase him?
(68) *Did [the dog the children like] chase the cat?
(69) *Did [she the children like] chase the cat?
(70) *Did she chase the cat?
She substitutes easily for the dog (66, 67) but not for the dog that the children are
said to like (68, 69), thus suggesting that the grouping is [the [dog the children like]]
(in 68).
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Given the grouping of the earlier sentence (64 as in 65); we can view it picto-











where the labels S, VP, and NP denote sentence (or clause), verb phrase, and noun
phrase, respectively. The noun phrase is an internal argument of the verb, since it
is inside the VP, and the word they here is an external argument. We aren’t going
to delve into syntax in any real depth in this work. But certain apparent properties
are both crucial to understanding what follows, and to seeing some of the possible
implications of the results that we will eventually arrive at. A somewhat more
sophisticated labeling of these trees, better reflecting their apparent regularities
follows 72 (Chomsky 1970, Jackendoff 1977, i. e. X-bar theory; the X′ below (73)













This has DP for determiner phrase (Abney 1987)—the being a determiner, and in
this analysis the head of the phrase. (More on the internal structure of the DP in
a moment; we’ve also left off elements from the top of the tree, into which some
elements technically should be moved, in order to bring the whole sentence fully








with YP defined as the complement of X, and ZP the specifier of X. (Thus the
complement of V holds an internal argument of V, and its specifier holds its external
argument.) Substitute V for X to get [VP They [V′ [V robbed ] [DP the bank ]]], or D
for X to get the subtree [DP [D′ [D the] [NP bank ]]]. An example DP that fills out








One of the important symmetries of these trees is as follows: there’s a tendency
of languages that create a phrase by attaching a word to an already existing phrase
to systematically put the word—the head of the new phrase, i. e. the X (73)—in
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the same position; in English, at the front; in Japanese, the head comes at the end.
English is head initial, Japanese is head final. Thus, for the following sentence
(75a, discussed in Baker 2001, p. 58), with the given word-by-word gloss (75b), and
translation (75c), a speaker of, say, English, unaware of the symmetries here, will
probably fail to notice the intrinsic order of the Japanese sentence, even given the
gloss (i. e. 75b).
(75a) Tarō-ga Hiro-ga Hanako ni zibun no syasin-o miseta to omette iru
b) Tarō Hiro Hanako to self of picture showed that thinking be
c) ‘Tarō is thinking that Hiro showed a picture of himself to Hanako’
The order can be recovered easily by comparing the build-up of phrases for English
and Japanese—unfortunately it will be a bit of a digression, so we’ll push it down into
a footnote. The essential thing is: various pairings of words or phrases are reversed—
but not all such pairings are reversed, making it extremely hard for someone whose
native language is a language like English to make sense of the gloss. So everything
appears (to the English-speaking reader) scrambled rather than simply reversed.
This is because phrases can also be built up out of other phrases, and here Japanese
and English have less of a chance to differ. In almost all languages (see Baker’s
(2001) discussion of Dryer 1992) the subject phrase (here, Tarō ga) comes before
the verb phrase, and here both English and Japanese adhere to the norm. (Baker
mentions the Mayan language Tzotil as one of the rare ones: head initial, like
English, but with subjects last. Thus it’s mirror Japanese.)11
11Traditional notions of headedness and phrase types sometimes conflict with the orderliness
implied by the head directionality parameter. The traditional head of a noun phrase in English (a
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There is no norm for headness, however; none cross-linguistically, that is.
Where it exists, you have roughly an equal chance of finding a head-initial language
(like English) or a head-final one like Japanese. (That makes it perfect example of
a parameter, Chomsky 1981.) Thus, in the computer scientist’s terminology, there
really seems to be just a single bit in the description of Japanese that needs to be
flipped to account for this difference in word ordering.12
The above discussion allows us to be quite precise when we discuss where the
Agent argument appears in a sentence; it can found, pretty reliably, in the external
argument, or subject, position. Other argument types appear there only when there
noun) is expected in final, rather than initial, position: in an old man, man is taken as the noun,








i. e. making the noun (man) the complement of the adjective (old), with the adjective the head,
thus creating an AP (adjective phrase) rather than an NP.
12Here’s the analysis of the Japanese sentence and its English translation. At the risk of turning
away the reader who is used to reading parse trees, we’d like to present the English translation
first as a series of bracketed forms into which new words are inserted—not the way you’d want to
read these things in general, admittedly; but the standard tree forms seem to make things a bit
too easy to read (it seems to us), possibly making it harder to think about how the words might
be gathered together to form the full utterance.
For the English sentence, the new words are almost always inserted (given this particular sen-
tence), and as is often the case (for English sentences in general, depending to some degree on
the details of one’s theory), into the far lower right corner of the tree; the rightward branching is
already suggested in the small trees given earlier (71 and later). (We’ll come back to the lines below
marked ().) The only complication is the phrase to Hanako, which is an arguent not of himself, or
of a picture, but of showed, thus grouping with a word a little farther back in the sentence.
39
is no Agent role—with the exception of a rather special construction (in English):
the passive, to which we will return later. Unfortunately, it is much harder to specify
with equal accuracy what happens in the internal argument positions; i. e. where in
[Tarō ]
()[ ... [is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]]
[ ... [... [thinking ]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [Hiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]]]]]
()[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [showed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ ... [... [picture ] ]]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ .... [ ... [... [ ... [of . . . . . . . ]] ]]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ ... [... [ ... [... himself]] ]]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ ... [... [ ... [... ... ]] [to . . . . . . . ]]]]]]]]
[ ... [... [ ... [ ... [ ... [ ... [... [ ... [... ... ]] [... Hanako]]]]]]]]
[Tarō [is [thinking [that [Hiro [showed [ a [picture [of himself]] [to Hanako]]]]]]]]
The structure into which to Hanako is inserted is in fact harder to read in this form; there’s also,
possibly, more room for disagreement here as to what the structure should be. On one instantiation
of X-bar theory, the branching should be binary; the tree form of this fragment, though, as we

























Note that the complication here is with the placement of an argument of a verb; the complication
exists because of the ability of verbs to take more than one internal argument, and that’s one of
the things that makes them the target of this study.
Of course, to build these phrases one has to know what the apparent phrase-structuring rules of
the language are. In fact, almost all of the phrases exemplify a head being attached to a phrase
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general does a Goal, Source, Patient, or a Theme appear in a sentence.





(its complement) to make a larger phrase, as in the left-hand side of the following chart.
English Japanese
head complement complement head
is [thinking ...] [... omette] iru
thinking [that ...] [... to] omette
that [Hiro ...] [Hiro ...] to
showed [a picture] [syasin-o] miseta
The English prepositions (corresponding to Japanese postpositions) are also part of the head
parameter setting, and the cross-language comparisons, though we left them off the chart because
at least some of them in Japanese are treated as attaching to their complements like suffixes
English Japanese
head complement complement head
of (him)self zibun no
to Hanako Hanako ni
The structure of the original Japanese (partially built from the right-hand side of the charts above)
is harder to grasp written out like the English—and harder to write out as well, given the less-
orderly bracketing. So here’s the tree-form (reverting to the simpler labels of the first tree, 71); it
makes things clear that almost every new word of the Japanese sentence, instead of being attached
to the lower-right corner as in English, effectively causes parts of the already existing tree to be
pushed down into new subtrees growing down toward the left.
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A Goal may also be a subject:
(77) The cloth
︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed most of the liquid.
Goal
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) state without further comment that Patients
are known to be realized as direct objects; Pesetsky (1995) is a bit more cautious,












































(CP = complementizer phrase, PP = adpositional phrase (postpositional in Japanese, prepositional
in English), AuxP = auxiliary verb phrase; we’ll mostly only need to consider PPs in what follows)
As for the lines marked () in the English version of the sentence, these are lines in which a
subject is joined to its verb phrase; since Japanese matches English at this point (as do almost
all languages), but doesn’t match elsewhere, the point of alignment ends up only adding to the
confusion (of the non- Japanese-speaker, that is). An example fragment of Japanese that lacks
any subjects (as Baker gives elsewhere, in fact—Baker 2003) can look quite simple in tree form:
everything may just branch down to the left, in mirror image of the English.
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certain exceptions’ in verbs of motion (Pesetsky 1995, p. 11, inc. footnote 2). But
our rob and steal examples show that both claims are problematic. They can’t be
maintained unless one asserts that the victim from whom something is stolen is
less a patient than the victim who is robbed of something. Levin and Rappaport
Hovav’s assumption implies that only rob’s argument is construed as a Patient; or
else, neither of the verbs have Patient arguments.13
1.3 Polysemy
One of the interesting things about language is that, for most of us, we know thou-
sands of words, but there isn’t a single one of them that is completely of our own
invention. Effectively, in order to refer to things (and actions and ideas) by name,
we are entirely dependent on other people to show us what those names are; and
on the rare ocasion that one of us does coin a word, it’s often done in the most
artificial way: we’ll think of a descriptive phrase and pick out the first letters of its
words, i. e. forming an acronym; or simply re-use some arbitrary, pre-existing word
13There are complications in assigning Agents to subject position, too. A sentence like
(i) You can buy a pretty decent meal here for $20
has Agent in subjet position, as expected; but the sentence can be paraphrased as
(ii) $20 buys you a pretty decent meal here
in which the former subject seems to have been demoted to a Beneficiary (compare 60, 63). (An-
other example: doing this should buy us some time.) In other languages this type of construction
might be more problematic; Callies (2006) discusses difficulties German speakers have encountered
in trying to learn the English construction.
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and make up a relevant acronym for it. Or we’ll borrow a word from some language
conventionally respected for such borrowings, such as Latin or Greek.14
As for the already existing words, and as we mentioned briefly earlier (p. 17),
almost all of them are effectively ‘re-used’ for a variety of purposes, sometimes
related and sometimes not, often without us noticing that such ‘re-use’ is going on.
A simple sentence like
(78) John put some books on the table
is trivial for us to process, but its words will generally have other, very different
uses. So there’s the noun books, as above, but also the verb, as in
(79) He books all his flights online.
Table of course can also be used as a verb, as in: enter something into a (different
kind of) table; or as in: remove it from the agenda. And so on. So here’s another way
in which the mapping from labels (John, books, table, etc.) to concepts seems quite
messy; some concepts seem to share labels because the concepts have something in
common, while others share them purely by accident—or it might as well be that
14True inventiveness in words is probably rarer than most people think, because the mere deriva-
tion of new words from old ones (using an old word in a new category—a noun as a verb, for
instance) is also often considered a new coining; supposed word-coiners like Shakespeare are just
word-derivers, most of the time. (Hope (1999) in noting laced as a verb (from the noun, from
French) and unlived for killed (Lucrece, 1754); “Shakespeare was almost uniquely positioned to
take advantage of the variation offered by Early Modern English” i. e. before “standardization gave
way to prescriptivism”.)
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way (you hail a taxi, and hail also falls from the sky). Lakoff (1987) refers to certain
label-sharing by related concepts as ‘motivated’: it’s not necessarily predictable (in
Lakoff’s view), but it’s not entirely arbitrary either. And yet we are proposing that
there is a great deal of systematicity here.15
Things can get even more complicated with other labels, depending on how
rich and complex the interaction between the world and the entity primarily picked
out by the label is. Take for instance the label string, and the fact that things
can be positioned into a string-like arrangement (string them together); strings, or
string-like things, can be attached to things (string the guitar), or removed (string
the beans). And there are other string-like arrangements that dictionary-builders
will tend to see as distinct senses, such as the stretching out of something, like a
string; and there are other kinds of attachment that might seem special, such as for
the purpose of binding something up.
15Note, too, the way that this complicates things for parsing. The reader probably had no
trouble at all parsing the last example sentence (79). But why was it so easy? The phrase all his
flights online could refer to some sort of online simulation, as in
(i) The disks all his flights online were stored on were erased by accident.
Note, too, that we sometimes refer to macho men as he men. Is it farfetched to think there might
be he books? Perhaps it is. But it probably isn’t easy to get an artificial system to recognize
distinctions like that and act accordingly. And a system that considers the possibility that he
books might be a phrase like he men could attempt to pair it with a phrase beginning all his flights
online, as is done with the disks (i), and the parser wouldn’t know it had a problem until it reached
the end of the sentence (79) and found no more words to complete the sentence. A system that, in
spite of sentences like this one, manages to parse with ease the earlier example (79) might be doing
a wonderful job of capturing the human sentence processing capabilities, or it might have just been
succeeding with the simple sentences only because it tends to fail with the more complicated ones.
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Different entities will have different ranges of use at any point in time, of
course. Circular arrangements can be requested (circle the wagons), and drawn
around things (circle the correct answer). Since circle names a path of a particular
shape, one can (apparently) also use the label to describe a movement along a
path of that shape; circle the wagons could also mean: go around the wagons. It
could even mean: place a circle on each of the wagons. And though it might strain
our imaginations, we can’t discount the possibility that circle the wagons, in some
special situation, might mean doing something else involving some sort of circle;
perhaps it could even mean: remove a particular circular object from each wagon.
These conflict with the idiomatic use of the phrase, and may thoroughly strain
our imaginations, but there isn’t necessarily any reason why the language couldn’t
support them. So far, then, it may be that the only significant difference between
string and circle, in spite of the major differences in how they are commonly used, is
in the ‘movement along a path’ sense (as in circle the building, meaning: go around
the building). String appears to lack a comparable use; perhaps because it isn’t
conceived of as a ‘real’ shape, whatever that would mean—nor as the right kind of
path.
The above examples are relatively easy to spot just by thinking of different
ways of using a verb, and noting if they seem obviously different in meaning. Other
closely related senses of a word are much more subtle in their relationships, and
harder to spot in English than in other languages. Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(1995, p. 181) make this point with the following Hungarian example (taken from
Moravcsik 1978, p. 257; the gloss element -ACC is for the accusative case ending,
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which marks the noun phrase that is the direct object of the verb):
(80a) János rámázolta a festéket a falra.
b) John onto-smeared-he-it the paint-ACC the wall-onto
c) ‘John smeared paint on the wall.’
(81a) János bemázolta a falat festékkel.
b) John in-smeared-he-it the wall-ACC paint-with
c) ‘John smeared the wall with paint.’
Here we have a case of an English verb smear that can realize its arguments in two
different ways; the Hungarian equivalents, however, use two different verb forms,
taking the prefixes rá- or be-. Compare next our earlier example of the verb fill
in use (40), referring to an event of moving some substance into some container.
Another example of fill being used in the same way:
(82) The scientists filled the space with pure oxygen.
But as we saw early on (Fig. 1.1), fill can also refer to the mere state of something
being in a particular relation to a container:
(83) Pure oxygen (completely) fills this space.
But, as we saw, not all eventive verbs have a stative sense, and vice versa. Native
speakers of English don’t accept the sentence
(84) *The card inserts this slot.
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as a valid alternative of the (stative) The card is in the slot. Insert lacks a stative
use—and this, too, would count as a different sense of the word. I. e., insert is
polysemous: it has multiple senses.16
1.4 The category Verb
So far, in laying out some of the basic elements of this work, we’ve been looking at
some of the core ideas of argument realization and of polysemy, sketching certain
ways in which we might think of the concepts we express in language as being
encoded in our minds—thus providing, by implication, a guide to how the computer
scientist should encode them in order to get similar behavior from a natural language
system. In the next chapter, we’ll discuss polysemy a little more, and note a couple
of additional phenomena that either further complicate, or provide more clues for,
the problem we are investigating. Meanwhile, we may have appeared to be taking
it for granted (in the above discussion of predication) that the language element at
the ‘heart’ of such predications is always a verb—and also be taking it for granted
that the reader knows what it means for something to be a verb. We’ll use a brief
note on this, and on a few other complications in the mapping from concepts into
16The sentence for fill (83) includes the optional modifier completely to help pick out the stative,
rather than the eventive, interpretation—the nonagentive, eventive interpretation being elicited
with something like
Pure oxygen slowly filled the space.
Events can be further subdivided—though we won’t do so here, unfortunately, in spite of its
relevance to the kinds of constructions a verb can appear in; a subclassification into activities,
achievements, or accomplishments is found in Vendler (1957).
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language, to close the chapter.
Actually, there is precedence for taking it for granted that the reader knows
what a verb is, even among linguistics. Baker (2005), speaking from his own experi-
ence, suggests that even the typical linguistics program leaves its students with an
idea of what a verb is that isn’t much deeper than whatever they knew coming into
the program. He’s engaging in a bit of hyperbole, presumably, since the language
student will surely learn a lot more about the appearance of verbs in different lan-
guages, and of the environments in which they appear; but it’s a different matter
to come up with an actual definition of what a verb is. One introductory textbook
(Fromkin and Rodman 1993, in the glossary) gives:
Verb: The syntactic category of words that function as the heads of
Verb Phrases ...
This of course leads you to search for the entry for Verb Phrase, for which a modest
experience with glossaries and dictionaries will allow you to see a circularity coming:
Verb Phrase: A syntactic category of expressions containing a verb
and, possibly, other elements such as a Noun Phrase ...
Baker, however, shows that a lot of work is needed to come up with a better defi-
nition. There are a number of features of verbs that should interest us here, given
our concerns, i. e. with the mapping from concepts into language. The first issue
shows up in the simplistic grammar-school notion of syntactic categories, which de-
scribe a noun as a “person, place, or thing” and a verb as that which names the
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“action”. These of course aren’t quite correct: destruction is a noun that names
a particular kind of action, and know is a verb that describes a state (the state of
having knowledge of something) rather than an action; and we saw a moment ago
(83, p. 47) how the verb fill can describe a state rather than an event. Nonetheless,
these highly approximate associations have gotten some attention for their possible
psychological significance: within theories of language acquisition, the notion of se-
mantic bootstrapping (Pinker 1984) relies on hypothesized innate associations like
the above as a guide to the learning of language.
On the practical matter of identifying syntactic categories, Pullum (2004)
makes the nice point concerning nouns (and pointing further to Huddleston and
Pullum (2002)), that in trying to decipher an unfamiliar language, searching for the
words that name persons, places, or things is a good way of looking for examples
of the category noun; but the converse (that a noun is a person, place, or thing)
doesn’t hold, as we have just seen. The situation with verbs is more complicated
though, since, while looking for words that name events might also be a good first
stab at finding a possible verb, it will sometimes get you a noun like destruction
instead. For many languages you can refine your search by looking for evidence of
affixes on the potential verbs; thus in English, one would hopefully eventually figure
out that learn gets marked as a verb in some sentences by virtue of the endings like
ing, s, and ed, as in
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(85) Jill is learning French.
(86) Jill learns new things easily.
(87) Jill learned about that yesterday.
(Though these things aren’t foolproof either, of course.) And there may be other
formal criteria that could delineate what a verb in a particular language is, accord-
ing to a particular language (the main verb of a Japanese sentence being at the
very end, with just a couple of exceptions—to take the simplest example). Thus,
Fromkin and Rodman (1993), in giving a purely structural definition, were being
quite reasonable, though circular.
And in fact, Baker (2005) gives a structural definition: verbs are simply the
syntactic category that takes an external argument. (Or more precisely, they have
a specifier, above p. 37.) Certainly, for us, argumenthood is the key thing: the
fact that the concepts expressed by verbs may need more than one argument is one
of the things that makes possible the complications in argument realization (and
polysemy) that (we claim) will allow us to discover interesting things about the
way concepts are encoded. Prepositions take arguments, too; but to us they are not
nearly as interesting for a couple of reasons. First, the overall syntactic environment
available to a preposition is simpler than a verb’s—possibly much, much simpler.
Semantically, many prepositions seem to take two or ever three (logical) arguments:
they can be used to express the notion that one element is in, on, over or under
another element, etc., or that one element is between a second element and a third.
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The second and third elements are expressed as a single phrase, however—between
[the bookcase and the wall ]—thus they’re a single ‘internal argument’ syntactically
speaking, i. e. the complement of the preposition. By comparison, we shall see (in
Table 3.2, p. 103) at least a dozen different kinds of cases where many, many verbs
similarly express two logical arguments as a single syntactic (internal) argument;
but in each of those cases they have an alternate way of expressing things, in which
the two logical arguments are given as distinct syntactic arguments (possibly). (We
say ‘possibly’ because if we were to follow Baker (2005), we would call some of the
‘arguments’, given in Table 3.2 as PPs, obligatory adjuncts instead.) Baker even
argues that, unlike verbs, prepositions really have no specifier: something like We
found [the book (to be) difficult ] is considered to contain the book difficult as a small
clause (Stowell 1983) even when the verb to be is omitted; Baker argues something
similar for the book on the table. (I. e. there’s an unpronounced predicative element
before the PP on the table without which, according to Baker, the PP wouldn’t be
able to modify book.)
In any case, a second property of prepositions renders the issue of their precise
syntactic nature considerably less important: they’re a closed-class category. I. e.
there are only a small, fixed number of them. Language users don’t routinely invent
new prepositions the way they invent verbs and nouns, for instance. (Take a couple
of common words to name, say, a new shipping company, form a one-word abbre-
viation for that name, and the result can often easily be a new verb: they decided
to fedex the package. See Levin’s (1993) Class 11.1 verbs.) Computationally, then,
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prepositions (and postpositions) are not as interesting.17






, and it was shocking to see.
Agent Patient
17The complications we saw earlier in the different ways of decomposing a verb’s meaning also
arise with the concept expressed by a verb combined with a preposition. There may be other ways
of ‘cutting up’ the concept (or: of labeling it in words), as can be seen in the following sentences,
(rough) paraphrases of one another:
(i) They went across the bridge on foot.
(ii) They crossed the bridge on foot.
(iii) They walked across the bridge.
Three core semantic elements expressed in each sentence (displacement, manner of locomotion,
and path) are distributed across verbs (go, cross, walk), a preposition (across), or an idiom (on
foot) in different combinations.
For various reasons, decompositions like the above won’t be available in all languages: languages
differ in how they combine the core motion and manner of motion components of concepts (satellite-
vs. verb-framed languages, Talmy 1985, as anticipated in other kinds of work, i. e. in the chassé
croisé of Vinay and Darbelnet 1958, as Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995 mention). In French,
two of the above sentences are problematic; only the sentence using the verb cross (ii) can be
directly translated into French. (French really has no preposition meaning across .) Slobin (1996)
found manner components were usually dropped translating from the text of a satellite-frame
language (English) to that of a verb-framed language (Spanish). Incidentally, one can’t assume
that dictionary makers will warn users of these ‘holes’ in a language (speaking again of the lack of
a word for across in French). Cassell’s (Girard 1962) lists à travers as a translation of across ; use
that (mis-)translation, and you’ll likely express the idea of going through something rather than
across it.
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was shocking to see.
Patient Agent
The arguments of the verb (88) also can appear as modifiers of the noun (89). The
real variety in argument realization appears with the verbs, however; and eventive
nouns are often derived from verbs, as destruction is, i. e. from destroy. So our study
will focus exclusively on verbs.
These last examples, however, being pretty close paraphrases of one another,
remind us that there were additional things missing from our Prolog-style represen-
tations given earlier. A first approximate encoding of the above examples might be
something like
(90) shock(destroy(city, invaders), )
which might more directly represent something like
(91) The invaders’ destruction of the city shocked everyone.
or
(92) The invaders’ destruction of the city was shocking.
Note the demotion of shock from a direct verbal use (91) to an expression of an
attribute of the destruction (92). We could expand the last example, and previous
examples, to
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(93) The invaders’ destruction of the city was shocking to everyone.
bringing it more or line with the other one (91). (The is the standard Prolog
variable that roughly speaking binds to anything, hence the interpretation here as
everyone.) Note that the argument requirements of the verb shock seem to more
strongly want the explicit expression of everyone (in 91), or of another phrase in
its place; with the other realizations of the semantic representation it is easier to
leave that piece of the concept unexpressed. Again, it’s the verb that has the more
complicated requirements.18 ,19
18Actually, Levin lists shock as an instance of a verb that doesn’t always need an object, giving
the example that movie always shocks (Levin 1993, p. 38). So the difference here is a matter of
degree.
19As for the representations, we’re still leaving out all sorts of details; we need something other
than the variable in
know(destroy(property, ), john)).
to represent forms such as:
John knows about the destruction of the property.
John knows that someone destroyed the property.
John knows that someone destroys property.
John knows about the event in which someone or something destroyed the property.
—all of which have crucial semantic distinctions—and of which language evidently supplies
the means to make those distinctions (with know being special—there being a difference be-
tween events and knowing about the event, requiring an encoding of situations (Barwise 1981,
Barwise and Perry 1983) or events themselves (Higginbotham 1983, Davidson 1967).)
And of course, the possibility of nominalization exists here, too:
John’s knowledge of the destruction of the property bothered him.
John’s knowledge of the property’s destruction bothered him.
bother(john, know(destroy(property, someone), john)).
55
As one more example of the complications in the mapping from concepts into
language, we should note that the syntax can have other, more drastic effects on
what gets expressed. We’re thinking about the forced appearance of an apparent
argument where the underlying predicate wouldn’t require one: e. g. from the ap-
parent need in English (and French and German, but not Spanish or Italian, etc.)
for an explicit subject. This causes a dummy word to appear in subject position,
because the underlying predicate doesn’t have anything it needs to express—as in
it’s raining, which logically might be considered a way of saying rain is falling, and
thus given a comparable representation that is predicated of something, namely,
‘rain’ (i. e. fall(rain))—though Jackendoff, for one, seems a bit reluctant to do
so (Jackendoff 2002, p. 135). If we think of that as its structure, then, lacking
any logical argument to express—the entity ‘rain’ is already named by the verb—
a meaningless it appears in subject position of the sentence. This complication
might be bigger than it seems at first. From one point of view, it looks like syntax
in English (and French and German) may tempt us into thinking a verb takes an
argument, when the underlying predicate might not really need one, at least hypo-
thetically. (And the syntax may in fact cause the dummy subject to take on some
of the properties of a real subject; Pesetsky (1995) and Chomsky (1981) argue that
it is a quasi-argument, and Bolinger (1972) calls it an ‘ambient it ’.) From another
viewpoint, it’s clear that the lexicalization process is the real problem here: we are
able to cover all of fall(rain) with the verb rain, even thought it has two distinct
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parts; the pronouncement rain is falling would be a perfectly direct reflection of
that conceptualization, but the one we routinely give, it’s raining, seems to obscure
that (possible) encoding.20
20See Baker (2001, p. 39) for some discussion of the rich syntactic consequences of the dummy
subject (also apparently parameterized in language), especially as it can be linked to cross-language
differences, depending on whether one needs an overt subject (as in English) or not (as in Italian):
Chi credi che verrà?
Who think-you that come-will?
‘Who do you think *that will come?’
(Chomsky 1981, Perlmutter 1971, Rizzi 1982, Kayne 1984)
—the word that being obligatorily supressed in English.
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Chapter 2
The extent of the mapping
Given that thousands of lexical entries are affected, and in (seemingly) individual
ways, the complications in the expression of concepts that we introduced in the
preceding pages would, if widespread, certainly make things (appear) messy: words
have multiple meanings, thanks to polysemy, and semantically similar words can
appear in completely different syntactic configurations, thanks to variations in ar-
gument realization—which is really just a one instance of how more-or-less identical
concepts can be ‘cut up’ by language (i. e. have their parts map into language) in
different ways. (The reader who—reasonably—is skeptical of just how widespread
these divergences are, given the data we’ve presented so far, will get a lot more data
in the next chapter.) From a computational viewpoint, however, this messiness by
itself could simply make things far less interesting: if things really are just random,
they just have to be stored in the lexicon, arbitrary piece by arbitrary piece.
Except, of course, it isn’t clear that things like this could ever be ‘just random’,
as we noted—given the existence of semi-regular patterns, among, for instance, the
irregular verbs. So we’re back to the question of the degree to which things are more
than just random. And those semi-regular patterns (if that’s what they are) are,
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we will argue, a big piece of the puzzle. Or rather, the relationship between two
big parts of that puzzle-piece—namely, the patterns in argument realization and in
polysemy—is a crucial clue, as we will show, to the degree to which native speakers
of a language can extrapolate beyond the individual word-behaviors they are most
familiar with, thus potentially providing evidence of the productive processes that
might lie behind the apparent semi-regularities. In this chapter, we’ll look a bit
more deeply into some of the issues concerning those possible regularities, and at
words themselves, and their meanings.
2.1 Productivity
We suggested earlier (p. 44) that we could think of polysemy as the re-use of words
for semantically similar concepts. We might also think of the syntactic patterns in
which words appear as if they were frequent candidates for re-use. At first this seems
silly or naive, especially in light of the work leading to X-bar theory, and more-or-less
building on it, which strives to understand the larger syntactic patterns in terms of
their more basic components and combinatory principles—though nowadays this ‘re-
use’ of patterns might also be seen as something akin to the constructional approach
taken in certain language acquisition work (i. e. Tomasello 2003, with the possible
caveat that the constructions are originally associated with particular words, etc.).
In any case, simply as a matter of convenience, it may be useful to think of things
in that way, at least initially, given the way that verbs seem to ‘share’ different
constructions. The link to language acquisition, justified or not, is also interesting
59
in light of the behavior of mature speakers of a language. Take for instance the
verb fax , which is a fairly new verb (newly in widespread use, at least); one might
imagine not so long ago that a speaker might have first heard it being used in a
sentence such as
(94) He faxed that resume to at least a hundred companies.
By a sentence ‘such as’ the above, we mean one where a particular element of
the underlying concept—here, the entities that are being the faxed the documents
(we’ll consider it another instance of a Recipient argument)—are always named
in a phrase headed by a particular word, namely to (i. e. to at least a hundred
companies). Even if you had only heard the word ıfax being used in that way, one
can reasonably predict that you might find yourself saying sentences like either of
the following
(95) I faxed them the document yesterday.
(96) I faxed the document to them yesterday.
even though the ordering of terms in the second part of the sentence is inverted,
and in the first sentence (95) the word to is missing. As a native speaker of English,
you probably know (seemingly intuitively) that this other way of expressing the
elements of the sentence is available, even if you have never heard it being used with
the word fax. (One’s personal intuitions about the productivity of the construction
(95) can’t be trusted, of course, since the verb is probably already familiar in that
construction. Recall, though, that verbs like fax can be made up on the fly (as with
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fedexing a package, see p. 52), and when these made-up verbs can appear in the
construction (95), the possible productivity of the above example with fax follows
immediately.)
And yet this construction is not available for just any verb—
(97) *She said him something.
(98) She said something to him.
—the first construction (97) being one that a native speaker of English would not
normally use with the word say (nor, of course, its (irregular) past tense form
said). ((97) is to (95) is to (98) as to (96).) It’s an instance of ‘Baker’s paradox’
(Baker 1979, and earlier Green 1974) as described by Pinker (1989).
In other ways it is taken for granted that a language has highly productive ways
of combining various elements into larger structures, in order to express more and
more concepts; language makes ‘infinite use of finite means’ (von Humboldt 1836
as cited by Chomsky 1965). There are a number of ways in which one can pile up
certain kinds words or phrases, without any fixed limit, to create ever-large phrases.
In the area of suffixation, there are straightforward cases of productivity, too (in
this case creating new words of a finite number of affixes, though); as soon as a
native speaker of English hears someone saying that they had just faxed a document,
without even knowing what it means to fax something, they might immediately be
able to say e. g.—
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(99) Are we going to be, er, ‘faxing’ other things later?
—the +ing suffix (underlined below) being fully productive, attaching to all English
verbs to give the progressive form (even for the verb be, with all its other irregular
forms, italicized below):
(100) I am being careful. I was feeling sarcastic.
(101) She is saying something. She was noticing the effects.
(102) You are looking better. They were seeing stars.
The problem now is that with something like the English past tense suffix
(+ed), deviations that block its application are limited—only about 130 of the
thousands of English verbs have an irregular form, i. e. one not formed simply by
adding +ed (Pinker 1998). Thus there is a clear case of an apparent default rule
(which isn’t fully productive, unlike the +ing suffix), and a handful of exceptions.
In any case, the (apparent) idiosyncrasies we will be looking at (distinguishing
e. g. fax from say, according to the constructions they appear in, as above) are
clearly more complicated: they’re spread over so much of the data that the rules
that come to mind often have a limited application, and it may seem like much of
what we want to handle are just ‘exceptions’ to those rules (if ‘rules’ is even the
right term); each verb (as we’ve been promising) is close to unique.
And yet we will indeed be arguing here that the level of productivity in lan-
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guage has been under-estimated up until now. Certain mechanisms that are thought
to be only semi-productive might actually deserve to be considered, with important
caveats, fully productive. (The problem is that productivity is necessarily defined
with respect to particular conditions; if the conditions are given too broadly, then
the mechanism will appear to be only semi-productive. The above examples show
that it would be patently false to say, regarding the oblique dative dative construc-
tion (which is what is being used in 96), that all that all verbs expressing their
arguments in that construction also use a double object construction (used in 95);
what about all such verbs that don’t sound latinate? Closer to the truth (discussions
in Pinker 1994), but still not completely true. Should we conclude that this is some-
thing that is only semi-productive? We really aren’t in a position to support that
yet—all we really know for sure is that we don’t yet know how to form a productive
rule.)
2.2 A connection?
So verbs vary in the way they realize their arguments, vary in the range of arguments
they take—sometimes reflecting a subtle variations in meaning (due to polysemy),
as between a stative sense of fill (e. g. 103) and a nonstative one (104)—
(103≈83) The audience completely fills the room.
(104≈40) The audience quickly filled the room.
—and nonetheless the verbs may exhibit patterns in their behavior (more on this in
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subsequent chapters) that suggest that there are productive forces behind this.
We have presented examples of these phenomena (argument realization, pol-
ysemy, and productivity) as if they were essentially complications in the mapping
from concepts to words—and we’ve only begun to show just how messy that map-
ping can appear; in fact, though, we are going to attempt to show that there is
a way of looking at the first two phenomena (argument realization and polysemy)
such that it will become apparent that, together, they offer evidence of a hidden
systematicity, for which (we will argue) a very nice and reasonable explanation ex-
ists: namely, that there are mechanisms underlying those phenomena that are in
fact highly productive.
None of which is intended to suggest that the idea is new that, taken together
or viewed separately, argument realization and polysemy can offer clues to the way
language works; on the contrary, lots and lots of work in linguistics in recent years
implicitly takes that to be the case. Comparisons of the different range of arguments
that a verb takes, the general meaning of the verb with the different arguments, and
how those arguments are realized, is standard practice, especially for people looking
at lexical semantics and/or the interface between semantics and syntax; we’ll see
some examples of this from Levin (1993), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), and
Jackendoff (1990). But the degree to which such connections can be systematically
found (specifically, between the range and type of arguments a verb takes, and how
they are realized) does not seem to have been properly studied. There are substantial
attempts to regularize the system; a late chapter of Jackendoff (1990) specifically is
aimed at trying to make his lexical entries as ‘minimalist’ as possible—‘minimalist’
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entries being, in this context, ones that specify phonological structure, part of speech
information, conceptual structure, and nothing else. (Thus verb argument realiza-
tion would have to following automatically from those minimalist elements, i. e.
mostly from the conceptual structures, i. e. the meaning of the verb.) But in general
the productivity of systems proposed are judged only with respect to a handful of
particular mechanisms; Jackendoff himself concludes, as we shall see, that a lot of
stuff just needs to be stipulated in the lexicon. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)
make similarly pessimistic statements, suggesting w. r. t. e. g. bleed and burp, as we
saw earlier, that the causative uses
(105=10) The doctor bled the patient.
(106=11) The father burped the baby.
are simply idiosyncratic—not the result of some regular process. One thing that
seems to be lacking is a broad-scale look at how often things are idiosyncratic,
and when they are, how deeply so—an important issue for anyone trying to store
the necessary information on a word-by-word basis for the thousands of words of
a language, and trying to build all the right machinery on top of all those lexical
entries.
Levin’s categorization of verbs (Levin 1993), the data of which forms the basis
for the present work, is largely based—almost entirely based, for the first part of
Levin’s book—on divergences in argument realization or polysemy. Levin presents
a number of divergences such as the one we just gave above comparing fax and say ;
here are the examples again with a few more verbs inserted.
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(107≈95) I faxed/mailed/sent/... them the document yesterday.
(108≈96) I faxed/mailed/sent/... the document to them yesterday.
(109=98) She said/stated/asserted/... something to him.
(110=97) *She said/stated/asserted/... him something.
Levin then lists other verbs of similar (or not so similar) meanings that behave sim-
ilarly with respect to that divergence. (We’ll introduce more of Levin’s comparisons
in the next chapter.) Levin focuses on apparent semantic commonalities, which is
reasonable, because there is an assumption that there is a strong degree of semantic
determination to the way verbs behave; but the data seems sufficiently messy that
just how strong a factor semantics is, and how it plays out, has been hard to define.
But that focus, we suspect, has led to something being missed. If semantics
forms an essential, if hard to delineate, basis to argument realization and patterns of
polysemy, other questions should arise, which might be easier to (partially) answer.
Such as: what is the ‘general shape’ of the relation between argument realization
and polysemy? I. e., to what degree are divergences in the one reflected in the
other? The latter question is especially interesting for one very practical reason: it
should be possible to figure out more-or-less the degree to which the divergences in
the two phenomena correlate with one another without first solving the much more
difficult problem of how both the phenomena actually operate. That idea, and its
follow-through in the pages that follow, is the contribution of this thesis.
We introduced our hypothesis connecting these two phenomena in Fig. 1.1, p.
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10, but without naming the phenomena; we’ve also been more-or-less presenting the
connecting data points of the two phenomena in many of our examples, but usually
without making the connection explicit. Put and fill, we saw, seem to diverge in
argument realization:
(111=37) *They put clothes in the bags.
(112=40) *They filled the bags with clothes.
(We say they seem to diverge because, as we discussed earlier (Sect. 1.2) we don’t
really know if we should consider them as expressing the same types of arguments,
as far as argument realization is concerned, e. g. {Agent, Theme, Goal}, or somewhat
different arguments (e. g. Goal the bags vs. something like Goal-Path in the bags).)
We also saw that the verb insert patterns more like put than fill :
(113=41) *They inserted the cards into the slots.
(114=42) *They inserted the slots with the cards.
As it happens, these verbs pattern differently in polysemy, too. Put, like insert , and
like pour (from Fig. 1.1), lacks a stative sense comparable to fill ’s.
(115≈83) *Air (completely) fills this space.
(116)=84 *Air completely pours this space.
(117=84) *The card inserts this slot.
(118)=84 *The card puts this slot.
As the reader will have gathered by now, we are arguing that this is not just a
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coincidence. From the data we will present in the chapters that follow, and our
subsequent analysis, we will argue (Sect. 5.3.1) that all such divergences will be
accompanied by a similar correspondence, given the appropriate notion of what a
divergence is (and some careful consideration of what a ‘similar correspondence’ is).
This is our ‘Rule of co-occurrences’.
2.3 Polysemy, homonymy, and synonymy
Our prior discussions of polysemy touched only briefly on an important complica-
tion: though a verb’s behaviors may appear to diverge because it can be used to
express slightly different concepts, it’s also possible that the concepts it expresses
are essentially unrelated, sharing the same name effectively by accident. We gave
the example earlier of the two words given as hail (p. 45); another example is
the word that refers to a certain action of attaching, possibly involving the use of
small nail-like hardware, vs. the one involving maneuvering a sailboat—both actions
known as tacking. Thanks to these complications, we will sometimes have to decide
whether we are dealing with two senses of a verb expressing different arguments, or
two different verbs that are really unrelated (except by their pronunciation and/or
spelling); in the latter case we can basically ignore any differences in argument re-
alization, since we have no particular reason to expect two semantically unrelated
verbs to behave the same. The curious reader can take an early peek at Appendix
A (pp. 209–212) for a particular list of such verbs; they comprise the (relatively
small) portion of Levin’s (1993) set of 3000+ verbs which (we decided) we could not
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reasonably take as being semantically related, given the main task of this research;
first, however, there are a few definitions that we need to present.
2.3.1 Mapping from labels to words to senses
At first glance, then, the mapping from concepts into language would seem to be
many-to-many: thinking now in terms of the written forms of words for concrete-
ness, we have verb pairs spelled with the strings rob and steal that seem to map to
the same concept, while different concepts—i. e. slightly different senses of a word, or
totally unrelated concepts—can map to the same strings, as we just saw in the case
of hail and tack . Viewed from one direction (and attempting to directly reuse the
traditional terminology), we could focus on the different concepts that just happen
to be expressed with the same word (they’re homonyms, having the same name);
or from the other direction, we could focus on the single word that gets attached
to different concepts—i. e., different meanings (thus the word is polysemous, having
multiple senses). But worked out in detail, it’s really more complicated than just
a many-to-many mapping. First, we will follow here the convention of positing an
indirect mapping, from names to an abstract thing, and from the abstract thing to
concepts; the abstract thing might in fact be considered the word. Homonymy and
polysemy are then two completely separate mappings; homonymy, ‘coming first’ in
Fig. 2.1, being accidental (mapping from labels Li to words Wj), polysemy being
potentially regular (mapping from words Wj to the senses whose expression is rep-
resented by the edges going to the different Sk). One can infer from the picture that
what we are thinking of here as ‘labels’ (L1 and L2 in the picture) can be consid-
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ered simply the spoken or written forms of words. Thus W2 and W3 are two words
(homonyms) that just happen to have the same pronunciation L2 (perhaps tow and
toe, to give another example); or possibly the same spelling (like the bank you trust
your money to, vs. the bank that lines a river). The edges leading to S1 and S2
represent the expression of the two senses of (polysemous) W1 (with edges to S3 and
S4, similarly, representing the expression of the senses of W3). The Cj represent the
particular ways in which verbs realize their arguments. To present another example
divergence: suppose, for the sake of the argument, that cover and lay share an Sk
that simply represents the putting of something somewhere—or perhaps, more nar-
rowly, the putting of something on top of something; then they would have distinct
Cj , since they realize that putative Sk differently, as the following examples show.
(119a) *They covered the blanket over the child.
b) *They covered the child with the blanket.
(120a) *They laid the blanket over the child.
b) *They laid the child with the blanket. (Intended to = 120a)
Note the extra verbiage in the previous paragraph about ‘expressing the senses
of Wj ’; we did not simply say that the Sk are the senses of the various Wj . This
is because it isn’t completely clear what the formal definition of a sense should be
here; and there are further complications stemming from the notion of of synonymy,
which we’ve also attempted to represent in Fig. 2.1. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (1993) defines synonyms simply as words that mean the same or the














































Figure 2.1: Homonymy vs. polysemy. Homonymy potentially appears in the map-
ping from Li to Wj , i. e. whenever an Li maps to more than one Wj ; Li can be
thought of as the written or spoken form of a word, with Wj as the word itself.
Polysemy, then, appears when a Wj maps to more than one Sk—giving rise to the
different senses of Wj . Each Cj represents the realization of an Sk by the adjacent
Wj .
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that is both useful and problematic. It’s useful, because one of the fundamental
problems that led to this research is, obviously, the existence of verbs that mean
nearly the same thing, but realize their arguments differently; in the extreme case,
and in a particular formulation that we will describe in a moment, two verbs could be
considered, in a kind of deep way, to be identical in meaning—and thus it could be
convenient to describe them as instances of true synonymy. But it’s also useful to be
able to say that true synonyms can be used interchangeably; yet, given that the verbs
that we are interested in are the ones that mean nearly the same thing but express
their arguments differently, they by definition they can’t be used interchangeably.
We showed this in our example with rob and steal :
(121=14) *They robbed the bank of $1,000,000.
(122=15) *They stole the bank of $1,000,000.
(123=16) *They stole $1,000,000 from the bank.
(124=17) *They robbed $1,000,000 from the bank.
We’ve been coming back to this example precisely because the two verbs really
do seem to express the same event (again, the defense of this claim is coming up
shortly); the other thousands of pairs we could have chosen from will tend to have
more obvious differences in meaning. For example, we saw fill and pour diverging
in their argument realizations (Fig. 1.1, p. 10), and chose them because they can in
fact be used to describe, though in a different way, the same event; but we clearly
wouldn’t normally call them synonyms, given the difference in the aspects of the
event that they pick out (i. e. with fill saying something about the placement and
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configuration of one entity with respect to another, and pour describing something
about the manner in which some substance is moving—e. g. it’s pouring out of one
location and into another).
There are, on the other hand, other sets of verbs that one also wouldn’t nor-
mally describe as synonyms, and yet there might be good reasons for doing so,
because they seem not to diverge in their argument realizations (at least as used

































With examples like this we can stress what is—for us—the utility of thematic roles,
or θ-roles. Sets of them may appear to be an odd (if traditional) way of looking at
the meaning of the verbs themselves; but note that such sets (θ-sets), though they
might seem at first like the ‘negative image’ of the verb’s meaning—they represent
a semantics in terms of the elements that have to appear with the verb, not the verb
itself—nonetheless, because they define the roles of those elements when used with
the verb, they indirectly say something about the meaning of the verb, too. The
particular set of θ-roles shown here ({Agent, Goal, Theme}) shows that they capture
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something that each of these verbs has in common (all of them are from Levin’s
(1993) verb class number 9.8, the Fill Verbs; we’ll return to the notion of a verb
class later). Each of these verbs refers (as used here) to some entity (the Agent)
putting something (the Theme) into (roughly speaking) a particular configuration
with respect to some other object (the Goal); but the particular ‘configuration’
depends on the particular verb.1
In fact, we can think of θ-sets (like {Agent, Goal, Theme}) as being a kind
of generalization of a verb’s meaning. Given a set of verbs that realize a θ-set
in the same way (as e. g. in 125), we could even think of those verbs as being
‘generalized synonyms’; all of verbs listed above (125) have obvious differences in
meaning, but at the level of generalization specified by their θ-set, they are identical,
and since they realize that θ-set in the same way, they might also be considered truly
interchangeable—at that same level of generalization, that is; i. e. one might be able
to ignore the difference between, say, coating something and filling something, if one
were only concerned with the putting of something (i. e. the Theme) somewhere with
respect to something else (i. e. the Goal). This ‘generalized synonymy’ might be
especially appropriate for the Lj that label a particular Wk, since in this case all of
the θ-sets for the Wk would be realized the same for each of the Lj; i. e., the Lj are
1This particular θ-set doesn’t by itself imply that there need be any such configurational compo-
nent to the concept expressed. (Cf. put, which we earlier gave the same θ-set to.) A constructional
approach (Goldberg 1995, Fillmore and Kay 1995) might simply assert that there is a construc-
tion giving that order to the θ-set that imparts that configurational component of meaning to the
concept expressed whenever that construction is used by verbs with the right (usually semantic)
components. We’ll define more precisely what we mean by a construction later, but we are using
the term only as a convenience—essentially, as something that gives structure to a θ-set.
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interchangeable in all of their senses (under this highly generalized sense of meaning).
We will in fact produce a number of such cases in the work that follows, because
with our system of delimiting the senses we will intentionally ignore distinctions
that seem irrelevant to the syntactic realization of a verb’s arguments, and/or the
range of senses it can express.
The case of rob and steal is interesting in a different way. Here, as we’ve been
claiming (starting on p. 25), the level of generalization is not really an issue: whether
we use general roles (Agent, Source/Patient, Theme), or extremely specific ones
(Thief, Source/Victim, Loot), rob and steal , we claim, are going to get the same
roles. This isn’t a logical necessity, of course, but one that follows from the use we
are making of the θ-roles: we have to try to identify the differences between concepts
independent of their realization in syntax, else those realizations in syntax will end
up biasing our characterizations of the semantics. This can be seen by looking at
verbs being used without all their (semantic) arguments expressed. Compare for
instance:
(126a) *They robbed me.
b) *They stole from me.
(127a) *They stole something from me.
b) *They robbed me of something.
From first appearances at least, it looks like it might be easier to find potential se-
mantic differences between the first pair (126a/b, with Theme unexpressed) than the
second pair (127a/b). One might wonder, for instance, if the argument realization
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requirements of steal somehow produce sentences that more strongly bring out the
Theme regardless of whether it is absent (126b) or not (127a): the first sentence
(126b), continuing in this line of thought, might seem to open up the possibility, in
a way that first rob sentence (126a) doesn’t (though further testing would need to
be done to confirm this), that the theft might have been habitual. (Compare, too,
the following sentences—
(128) *They robbed me for weeks.
(129) *They stole from me for weeks.
—in which one can almost get a continuous reading with the first sentence, 128,
but less so, perhaps, with the second, 129). Alternately, the first steal sentence (i. e.
126b) might open up, in a stronger way, the possibility that more than one thing
was stolen. The other steal sentence (127a), by comparison, explicitly specifies, in a
way the earlier sentences (126a/b) don’t, that it was just one thing that was taken.
Either way, should something like this be right, the steal sentences would seem to put
a focus on the Theme, rather than the Source/Victim. And a similar line of thought
might suggest that rob puts a focus on the Source/Victim rather than the Theme.
But why do such impressions come to mind? Things become clearer if one tries
to introspect on the infinitive forms to rob vs. to steal. Of course a native speaker
of English can feel a difference: the noun phrase that rob realizes as its object is
the (often human) (Source/)Victim, whereas steal ’s is just a (typically inanimate)
Theme. One’s knowledge of the syntactic requirements of those verbs automatically
makes them seem different. And there may be strong statistical differences, too,
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with rob perhaps appearing a lot with just the Victim but not the Theme, and vice
versa with steal . But we want to know if there is a difference in the event being
expressed by these verbs. For the Fill Verbs from Levin that we listed above, there
are obvious differences: filling, covering, surrounding, etc., are all different events,
and an event that is one of those can’t necessarily (or even typically) be described
as any of the others. But a robbing event is also a stealing event, and vice versa.
Arguably, it isn’t even a matter of picking out different aspects of the event. While
pouring water into the tank, or filling the tank with water, might be used to refer to
the same event, they are obviously picking out, and leaving out, different aspects of
the event (and we gave them earlier: it’s the manner in which the water flows into
the tank—pouring in—vs. the end-state configuration of the water in the tank—the
tank becoming full of the water); rob and steal , both used with all their (logical)
arguments, i. e. Agent, Source/Victim, Theme, are picking out the same features of
the event, and at most putting a bit more focus on one feature over the other.
The extent to which these effects of syntactic expectations ‘infect’ our impres-
sions can be seen with another verb pair: buy and sell . These are conventionally
considered opposites. Yet when we consider them with the above discussion in mind,
something surprising happens: they turn out to seem no better as opposites than
rob and steal , which normally might not be considered opposites at all; further-
more, with the sloppy definition of synonymy we gave above (i. e. two words that
mean more or less the same thing), rob and steal might be loosely, if misleadingly,
considered synonyms (sloppily, since they are not interchangeable), and buy and
sell , it turns out, along that sloppy train of thought, will appear as even better
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Seller Buyer Theme Theme
Like rob and steal , the verbs buy and sell appear to be expressing exactly the same
event, picking out (in the sense we used above, and in the full-blown expression of
their logical arguments) the same features—though presenting them in a different
order. In fact, if we were, contrary to the arguments above, to consider rob more
of a verb affecting its object than a verb of removal, and vice versa for steal (as in
Section 1.2), then rob and steal might seem to be farther from synonymous than buy
and sell—though, again, since neither pair is syntactically interchangeable, labeling
them as synonyms at all is problematic.
To capture what is essential here, given our focus on θ-roles (and alluding to
the use of the symbol θ as—sometimes—a shorthand for thematic), we’ll call pairs
like rob and steal , or buy and sell , thematically identical verbs. For verbs like fill,
cover, surround, etc., we’ll avoid that term, even though they may have identical
θ-sets, given the obvious semantic differences that might in principle be used to
distinguish them. We’ll call them thematically similar instead, with the implication
that any appearance of thematic identity for them, in any particular analysis, is an
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artifact of the level of semantic generalization in play in that analysis, rather than
a fundamental (thematic) identity as found with rob and steal , and buy and sell .2
2.3.2 Senses or words
We will close Section 2.3 with two more notes about the distinction between poly-
semy and homonymy. The previous picture diagrams a way of talking about things
(distinguishing “those are two different senses of the word” from “those are really
two different words that just happen to be pronounced the same”); and it shows that
there are some differences we should want to try to account for (they’re instances
of putative polysemy) and others we should try to ignore (they’re instances of a
random process, i. e. homonymy). In practice the distinction between polysemy and
homonymy can be hard to make. And it depends on exactly how those productive
and (we claim) largely semantically based mechanisms that we are investigating here
turn out to operate. Thus, whenever possible, we will try to imagine that polysemy,
rather than homonymy, is involved, and posit homonymy, rather than polysemy,
2Again, this is not to say that, as a matter of logic, a different theory of argument realization
couldn’t choose to label the θ-sets for rob and steal differently; perhaps as something like {Agent,
Patient, Theme} and {Agent, Source, Theme}, respectively, thus explaining away their different
realizations. (Their argument realizations don’t technically diverge in this case, since their θ-sets
differ.) The distinct, Prolog-like, conceptual structures we gave them earlier (Sect. 1.2) suggest
exactly those θ-set differences. But to provide such θ-sets in earnest, a theory would simply be
describing the ‘end result’ of some putative process that allows a fixed event to be encoded in
different ways, as if there were different types of events present; we’re effectively trying to figure
out what that putative process is, so to turn a single event into two different ones (only one of which,
according to those θ-sets, involves a ‘real’ Patient) would—for our purposes—be tantamount to
falsifying the data.
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only as a last resort. And we’ll list in Appendix A, as we mentioned, those words
we decided to treat as homonyms; i. e., words that are ‘pronounced the same’ but
seem too dissimilar semantically to be seen as senses of a single word, at least in
the system that we will be developing.
And whenever we refer to a word, or the category of word that is most impor-
tant to us (i. e. the category Verb), we’ll tend to mean it in this technical sense of
the abstract thing that can have more than one sense (thanks to polysemy), and in
the extreme case might be written or spoken in more than one way (if we consider
‘generalized synonymy’). Actually, we’ll be dealing with an even narrower sense of
polysemy. We won’t care much about a sense distinction, even if one might find it in
a dictionary, for instance, if it should happen to be the case that the corresponding
sets of argument types are more or less the same, and have identical realizations.
For instance, PropBank (Palmer et al. 2005) gives several distinct entries for move.
On the one hand, one of them covers a lot of ground, namely, what might be called
the ‘everyday’ senses of move: it will refer to some entity whose location or position
changed (132); or refer to the location to which such an entity (or entities) moved
(133); or refer to another entity that directly brings about such events (134); it
might refer to a change-of-location event that exists, say, in time rather than space
(135).
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(132) Suddenly, the so-called statue moved.
(133) The guests moved into the adjacent room.
(134) We moved the furniture.
(135) We moved the meeting to the following day.
There are four distinct sets of θ-roles being expressed here, thus, by our (simplifying)
formalization, four distinct senses. On the other hand, PropBank provides a distinct
entry for a sense of move that they describe as one of attacking; something like
(136) They were determined to move against their opponents
while there was still time.
Now, against is commonly used to introduce an entity that some sort of force is being
applied to—perhaps even systematically used that way, judging from examples in
Levin (1993). Whether or not we want to call this a distinct sense, however (i. e. 136
distinct from 133), given that they might use the same θ-roles, i. e. {Theme, Goal},
is going to depend on whether we need to do so in order to distinguish this verb
move from others that use against similarly.
We’ll see more of how this plays out in later chapters (especially Ch. 5), and at
that point see the big practical reason we have for using sets such as {Agent, Goal,
Theme} and {Goal, Theme}, referring to the arguments of a verb, to label the senses
of that verb. For us, polysemy is (above all else) simply a process by which a verb
expressing a set of arguments of certain semantic types can also be used to express
something related in meaning, but requiring a different set of argument types.
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2.4 More potential ‘atoms’ of language?
That we introduced tree structures in the earlier sections shouldn’t be surprising in
a work on language; perhaps they still seem out of place, though, since the present
work otherwise presents only a minimal amount of material on syntax. Partly it was
so we could introduce terms like NP, PP or VP. But we also had another motive
for introducing them. Having introduced them, we can now refer to a ‘working
metaphor’ that we have kept in mind while doing our research, with which we will
close this chapter.
It shouldn’t surprise the reader to find out that, language being language,
headedness—which is what distinguishes the structuring of words in English from
Japanese—has its own complications. Baker (2001, pp. 82–83) points to German
and the African language Nupe (citing Zepter 2000) as languages that are not per-
fectly head-initial or head-final. (The appearance of verbs at the end of a German
sentence being a clue that it might be head-final, inspite of having prepositions like
(head-initial) English.) And Baker cites Amharic (Amberber 1997), as a case where
historical and geocultural reasons might partially explain why it is a mixed case. So
even in this clear case of something that seems to be highly systematized, there are
exceptions (though they are rare—Dryer 1992).
And yet, there’s enough regularity there that Baker is comfortable constructing
an entire book around a particular metaphor (Baker 2001), building on the history of
certain scientific discoveries, and the structure of the corresponding phenomena, in
a completely different field of inquiry. Baker argues that our current understanding
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of the range of possible languages (or language types) is similar to our scientific
understanding of chemical compounds (and their makeup) prior to Mendeleev’s
(1869) prototype for the periodic chart of the elements. The head-directionality
parameter, and several others, combine, or so Baker argues, following the Principles
and Parameters theory (Chomsky 1981), to produce the various language types; but
linguists are still early in the process of discovering the details of that system (or at
least that’s what the metaphor urges us to think). Similarly, until Mendeleev’s time,
various patterns of chemical behavior had been noticed (references in Baker), but it
wasn’t easy to to put forth the overall scheme or ‘big picture’ for the elements, which
required getting past inaccuracies in contemporary atomic mass measurements and
various gaps where elements had yet to be discovered—as well as just having the
idea to try to put things in such an order.
The periodic table analogy also seems very appropriate for what we are trying
to do here. We would have been strongly tempted to discuss the periodic table
at length, along with the work of Mendeleev and others, interleaving it with dis-
cussions of the language phenomena we are focused on, highlighting in the process
the strength of the analogy—if only that didn’t mean stealing half a book from
Baker.3 Yet the analogy seems just as appropriate, if not more, for our topic; we
are very tempted to suggest that at some point we might actually have the sort of
understanding of the semantic elements that go into the meanings of words, and
3Of course, the periodic table is probably a fertile ground for analogies. Jackendoff (1991)
brings up the table to justify doing lexical decomposition regardless of whether one knows how far
to go in the decomposition. (Have we reached the atom yet? the electron, proton, or neuron? the
quark?).
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of the syntactic interactions, that would allow us (perhaps) to generate the verb
types with the patterns that so far have been just barely recognizable. We won’t
actually be producing such a chart, though—far from it, in fact. Baker mentions
that he hopes that his work might be seen as the linguistic version of the work that
was a precursor to Mendeleev’s, rather than of Mendeleev’s itself, and our work is
going to be even farther from Mendeleev’s (taken metaphorically) than Baker’s is.
Through our analysis of the 3000+ Levin verbs, the essential theoretical goal of the
current work is simply to show, in an interesting and rather indirect way, that such
regularities that may eventually lead to something like a ‘periodic system of the
verbs’ do in fact exist.
Interestingly, of the authors we will cite here who have something detailed to
say about our subject (patterns in polysemy and argument realization), each of them
at some point feels compelled to accept certain verbal behaviors as things for which
no productive mechanism can be posited—and thus, they’re things that simply have
to be stipulated in the lexicon. Our argument, that there is a systematicity in the
lexicon that has been missed up until now (Fig. 1.1, p. 10), is going to put a limit
on such claims of idiosyncrasy.
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Part II
Mostly on the data
Chapter 3
A tangle of verbs
We will attempt now to develop one of the idées fixes of the previous chapters, which
so far has appeared and reappeared as a mere implication: that the differences be-
tween the handful of verbs discussed there (rob, steal , go, move, be, pour , fill , fax ,
put , insert , say , bleed , burp, cover , lay , ...) were truly symptomatic of (apparent)
idiosyncrasies rampant across the lexicon. This implication is consistent with the
claims found in the literature; for instance, Levin (1993) asserts that if she were to
attend to every distinction between the (3000-plus) verbs she investigates, she might
end up with verb classes of one member each; i. e. each verb would have been uniquely
defined in polysemy and argument realization. (Instead, she assigned her 3000+
verbs to just 192 classes—a very small number, as we shall see.) Researchers who
have chosen not to ‘smooth over’ various distinctions have indeed found verbs head-
ing more in the direction of uniqueness (Saint-Dizier 1996, Gross 1975, for French).
On the other hand, in grouping her verbs into just 192 classes, Levin is ex-
plicitly following the notion, which she has continued to express more recently, that
there are ‘semantically identifiable classes’, taken to mean distinct classes of verbs of
like semantic and syntactic behavior, following Fillmore (1970). (That there are such
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classes is something that has long been known, say Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005,
p. 1.) And though Levin doesn’t hold her classifications to be the only reasonable
ones for the sort of thing she is doing (“other, equally valid classifications schemes
might have been identified”, Levin 1993, p. 18—and we’ll present a rather different
one later), she also has an appendix elsewhere (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1991)
entitled ‘How many clear verbs are there?” in which she expressly defends putting
a particular number of verbs in her Clear class (eliminating, in fact, drain from
her own earlier (1993) classification). Pinker (1989), too, groups verbs in classes—
broad and narrow conflation classes, depending on whether they are determined
by his broad, or his more narrowly-tailored criteria; if one is to associate the nar-
row classes with something like the Levin classes, but make them truly sensitive to
Pinker’s narrow criteria (which might not have been his intent) there’d be a lot of
classes of size one, as we shall see; actually, it seems unlikely that he would have
wanted to bother with the notion of a narrow conflation class, if so many of them
were to be that small.
Goldberg (2006, p. 56) writes that
Verbs are occasionally quite idiosyncratic in the types of ar-
gument structure patterns they appear in.
As a major proponent of Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995, Fillmore and Kay
1995), which came into existence at least in part because of an interest in the many
apparent idiosyncrasies concerning constructions in language (Fillmore et al. 1988),
Goldberg’s comment is perhaps best understood as saying things are occasionally
quite idiosyncratic even within a formalism intended to handle such idiosyncrasies.
87
But it’s still surprising that she would say that the verbs are only ‘occasionally’
that.
All of this is at best easily misinterpreted. Levin also says (Levin 1993, p.
18), regarding the possibility of having classes of only one member, that it would
be “a state of affairs that would not provide much insight into the overall structure
of the English verbs lexicon.” But that doesn’t mitigate the possibility that a
classification that ignores data to fit verbs into larger classes, for whatever that may
be worth, might also be creating something artificial, and be missing some very
essential features; in fact, Levin acknowledges that “there is a sense in which the
notion of ‘verb class’ is an artificial construct” (p. 17).
Here, then, we will begin to back up the notion that the apparent idiosyncrasies
introduced in the previous chapter are in fact widespread, with the intent of showing,
in later chapters, that a strong degree of systematicity can be demonstrated even
with a lot of apparent idiosyncrasies included in the analysis.
3.1 Diathesis alternations
One of the things that makes all of this interesting (as well as rather complicated to
straighten out) is the set of theoretical traditions that shape the typical presentations
of the data from the very start. When it comes to the kind of polysemy we are
interested in here—i. e. of the kind that seems to put the same verb in different
syntactic configurations, with different types of arguments—one of the issues we
face, especially given the work that follows in some way from Chomsky (1957, 1965,
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etc.), concerns the ways in which those different syntactic configurations might be
related to each other. There are essentially two fundamental issues here. The
first problem concerns the extent to which differences in the surface forms of two
expressions, using (seemingly) the same verb, might simply be due to differences in
the ‘online’ processes building the expressions from the same lexical entries. The
second problem, which like the first has many different facets, concerns the properties
of those lexical entries: the ways in which they differ from one another; and the
possibility that some of the things that determine the nature of the online processes
might also affect the (‘offline’) creation, and hence the ultimate nature, of the lexical
entries.
A standard example of what we are calling an online process is the formation
of question forms. In English, it’s possible to ask a kind of question by simply
replacing the (typically) unknown element of the concept with a kind of variable,
i. e. a ‘wh-word’ (who, what, where, when ...):
(137) She faxed what to her former employer? 1
But while this formulation of a question (wh-in-situ) is the general way of asking
one in some languages (e. g. Mandarin), in English of course the normal procedure
is to place the wh-word to the front of the clause—i. e. to apply wh-movement:
1Compare the way one runs a program in Prolog: one presents a query, a form that usually
will have one or more variables: the form fax(sue,W,employer) would be used to ask the Prolog
system to return the set of Ws such that fax(sue,W,employer) is true.
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(138) Whati did she fax ti to her former employer?
(with ti marking the place where φi would otherwise be expected, for some con-
stituent φ; e. g., it’s the place where a constituent would be found for the corre-
sponding yes/no question—
(139) Did she fax [the form] to her former employer?
And of course it’s the place where the constituent would be found in the correspond-
ing declarative sentence:
(140) She faxed [the form] to her former employer.
I. e. φ = the form in these last two sentences.) We can also take concepts expressed
by earlier examples, such as They robbed the bank (p. 11), and embed them in other
concepts, expressed, in systematically altered form, in larger sentences like:
(141) [The bank they robbed] wasn’t well-guarded
—i. e. with a relative clause formation, in which there seems to be, in this case, and
looking at things in a kind of Fregean way, a function (f(x) = they robbed x) which
is used (in 141) to refer to the bank of which f(the bank) is true.
English certainly provides productive means of arranging similar sets of words
into somewhat different arrangements depending on the type of utterance one needs
(a wh-question, a yes/no question, a declarative sentence, etc.); as we suggested
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earlier, a native speaker ought to be able to form the progressive of any putative verb
immediately (e. g. to be faxing something, p. 62) even if the meaning of the verb is
still unclear. It seems natural, then, to wonder if similar mechanisms, also similarly
productive, might exist for cases where a verb has different ways of expressing a
single set of arguments; at this point, by a ‘similar mechanism’, we merely mean a
way of taking a single set of lexical entries (i. e. for a verb and its arguments) and
combining them in different ways depending on what is needed, or most felicitous
in a given context. In a few moments, in the first couple of subsections to follow (in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2, pp. 100 and 103), we will list a fairly large number of examples of
cases just like this (from Levin 1993), where the difference in meaning between the
different ways of realizing a verb’s arguments are often quite minor, and sometimes
seemingly nonexistent.
Even if we adopt a theory that avoids transformations on syntactic structures
per se (see Culicover and Jackendoff 2005 and citations therein), we’re still going to
want to deal with the possibility of having different constructions arising in some
way from common semantic representations; and even if we go the other way for
some verbs, and posit distinct lexical entries for the different argument realizations,
we’ll still want to understand how one gets from the underlying semantics, seemingly
close to identical, to the different representations.2
2Arguments for the existence of lexical rules by which certain lexical entries are created from
others are given by Chomsky (1970) and picked up on by Jackendoff (1975) and Oehrle (1976);
recent arguments for the formation of those lexical entries by mechanisms taken from work in
syntax are given in Hale and Keyser’s work (2002, 1997, 1993, 1992); See Wasow (1977) for where
lexical rules belong, and where syntactic transformations; also Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005).
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Given our interest here in the lexicon, a more interesting apparent transfor-
mation of a sentence form occurs with the English passive, in which the realization
of the verb’s arguments appears to change.
(142) An unarmed man
︸ ︷︷ ︸




(143) A large downtown bank
︸ ︷︷ ︸




The object of the active sentence (142) moves into subject position (as in 143), its
subject may appear in a prepositional phrase, or not appear at all, and a different
form of the verb is required—the past participle, as used in the present perfect
(italicized in 144, and in the passive form of that sentence in 145).
(144) Some unknown person
︸ ︷︷ ︸




(145) All our money
︸ ︷︷ ︸




Note that since this alternation is marked by the form of the verb, it is reminiscent
of the Kinyarwanda alternation in Ch. 1 (25-26).
The passive is interesting because, at least in English, it also has verb-specific
properties. Some verbs don’t passivize, or do so only in some senses; expanding on
an example given by Culicover and Jackendoff (2005, p. 59):
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(146a) We expected/needed/wanted him to do well here.
b) He was expected/*needed/*wanted to do well here.
(147a) The police expected/needed/wanted him.
b) He was expected/needed/wanted by the police.
And some verbs are found only in the passive; Levin (1993) gives reincarnate, ru-
mor, repute. Thus the English passive is not as free in its application as processes
like relative-clause formation or wh-movement, but it’s not as restricted as the alter-
nations we are about to introduce, and none of the latter have special requirements
for the form of the verb. Thus the passive seems to be an intermediate case.
Levin (1993), as we were beginning to see in the previous chapter, presents her
3000+ verbs largely by way of pairs of constructions—i. e. diathesis alternations, by
the traditional name; examples include the dative alternation used by fax and give
in the previous chapter (p. 66), but not say . Recall that we described the verbs
rob and steal as having arguments that play the roles (speaking very specifically
now) of Thief, Loot, and Victim; generalizing again over those roles, but taking
into consideration the Victim’s role as both the affected entity and the source of
the thing being stolen, we gave rob and steal and more general θ-set {Agent, Theme,
Source[/Patient]}, the Patient being the affected entity; we put it in square brack-
ets so we can use the same θ-set in a moment for verbs that, unlike rob and steal ,
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From now on, we will use the term θ-set to refer to not just any set of θ-roles, but
one that defines the arguments of some sense of a verb.3 And we will typically use
argument to mean an argument of the apparent Fregean predicate that might be
used to represent the verb sense—which as we’ve seen, need not correspond to the
arguments required by syntax. We can use a vector to designate the construction
with which a verb realizes a θ-set; it will include all the θ-roles of the corresponding
θ-set, ordered according to how they appear in the usual declarative sentence of
English (i. e. subject first, indirect object if present, direct object if present), and
with other required elements like prepositions included. The following table shows
the way rob and steal realize their (semantically identical) arguments.
{Agent, Theme, Source[/Patient]}
rob <Agent, Source[/Patient], of Theme>
steal <Agent, Theme, from Source[/Patient]>
These two constructions (one for rob and and one for steal) do in fact form an
3We avoid the conventional name θ-grid (Williams 1981, Stowell 1981) since it is typically used
to name something more structured than a set, depending on requirements of one’s theory.
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alternation—not for rob or steal, but for the verb clear, the only one of the three
verbs that uses both constructions:
(150a) Sue cleared her schedule of all unnecessary meetings.
b) Sue robbed her neighbor of $1,000
c) *Sue stole her neighbor of $1,000
(151a) Sue cleared all unnecessary meetings from her schedule.
b) *Sue robbed $1,000 from her neighbor.
c) Sue stole $1,000 from her neighbor.
Levin in fact names this alternation after the verb, calling it the Clear alternation.
At first glance, Levin (1993) enumerates 80 alternations, listing in most cases
(but not all) verbs that do or do not utilize the alternation, or that utilize only
one of its constructions. Not all of the 80 alternations are really alternations; some
of them are just single constructions (which may or may not have another implied
construction with which they can alternate); and some of her alternations are ‘bet-
ter cases’ than others. We can argue that in a couple of different ways. First,
there’s the question of whether or not there really is a productive mechanism caus-
ing a set of verbs that uses one construction to use the other construction as well.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005) exhibit an obviously reasonable reluctance to
consider a pair of constructions a true alternation unless multiple verbs utilize it;
but that doesn’t stop Levin (1993) from listing an alternation used by only one
verb—blame (see below). (Better understanding of the basis of argument realiza-
tion could in fact show that it is perfectly predictable that a concept with certain
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components of meaning will use one construction, and that a concept with other
components will use another construction, and that blame happens to fulfill both
criteria.) Second, the composition of the paired constructions relative to one an-
other also varies quite a bit, regardless of any theoretic considerations of how the
one construction might derive, in any significant sense, from the other. Levin groups
her alternations essentially according to syntactic distinctions: for more than half
of them, she classifies them first according to to whether they change in transitivity
(i. e., in realizing an argument as a direct object in one construction but not the
other; Levin’s Section 1); or, where transitivity, and realization of the subject, is
held constant, according to differences in the way the internal arguments are realized
(Levin’s Section 2). For a contrast, and for the sake of some references to the data
that we make elsewhere, we’ll present the alternations in a rather different order.
We’ll take as our basic difference whether or not the alternation, in both its con-
structions, preserves the same number of logical arguments—i. e. the same number
of entities participating in the event(s) or state(s) being expressed by the two con-
structions. (The same contrast is adopted by Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005 in
their chapter on multiple argument realization.) Where the alternations do ‘preserve
their arguments’, this will often be a case where the constructions express more or
less the same event or state (as with clear in 150, 151, above). The same number
of underlying participants may or may not require the same number of syntactic
arguments or adjuncts, however; for instance, two logical arguments may form a
single argument as a simple conjunction of noun phrases (152, underlined)—or not
(153):
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(152) *Sue and Claire met for lunch.
(153) Sue met Claire for lunch.
(Levin’s alternation 1.2.4, in our Table 3.2). As a sort of mixed case according to our
main distinction (between alternations that differ mostly in how a fixed number of
participants are realized in the syntax, and alternations that express different events
or states, with a different number of participants), there are also alternations for
which the number of logical arguments remain fixed, and one of them need not be
explicitly expressed—but there is a crucial distinction regarding the event or state
being expressed in that case. For instance, in
(154) Sue waved (her hand/the flag/the papers/the baton/...)
—(Levin’s alternation 1.2.2, in our Table 3.3)—the things being waved can be almost
anything, even something abstract (compare the idiom wave it in her face); but if
it’s not expressed, the interpretation will generally be (in this example) her hand.
Thus there are four main cases. 1) Some alternations, like the Clear alter-
nation above, can reasonably be seen as a pair of constructions that realize the
same θ-set. 2) Some alternations appear to express some fixed number of logical
arguments, say k; but one of the constructions can do so with less than k distinct
arguments (or adjuncts) in the syntax. 3) Other alternations allow an element of
some potential underlying concept to remain unexpressed in one construction, but
not the other—and the unexpressed argument has a special interpretation. 4) Oth-
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ers alternations have one construction that appears to add a logical argument to
the other construction—Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005, p. 189) refer to some of
these as instances of event composition, a term we shall use quite generally. This
differs from cases 2 and 3 in that the element missing in the one construction is also
missing, generally, from the underlying semantics.
We’ll present now Levin’s alternations (both true alternations and otherwise)
in several tables according to the four top-level cases we just gave, with a few special
cases left over. We’ll also give each alternation or construction a tentative list of
θ-roles. (Levin generally gives no such analysis.) Our intent here is not to show the
details of the constructions involved (see Levin, and her references, for that) but to
just provide a quick image of the complexity of the range of argument realization
schemes that are in use in the English verb lexicon—something that is rather time-
consuming to get directly from Levin, given the way the data is spread over what
sometimes seems like a kind of structured, book-sized, bibliography—though with
unusually rich ‘annotations’, of course.
3.1.1 ‘Argument-preserving’ alternations
Since our goal is just a quick image of the data, we’ll abbreviate construction in-
formation instead of listing the full construction as a vector, as we did above for
the Clear alternation. (We’ll return to the vector notation in Chapter 5.) In the
simplest case, there are two or more θ-roles listed for an alternation, and one of
them is preceded by a preposition in parentheses; this means that the correspond-
ing argument may occur inside a prepositional phrase, or by itself as a noun phrase.
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So for instance, the conative alternation (Levin’s number 1.3, in our Table 3.1, p.
100) is utilized by swat in these two examples:
(155) The nurse swatted the fly.
(156) The nurse swatted at the fly.
The same two arguments are there in both cases (listed below as Agent and Patient),
so this is an argument-preserving alternation, our case 1. (Note that this doesn’t
in any way imply the two constructions mean the same thing; usually they don’t.)
A slightly more complicated case (but still alternation case 1) has different θ-roles
being realized differently in each construction. For example, in the clear alterna-
tion above (Levin’s number 2.3.2), Source takes a preposition in one construction
(from), and Theme takes one in the other (of ). So pairs of parenthesized material
are to be applied in an alternating manner. For brevity, we also don’t distinguish
between arguments that take on dual roles, and those that take on one role (α) or
another (β), depending on the verb—both cases are shown as α/β.
Note that we have chosen θ-roles in an opportunistic way. (Perhaps that
was already clear.) We refine them where a ‘sharper focus’ seems convenient, and
generalize them when we need a softer focus. In many cases, it’s hard to delineate
them clearly, anyway (Dowty 1991). There is a rather special set defined with
examples in Fig. 5.3.2, p. 182. But we are intentionally slightly more general there
than here. (We definitely need the ‘softer focus’ there, as we shall see.) Also, here we
effectively break up oblique arguments into preposition and prepositional argument,
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Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified) — Θ-roles and Realizations
example verb
1. 1.1.3 Substance/source (from-)Source Theme
sprout
2. 1.3 Conative Agent (at-)Patient
shoot
3. 1.4.1 Locative prep. drop Theme (up/down/along/...-)Path
jog
4. 1.4.2 With drop Actor (with-)Actor
fight
5. 2.1 Dative — send Agent (to-)Recipient Theme
6. 2.2 Benefactive Agent (for -)Beneficiary
get , build Theme/Result
7. 2.3.1 Spray/load Agent (into/onto-)Goal (with-)Theme
8. 2.3.2 Clear (transitive) Agent (from-)Source (of -)Theme
9. 2.3.4 Swarm (with-)Theme (in/...-)Location
10. 2.4.1 Material/product (trans.) Agent (out of -)Patient (into-)Result
make
11. 2.4.2 Material/product (intrans.) (from-)Patient (into-)Result
evolve
12. 2.6 Fulfilling Agent (to-)Goal (with-)Theme
supply
13. 2.7 Image impression Agent (with-)Theme (on/...-)Goal
paint
14. 2.8 With/against Agent (against-)Goal (with-)Theme
strike
15. 2.9 Through/with Agent (through-)Location/Patient
jab (with-)Theme
16. 2.10 Blame Agent (for -)Event (on-)Patient/Goal
17. 2.11 Search Agent (in-)Location (for -)Theme/Goal
18. 2.13.3 Possessor and attribute Experiencer (in-)Possessori
value (for Possessori’s-)Property
19. 2.14 As Agent/Experiencer/... Patient/...
imagine, mark (as-)Property/...
20. 3.10 Source subject (from-)Cause Patient
benefit
21. 6.2 Locative inversion Theme in/on/into/...-Location/Goal
hide, drift
Table 3.1: Argument-preserving alternations from Levin (1993), our case 1 alterna-
tions. See the discussion starting on p. 98 for creating example sentences from the
example words and θ-roles listed.
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so sometimes it seems clearer to give a role name that is that of the preposition’s
argument rather than the verb’s. For instance, a verb’s Path argument may be
realized as going through a Location.
We’ve modified the Levin’s alternation names very, very lightly, mostly just
by removing the word alternation from the titles; one or two example verbs from
Levin (1993) are listed when Levin’s name itself doesn’t name a verb. To reconstruct
an example sentence, remember that if there’s an Agent, it can pretty reliably be
put in the subject position of the sentence; if there’s no Agent, take an argument
that doesn’t need a preposition. This may underdetermine the possible sentences
with certain alternations, so the example verbs are there to allow one to try out
the possible sentences. For the first alternation (1.1.3), for instance, there’s no
Agent, but there’s a Theme not using a preposition, plus one other argument that
has an optional preposition. This tells us to create three possible sentence types
using the given verb sprout, of which two are in fact grammatical, thus forming the
alternation.
(157) Weeds sprouted from lawn.
(158) *Weeds sprouted the lawn.
(159) The lawn sprouted weeds.
There’s one case 1 alternation (6.2) whose arguments merely swap positions;
for an alternation with a possessive form (2.13.3, with several more in later tables),
the possessor in the possessive form will typically be pronominal—
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(160) *She values her next-door neighbors for their honesty.
—rather than:
(161) *She values her next-door neighbors for her next-door neighbors’
honesty.
Note that there’s a lot of variation hidden in this chart; alternations will differ
in whether or not argument optionality also differs across the alternation. Here’s
one it which it does:
(162) They’re blaming me (for their problems).
(163) They’re blaming their problems *(on me).
I. e. the oblique is optional in the one case (162) but it’s obligatory (so it can’t
be optionalized by putting parenthesis around it) in the other case (163). And
remember, for every one of these alternations, and the ones that follow, there are
verbs that only use the first of the designated constructions, or the second, or (for
many of the alternations) neither of the constructions.
3.1.2 ‘Argument-merging’ alternations
Our case 2 alternations (Table 3.2, p. 103) are the ones in which, conceptually, both
constructions refer to the same entities, but one of the constructions realizes some
of them as a single argument: either the argument is plural, or there’s a possessive
construction that effectively ‘eats up’ two (semantic) arguments. We also include
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Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified) — Θ-roles and Realizations
example verb
22. 1.2.4 Understood reciprocal object Actor/Theme (Actor/Theme)
1.2.4 embrace, intersect
23. 1.2.7 Way object Actor/Theme (Actor/Theme’s way)
press into/along/through/...-Location
24. 2.5.1 Simple reciprocal (trans.) Agent Theme
blend , separate (with/from/... Theme/Location)
25. 2.5.2 Together reciprocal (trans.) Agent Theme (together)
lump, stir (with/into/... Goal/Theme)
26. 2.5.3 Apart reciprocal (trans.) Agent Theme (apart)
rip (off (of)/... Source)
27. 2.5.4 Simple reciprocal (intrans.) Theme
intersect , diverge (with/from/...-Theme/Location)
28. 2.5.5 Together reciprocal(intrans.) Theme (together)
join, mix (with/into/... Goal/Theme)
29. 2.5.6 Apart reciprocal (intrans.) Theme (off of/... Source) (apart)
slip
30. 2.12 Body-part possessor ascension Agent Patient/Goal(-’s Location)
pat (on Location)
31. 2.13.1 Possessor object Agent/Source Goal(-’s Property)
condemn (for Goal-’s Property)
32. 2.13.2 Attribute object Experiencer (Property in Source)
enjoy (Source-’s Property)
33. 2.13.4 Possessor subject (trans.) Agent(-’s Cause) Patient
hurt (with Cause)
34. 2.13.5 Possessor subject (intrans.) (Property of -) Patient
fluctuate (in Property)
35. 6.1 There-insertion (there) Theme Location/...
be
Table 3.2: Our case 2 subset of the Levin (1993) alternations. For these, the number
of syntactic elements varies across an alternation, but the number of underlying con-
ceptual arguments remains constant; for most of these, in one form of the alternation
the underlying arguments ‘merge’ into one syntactic phrase.
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an alternation (1.2.7) that adds a fixed surface element (’s way) that adds little to
the semantics; and another one (6.1) that adds an expletive there (cf. the expletive
it in it’s raining, p. 56). Like the other alternations, they differ in the number of
elements required by the syntax, but express the same number of underlying logical
arguments. Note, too, that many verbs appear in more than one alternation: we’ve
given intersect as an example for two (1.2.4 and 2.5.4; Levin actually misses the
latter); thus the constructions a verb gains by participating in any one alternation
do not generally define its full behavior.
3.1.3 Implied-argument alternations
Next, we have case 3 (Table 3.3, p. 106), in which some element is an argument in
one construction, but unexpressed and implied in the other. There’s also a special
case where the verb effectively names one of it’s conceptual arguments, such as in
(164) They buttered the bread before they toasted it
where the Theme (i. e. the butter) is already expressed by the verb. But one can still
elaborate on it—
(165) They buttered the bread with their most expensive butter.
—which is an example of Levin’s alternation 7.2 at work. For these case 3 alter-
nations, the arguments that may be unexpressed appear as θ-roles in parentheses.
At first, these may look similar to the case 2 alternations, since for some of the
alternations it’s possible for an expressed argument to realize an unexpressed argu-
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ment (e. g. alternation 1.2.3: Karen dressed quickly = Karen dressed herself quickly);
generally, though, when expressed, the argument will be saying something different
(Karen dressed quickly 6= Karen dressed her children quickly), and sometimes the
expression is more-or-less obligatorily different (as in 165). The instructional im-
perative (1.2.8) is for examples like Stir (the mixture) for 30 seconds.
3.1.4 Event-composition alternations
For cases of event composition, our case 4 (Table 3.4, p. 107), the θ-roles in paren-
theses refer to an argument that may not even be implied when it is not expressed.
Sometimes the distinction is clumsy, though; worldly facts require certain exchanges
of money to be done under control of an Agent, thus alternation 3.9 is in Table 3.3,
not 3.4, and some of the others might have gone in either chart. Sometimes, too,
individual verbs behave differently: to the extent wiping the table may imply some-
thing was wiped from the table, alternation 2.3.3 could have gone in the previous
chart; but combing one’s hair doesn’t necessarily imply that something was combed
out of one’s hair, and verbs like comb are also assigned by Levin to 2.3.3.
Especially interesting syntactically is the resultative construction (7.5), in light
of the unaccusative hypothesis (Perlmutter 1978, Hall[Partee] 1965, and others, see
Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995): for some verbs with intransitive senses, i. e. with
a subject but not an object—
(166) The vase broke
—the subject may have actually been encoded like an object, i. e. an internal ar-
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Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified) — Θ-roles and Realizations
example verb
36. 1.1.1 Middle (Agent) Patient (Manner/...)
scratch
37. 1.2.1 Unspecified object Agent (Patient/Theme/...)
eat , sing
38. 1.2.2 Understood body-part object Agent (Theme)
wave
39. 1.2.3 Understood reflexive object Actor (Patient)
bathe
40. 1.2.5 PRO-arb object Cause (Patient)
entertain
41. 1.2.6.1 Characteristic property of agent Agent/Cause (Patient)
sting
42. 1.2.6.2 Characteristic prop. of instrument (Agent with-)Instrument
slice Patient
43. 1.2.8 Instructional imperative (Agent Patient)
cook
44. 2.3.5 Clear (intrans.) (Theme from-)Source
45. 2.4.3 Total transformation (trans.) Agent Patient (from Source)
convert into-Result
46. 2.4.4 Total transformation (intrans.) Patient (from Source)
change into-Result
47. 3.9 Sum of money subject (Agent) Theme (for -)Theme
buy
48. 4.1 Virtual reflexive (Cause/...) Patient/Theme/...
sell (itself )
49. 7.1 Cognate object Actor/... (Event/...)
dance
50. 7.2 Cognate PP Agent Source/Goal/...
oil (with Theme)
51. 7.3 Reaction object Actor/Source (Event/Theme)
roar
Table 3.3: Our case 3 alternations from Levin (1993). Across each alternation in
this set, one argument may be implied but unexpressed.
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Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified) — Θ-roles and Realizations
example verb
52. 1.1.2.1 Causative/inchoative (Agent) Patient/Theme
change, bounce
53. 1.1.2.2 Induced action (Agent) Theme Path
race
54. 1.1.2.3 Other causatives (Agent) Source/Theme/...
beep, dangle
55. 2.3.3 Wipe Agent (Theme from-)Source
56. 3.1 Time subject (Agent/Experiencer/... in-)Time Event
catch
57. 3.2 Natural force subject (Agent in-)Cause Patient
age
58. 3.3 Instrument subject (Agent with-)Instrument Patient
crack
59. 3.4 Abstract cause subject (Agent with-)Cause Predicate
prove
60. 3.5 Locatum subject (Agent with-)Theme Goal
cover
61. 3.6 Location subject (Agent in-)Location Theme
house
62. 3.7 Container subject (Agent into/...-)Location/... Theme
integrate
63. 3.8 Raw material subject (Agent from-)Patient/Material Result
make
64. 7.4 X’s way Actor/Theme (...)
push, talk (Actor/Theme-’s way througth/.. Path)
65. 7.5 Resultative Agent Patient (Property)
pound
66. 7.8 Directional phrases with Actor/Theme
nondirected motion verbs (into/out of/... Source/Goal)
thunder
Table 3.4: Our case 4 of the Levin (1993) alternations. These exhibit event com-
position (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005), whereby one form of the alternation




Number Name (Modified) — Θ-roles and Realizations
example verb
67. 4.2 Reflexive of appearance (Agent) Theme (itself ) ...
show
Table 3.5: This ‘extra case’ also exhibits event composition, but the syntax requires
an extra reflexive argument (itself, herself, myself, etc.) in the conceptually more
basic case, thus preserving the number of (apparent) syntactic arguments.
Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified)
68. 8.1 Obligatory passive
69. 8.2 Obligatorily reflexive object
70. 8.3 Inalienably possessed body-part object
71. 8.4 Expletive it object
72. 8.5 Obligatory adverb
73. 8.6 Obligatory negative polarity element
Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified)
74. 5.1 Verbal Passive
75. 5.2 Prepositional Passive
76. 5.3 Adjectival Passive (from trans. verbs)
77. 5.4 Adjectival Perfect Participles (from intrans. verbs)
Levin Levin
Number Name (Modified)
78. 7.6.1 Unintentional Interpretation with Reflexive object
79. 7.6.2 Unintentional Interpretation with Body-Part object
80. 7.7 Bound Nonreflexive Anaphor as Prepositional object
Table 3.6: Additional constructions and interpretations listed in Levin (1993). We
don’t utilize these for various reasons (see Sect. 3.1.6, p. 110), and so we present
them without further analysis or example.
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gument of the verb, at some deeper level (e. g. D-structure in Chomsky 1981, as
assumed by Levin and Rappaport Hovav); thus the underlying object appears to
have been moved into subject position by some sort of syntactic operation (coinci-
dentally fulfilling the subject requirement in English, though other languages show
the same kind of phenomenon, see Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995). The resulta-
tive construction is relevant here for the way it is used by Levin-Rappaport-Hovav
(1995) to try to diagnose whether an intransitive (e. g. 166) has a ‘real’ (i. e. ‘deep’)
subject or not.4,5
4Although we won’t have to deal with this issue directly here, eventually we’ll have to contend
with the possibility that, if we have a strong way of mapping from semantics to syntax, the proper
target of that mapping may not be what it appears to be on the surface.
5The resultative is a construction that adds a word or phrase (typically an adjective) that
describes the end-state of an entity, that end-state resulting from the action expressed by the verb.
Thus,
(i) The vase broke open,
adds information (to 166) about the vase; it wasn’t just left broken by the event, but open. In
other cases the resultative might add an entirely new component to the event:
(ii) The workers pounded the material flat.
Without the resultative component (flat), the material the workers were pounding on might
not have been affected at all. Crucially, the resultative seems to be predicated of the direct
object, i. e. the internal noun phrase argument of the verb—with some interesting complica-
tions, in which the noun phrase sometimes isn’t really an argument of the verb at all (see
Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995). Moreover, if an intransitive isn’t underlyingly an object, it
can’t be the noun phrase the resultative is to be predicated of; thus, elaborating on Levin and
Rappaport Hovav’s (1995, p. 35) examples, we have:
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3.1.5 ‘Hidden compositions’
Levin also lists an alternation that has an optional conceptual element (Table 3.5,
p. 108), so it’s compositional, but a reflexive is needed when that element is missing,
so the number of syntactic argument remains unchanged. Thus, it’s similar to, but
a kind of negative image of, our cases 1 and 2, where the concept being expressed
could be more or less fixed, but the syntactic expression changed.
3.1.6 Miscellanea
That leaves 13 ‘alternations’ unaccounted for (Table 3.6, p. 108). Six concern very
specific constructions that a very small number of verbs utilize, so we won’t provide
an analysis, though there is a chance that some verb/construction instances will
become relevant later for the kind of work we present in Ch. 5. Another four
concern either 1) a passive, which we will take as a construction that arises through
some fairly general, widely applicable process (though with some lexeme-specific
properties)—i. e. it’s far more productive than the other phenomena we are studying
here; and its requirements for a special form of the verb are unlike any of the other
alternations; so we’ll tentatively set this alternation aside; or 2) the alternations
(iii) *Suzy shouted hoarse (meaning Suzy was hoarse when she was shouting),
(iv) *Suzy shouted hoarse (meaning Suzy made herself hoarse by shouting),
i(v) *Suzy shouted herself hoarse,
The last example (v) means exactly what the previous (iv) can’t mean, i. e. it’s a resultative; but a
reflexive pronoun (herself )—i. e. a direct object (in this example)—has to be added to make that
possible.
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concern something that isn’t really verbal (5.4). That leaves three more items,
which merely concern interpretation, and concern it in a way that isn’t going to
appear in our processing of the data at all, so we will ignore them, too (though 7.7
also has some verbs with a specific constructional requirement).
3.2 Verb classes (often of one element)
Given the existence of several dozen alternations, the challenge of course is to deter-
mine what range of verb behaviors are possible with respect to those alternations—
which combinations of alternations can a verb participate in; and for which alter-
nations might a verb utilize one of the constructions but not the other. This might
be restated more simply (if simplistically) by ignoring alternations completely, and
just asking: what are the various possible combinations of constructions that a verb
might utilize? What are the semantic determinants of a verb’s behavior with respect
to these constructions? (Though of course, some people are going to want to ask how
those determinants are encoded syntactically (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995),
and one reason for our presentation of both semantic and syntactic in Ch. 1, how-
ever brief, was to suggest the possibility that the syntactic structures may bear
on the semantic ones.) The computer scientist, in any case, trying to implement
a system that, roughly at least, captures the way people process language, has
the obvious challenge of assigning each of thousands of verbs to exactly the right
constructions.6 And a deeper challenge, as we’ve been saying, is presented by the
6There are many kinds of language processing applications, and some of them might not need
this information, of course. But applications that need to parse language as well as people do
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possibly productive way in which those assignments might be made; i. e. by the
ability of a native speaker of a language to learn a novel verb and potentially have,
immediately, in wide agreement with other native speakers, a set of constructions
he or she will be comfortable using the new verb in—such as we discussed earlier
for the verb fax (p. 61). Thus, simply assigning a list of legal constructions to each
verb won’t, computationally, fully model the native speaker’s behavior; and it fails
to implement, in any way, whatever it is that causes the verbs to take on a particular
pattern of constructions in the first place.
We have been assuming here, of course, that the productive behavior of native
speakers does in fact exhibit regularities in the way that verbs, largely depending
on their semantics, are assigned to constructions. Levin actually goes farther and
tries to show that there are alternation-combining, class-forming patterns (or at least
semi-regular tendencies) in the second half of her (Levin 1993) presentation. But her
presentation has to be interpreted ‘with care’, as she herself says (Levin 1993, p. 17),
since in grouping verbs into classes, supposedly by shared semantic and syntactic
behavior, a lot of syntactic behaviors that distinguish the verbs are effectively hidden
inside each class. The first part of her book is quite precise in laying out the verb
behaviors (which we summarized in tables 3.1–3.6); her second half, in comparison,
needs to be seen 1) as intentionally more suggestive than precise; and/or 2) as
a presentation as much about the ways in which the given classification doesn’t
ultimately will need it (see the examples starting on p. 195); and even with some of the applications
that would have no use of this information currently, such as speech recognition, the reason is not
an absolute lack of utility (or potential utility), but a current lack of the technical means with
which to make use of it.
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completely work, as about the ways in which it does work. I. e., Levin consistently
and intentionally groups together verbs that behave alike in some of the ways she is
interested in (and typically in contrast to other verbs), but they also differ in other
behaviors that she is interested in.
Even in setting up the notion that there are distinct classes of verbs of like
semantic and syntactic behavior (Fillmore 1970), Levins introduces a set of four of
her classes (which she calls the Break, Cut, Touch, and Hit verbs) framed in terms
of just three diathesis alternations (the conative (1.3): swatted the fly vs. swatted
at the fly ; the body-part possessor ascension alternation (2.12): she hit his head vs.
she hit him on the head ; and the English middle alternation (1.1.1): it scratched
the surface vs. that surface scratches easily). And this fails to suggest the degree to
which these classes, against the Levin classes as a whole, and like the Levin classes
as a whole, are rampantly intersective (Dang et al. 1998). Table 3.7 lists her initial
example verbs for the Hit class (18.1), for which we have listed the other classes
Levin assigned them to, labeled on the left.
Each of the six verbs appears unique—though, of course, to determine the
full relevance of such multiple class assignments, one must go back to the diathesis
alternations the verbs appear in, and see what additional syntactic behavior, if any,
is intended to be reflected by the fact that some verb v is assigned to a class x as well
as a class y. Criticisms of the notion of a verb class were already raised Mufwene
(1978) in response to Zwicky’s (1971) manner-of-speaking verbs, as Levin notes.
The implied semantic commonalities of a class may or may not be highly relevant
to the syntactic behaviors: since the syntactic behaviors usually cut across classes,
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bash hit kick pound tap whack . . .
9.3 Funnel Verbs ×
11.4 Carry Verbs ×
17.1 Throw Verbs × × × ×
18.1 Hit Verbs × × × × × ×
18.4 Non-Agent. Impact ×
23.2 Split Verbs ×
26.1 Build Verbs ×
35.4 Investigate Verbs ×
40.8.2 Tingle Verbs ×
47.8 Contiguous Location ×
49 Body-Internal Motion ×
...
Table 3.7: Six of Levin’s (1993) Hit Verbs, with the all the Levin classes they are
assigned to. (Levin calls class 18.4 the Non-Agentive Verbs of Contact by Impact.)
the relevant semantics may cut across them as well, rendering the semantics of the
class itself largely accidental, or at least secondary. Regarding Zwicky’s manner-
of-speaking verbs (carried over into a subclass Levin gives of her Class 37 (Verbs
of Communication), see p. 136 below), every one of the class properties may be
found in verbs not in the class, as Mufwene tries to show. The semantic effect of
the common property of the verbs in Levin’s Class 40 (Verbs Involving the Body)
might be significant, but it seems secondary to the other properties that cut across
that class in different ways (p. 137–140 below).
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3.2.1 Construction families
!Dang et al. (1998) attempted get a better picture of the range of verb behaviors
by untangling the cross-classifications of the Levin verbs. They discuss extracting
the ‘intersective Levin classes’—a re-ordering of the Levin verbs in which each verb
is classified according to the set of Levin classes it is assigned to. Thus, it’s a
true partitioning of the verbs. It was also natural for us, in the course of our own
investigations, to extract the intersective Levin classes, so we’ll present some data
on that. Levin’s intersective classes vary (from 1 to 9) in the number of classes in
the intersections, and (more importantly) in the number of verbs attached to those
‘intersective classes’ (from 1 to around 90—1 being the more typical size by a huge
margin, as shown in the second chart).

























Number of classes in the intersective class
Figure 3.1: Histogram of intersective class intersection size
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Number of verbs in class
Figure 3.2: Histogram of intersective class size
Curiously, Dang et al. (1998) did not present any empirical results for their
reclassification. (They also present an algorithm for doing the reclassification that
isn’t tractable if taken literally.) Perhaps such results would have been too far
removed from the ‘real’ data, anyway: what we really want is to know, for each
verb, the set of constructions the verb appears in, and how those sets vary in size
and make-up across the complete set of verbs. Intersective classes simply tell us
that a verb is associated with certain classes whose members tend (merely tend)
to utilize certain constructions. Dang et al. also had to worry about homonymy,
since the noise it adds might create a lot of false intersective classes. Their solution
was to simply throw out all classes with only one or two verbs in them—but as
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the chart shows, that’s almost all of the Levin verbs. Dang et al. were in a bind
because they didn’t actually have representations of the constructions for each of the
Levin classes. We do, for the analyses we will be presenting later; we assigned each
verb the set of θ-sets it utilizes, which we call a θ-family; we call the corresponding
set of constructions realizing a θ-family a construction family. Thus, a ‘true’ verb
class, whose members show the same behavior with respect to argument realization
and polysemy, is simply the set of verbs that have the same construction family.
We thus can provide a histogram for that that parallels the one we just gave for
the intersective classes (Fig. 3.3). Note, furthermore, that qualitatively the two
charts do in fact look the same, but this new graph is a much more direct measure
of actual verb behavior. Perusal of our data furthermore shows that a histogram
of the number of words in a construction-family, vs. the number of construction
families, would also show the identical qualitative shape as the second graph above:
a huge number of constructions—almost all of them, in fact—with just one or two
verbs assigned, and a very small number of simple construction families at the other
end of the graph—with a hundred or so verbs each. This also confirms that the
bifurcation of classes is not just an artifact of Levin’s largely semantic grouping.
3.2.2 ‘Linking up’ the alternations
Looking at verb behaviors in terms of alternations, and defining those alternations
simply as pairs of constructions, as we’ve done here, also suggests another way of
investigating the structure of the verb lexicon. Graph-theoretically, each verb that


































Size of construction-family (in number of constructions)
Figure 3.3: Histogram of construction-family size (in number of constructions)
each representing one of the constructions of that alternation. Upon starting this
project, one of the first things we looked at, therefore, was the possibility of simply
partitioning the network created with these edges into many different sublexicons
that might then be investigated separately—for a simple kind of divide-and-conquer
approach. But that was made difficult by the possibility of a situation in which con-
structions c1 and c2 are connected by verb v1 (i.e. by virtue of forming an alternation
that v1 utilizes), and c2 and c3 are connected by v2, and c3 and c4 by v3, and so on,
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using up nearly all the verbs and nearly all the possible constructions. And at var-
ious stages in this project, that is exactly what we have found: almost all the verbs
and constructions can be related to other verbs and constructions in this manner.
Even a mechanical search for a useful articulation point—a construction which, if
removed from play, would leave two disconnected networks—proved fruitless; as did
a search for a useful bridge—a set of verbs using the same constructions, which, if
removed from play, would take one of those network edges with it, creating, again,
two disconnected networks. The problem is that, although there are some verbs
that are assigned just one construction by Levin, a far larger number of verbs utilize
one or more constructions; and furthermore, they do so in an overlapping way. Fig.
3.3 shows that only 40-some construction families have only one construction; note
that many have more than 10. The exact number and makeup of those families, and
the number of verbs using the larger ones, depends on the θ-roles in use, since we
defined constructions in terms of them; a fairly large set that we’ve used contains
about 25 roles (which we later generalize down to 14; we see Ch. 5); and with them,
88% of the verbs use 2 or more constructions. (A large set of θ-roles might increase
the distinct constructions a verb uses, but it should also decrease the chance of two
verbs ‘meeting’ at a shared construction, thus forming a chain in the network.) And
even with these finer-grained θ-roles, almost all (92%) of the constructions are found
in one large network. Thus the title of this chapter—A tangle of verbs—was meant
quite literally. The strong tendency of verbs to use multiple constructions, and yet
to vary widely in the precise set of constructions they use, effectively connects those
constructions, and the verbs, in a very tangled manner.
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Chapter 4
A mass of conceptualizations
The previous chapters were intended to highlight the vast amount of variety in the
verb lexicon. It might even seem that we have succeeded ‘too well’ in making the
lexicon look like a messy place. But it seems to us that, given what is known
now about the phenomena, there just isn’t a way of making it look simple without
oversimplifying the data. (The half of Levin (1993) that presents her verb classes,
if not taken with the ‘care’ that she urges them to be taken with, can end up
producing just that sort of oversimplification.) To return to the metaphor that we
borrowed from Baker (2001), it’s as if we’ve catalogued the great mass of behaviors
of thousands of chemical compounds, but we still haven’t noticed the order that lies
underneath once one isolates the atomic elements and looks at their behaviors. In
the present case, of course, we’re still not sure what sort of elements even exist in
that underlying system—or how much of a ‘system’ it really is.
Nonetheless, there appear be a couple of ways to filter and reorganize the
data to bring out something that is simpler than one might have expected—at the
risk, though, of oversimplifying things, if one fails to keep the data of the previous
chapters in mind. (Especially the charts on the previous pages showing how many
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verbs appear unique, or nearly so.) The first way involves constructing a small set
of schemata that will cover the 3000+ Levin verbs; the plan is make it easier to
grasp that, though the range of basic syntactic behaviors, considered here simply as
the set of constructions that each verb appears in, is in fact complex, there might
nonetheless be some general semantic arrangement which, if we ignore the syntactic
details, really does seem pretty simple.
4.1 Relating the θ-roles
The θ-roles we utilized we clearly not very explanatory to begin with—or at least,
we made no attempt to show what it was they might be explaining. A large num-
ber of the θ-sets can be realized multiple ways, and almost all of the verbs utilize
one or more of those multiply realized θ-sets. We are going to take advantage of
that in two ways: this chapter presents the first way, the next chapter will present
the second way. Our goal in this chapter is to simply cover the full set of θ-sets
in a very direct fashion. We will construct a series of schemata and suggest a
loose ordering for them—for expository purposes only—with simple ones combin-
ing in some sense to create more complicated ones. To represent these schemata,
we’ll supply simple diagrams with arrows, which might call to mind Schank (1975)
and Schank and Riesbeck (1981), but we’re going to keep things much, much sim-
pler, and simpler than Jackendoff’s (1990) presentations, too, because our goals are
very different. In effect, though, this is a version of Jackendoff’s argument, which
he built up from Gruber (1965), that different semantic fields ‘re-use’ the same
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syntactic structures to express their arguments. (We introduced the Locational,
Identificational, Possessional, and Circumstantial fields on p. 18.)
4.1.1 Generalizing to a few schemata
Actually, our first schema is almost too simple to call a schema. This is not only
because of the ordering we are going to build, with the first elements effectively
forming certain basic components to be included in the later elements; it also appears
to be the case that there just are some verbs that are more semantically basic.
For instance, there’s the verb move: it can be used as a ‘verb of putting’ or a
‘verb of removing’; in Jackendoff’s (1983, 1990) kind of representations, it might
be considered the verb that can be associated with go—perhaps more so that the
verb go itself, which has some semantic restrictions on some of its uses. (E. g. it
contrasts with come, as in come and go; recall, too, our very first examples (1–4) in
Ch. 1.) Move can thus be quite basic, referring simply to a movement nowhere in
particular, as in it moved.
Thus, we’ll think of it (the concept of moving) as a basic schema that can be
expanded to a putting schema or a removing schema, which we will come to in a




intending here that the element designated y is precisely the Theme of our earlier
discussions; but for the sake of (graphical) simplicity, we will stick with simple letter
names.
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Other verbs that may ‘attach’ here further describe the manner of movement:
verbs such as run and skip, etc.
Another simple component represents activity. A verb for this might be do.
Essentially, the entity ‘doing something’ is an Actor, and an Actor doing something
to something else is an Agent. The schema designating an x acting on some y (thus,
a Patient now) is:
(168) x ; y
and the mere doing of something by x is shown as:
(169) x̂
Actually, if we wanted to make it explicit that the element acting on the y above
(168) was an Agent, i. e. typically an animate entity doing something to bring about
the event, we should put a hat on it too; otherwise it’s just a Cause.
Next comes a situation in which some x does something to cause y to go to z,
which we’ll put below the other two schemata, since it can be seen to include both
movement and agentivity. Many constructions can be covered by this schema. We’ll
represent it in diagrams as
(170) x̂ ; {
y
−→ z }
Element z, in other words, realizes the θ-role Goal. All of Levin’s Verbs of Putting
(a large percentage of her 3000+ verbs, in fact) can be covered by this schema—as
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can many other Levin verbs; a lot of verbs that involve movement are put in other
classes, either because their element of movement seems only potential rather than
definitional, or it’s abstract, or the verbs only potentially involve putting their Theme
somewhere. For instance, Levin quite reasonably has a separate class for verbs of
change of possession, like give—in keeping with our introduction of its basic θ-set
earlier as {Agent, Theme, Recipient} rather than {Agent, Theme, Goal}. However,
for the sake of these generalizing schemata, we will consider a Recipient a Goal,
and thus treat it as a kind of movement, though in the Possessional field, following
Jackendoff (1983).
When we have schemata with multiple roles to express, and roles other than
Agent (which, remember, is realized as the subject of the clause), we can of course
begin to see how the schemata will fail to predict the realization of its arguments.
For this last schema, the realizations include:
(171) x put y in/on/under/around/... z
x poured y into/... z
x inserted y into z
(172) x gave y to z
(173) x gave z y
(174) x filled z with y
So there are at least 4 basic ways of realizing those 3 arguments. (We’re considering
the first construction (171) to have several variants, depending on the exact set of
prepositions being used by a verb.) Actually, we’ve left out two cases in which one
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of the elements is encoded directly by the verb, thus leaving only two elements that
need to be expressed as arguments.
(175) x y+ed z (e. g. painted)
(176) x z+ed y (e. g. potted)
(Compare rain as fall(rain) (p. 56), where there are no elements left to be ex-
pressed as arguments.) Note, too, that we are representing with the schema an
effective simplification of the meaning of the verbs given as examples above—in
spite of warnings concerning such simplifications in earlier chapters; the schema
above doesn’t try to show that the y of fill is actually filling the z, and not just
going to it, etc.
The next schema is intended to cover a lot of ground with the y element simply
made to move in the other direction, i. e. away from the z, with x doing something
that causes that movement.
(177) x̂ ; {
y
←− z }
Its realizations include expressions such as
(178) x stole y from z
(179) x pulled y from/out of z
(180) x robbed z of y
(181) x swindled z out of y
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(182) x y+ed z (e. g. x cored the z)
(183) x z+ed y (e. g. x mined the y)
Note the cases here, too, where one element is incorporated into the verb (as with
core or mine).
A kind of variant on these last two schemata is interesting because it has four
















(185) x sold y to z for $w
(186) x sold z y for $w
(187) z bought y from x for $w
Now, with syntax in mind the idea that there are two Agents might be problematic,
but semantically it’s quite clear that something like agenthood must be ascribed
to the two arguments. (If the seller isn’t acting agentively, it’s theft, not a sale
or purchase.) Given the linking regularity that puts Agents in subject position,
perhaps it isn’t surprising (given that there’s only room for one subject) that there
are two verbs buy and sell each choosing a different Agent for its subject.
There’s another set of verbs that express a concept that has two arguments
acting in a symmetrical manner. We aren’t going to try to represent this graphically,
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but one should imagine that the y and z are both moving away from each other in




and similarly for the case of y going toward the z: imagine that they are both moving
toward one another. This enables variants of the putting and removing schemata
found in:
(189) x mixed y together
(190) x took y apart
We also want to represent Instrument: we’ll imagine it as a v used by x to




For Beneficiary, we have some x acting on y for the benefit of some u:
(192) (x ; y) ; u
as in x cooked some y for u.
We also need to imagine relatively static locations, e. g. an y at a particular
position relative to a z, rather than moving to or from that z. Again, we won’t try
to show it graphically, but instead will treat it as if it were a special case of y going
to or from z.
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Let’s attempt to build all of this up again from scratch. We can have an x
doing something
x̂,
possibly acting on some other element y
x̂ ; y,




and furthermore, possibly, causing that y to go to or from some z
(193) x̂ ; {
y
←→ z },




and/or doing this for the benefit of some u
(x̂
v
; y) ; u.




possibly moving to or from some z
y
←→ z,




and then continue with the composition as before (i. e. with 193).
4.1.2 Application to the Levin classes
The above, we suggest, is a kind of ‘quasi-locationalist’ (i. e. quasi-Jackendoffian)
sketch of how the syntactically relevant semantic possibilities of verbs can supposedly
be conceptualized (leaving out the complication of buy and sell , which would add an
additional Agent and Theme). We basically have schemata for moving, doing, and
acting on something, which can be thought of as combining to produce putting or
removing, with the other schematic bits further combining to include an instrument
or a beneficiary. We have presumably left out a few combinations and/or compli-
cations, but these are the essential elements, according to a (quasi-)locationalist
account. How well does that cover the 3000+ Levin verbs? Surprisingly well—or
rather, they cover the verbs surprisingly well given what little may be needed of
such schemata. By that we mean (in terms of argument realization, for instance):
129
there are only a small number of ways of realizing an argument—as a subject, as a
direct or indirect object, or as an oblique (with some finite range of prepositional
possibilities, though that also varies with the verb), and with a small number of
additional forms for verbs that take sentential arguments. There are potential com-
plications here already, given for instance the unaccusative hypothesis (according to
which some subjects are ‘underlyingly’ objects, p. 105), but even with that, there
are still just a small number of basic ways of realizing an argument. Thus, many
semantic distinctions may not need to be covered. Many of the distinctions between
the verbs we grouped together earlier, like coat , cover , encircle, pad , surround (125,
p. 73), may in fact be immaterial to their syntactic behavior. Of our schemata,
x̂, representing x doing something, may seem pretty close to vacuous; but if some
verbs express little else—not the movement of something somewhere, nor any kind
of movement at all, nor any kind of effect from whatever is being done that could
affect another entity—then ‘x is doing something’ may be all that is really relevant
syntactically—for those verbs, that is.
Otherwise, our analysis will rely heavily on the Jackendoff (1983)-style notion
that many verbs appear to ‘re-use’ the syntactic frames for locational states or
events, putting them to a non-locational use (above, Sect. 1.1, p. 18). The idea
of applying this to the Levin classes is not new; Dorr (1992) created a system for
translation that has actual Jackendoff-style conceptual structures (below, p. 161), for
all the Levin verbs (see also Dorr et al. 2001). Unfortunately, that particular use of
Jackendoff fails to maintain Jackendoff’s own idea of what a Theme in the Locational
field is. As a result, the vast majority of the Locational verbs are assigned at least one
130
conceptual structure that mislabels (by Jakendoff’s criteria) a Theme as something
else; and almost all of the classes below that we present as ‘easily’ mapping onto our
schemata will in fact do so differently than Dorr (1992) or Dorr et al. (2001) would
do.
Levin’s 192 classes, numbered 9.1 through 57, are grouped into 48 high-level
classes, i. e. classes 9 through 57. We’ll run through each of these now, class by
class, to see how the ‘schematization’ we just gave can cover them—and perhaps
even cover the full repertoire of English verbs, depending on how representative
those 3000+ Levin verbs really are. We’ll put off one section of classes until the end
of our discussion, since they include almost exclusively those verbs that are not so
easily covered by our schematization. Actually, Levin, in subdividing her verbs on a
number of very different semantic distinctions, often creates distinctions that align
pretty well with the characteristics that distinguish our schemata—but not always,
and there are problematic cases scattered throughout her classification. Starting at
the ‘top’, then:
• Classes 9 and 10 are called the Verbs of Putting and Removing, respectively;
the names clearly imply that they should be easily covered by our putting
and removing schemata, and perusal of each of the subclasses therein shows
that to be the case. (This is not to say that many verbs in the classes won’t
have senses more basic than putting or removing schemata; the basic senses
might ‘reduce’ to mere moving in a certain manner, for instance, or to being in
a certain configuration—surrounding something, for instance. Mere moving,
131
in the case of move, is actually in the next class. In any case, each of these
verbs can be extended if necessary to refer to putting or removing.) To keep
a discussion that is already overly large from getting even larger, we won’t
typically give specific example verbs for the classes where the class name refers
to a verb directly or indirectly (as the Verbs of Putting and Removing do for
put and remove respectively)—unless an example sentence is needed to clarify
things. The verb classification that really matters for us is listed in Appendix
B, and all of that portion of the 3000+ Levin that we have classified is listed
(and indexed starting on p. 319).
• The next set of verbs is in Class 11 (Verbs of Sending and Carrying), which
also fits the putting or removing schemata, with certain new specializations,
requiring for instance that the x accompany the y in moving to the z, in the
case of verbs like carry. (That x is not merely accompanying y, but being
carried by y, and other similar details, are, in general, only important to us if
they have apparent effects on argument realization and polysemy; and as we’ve
been saying in our references to θ-roles, for the target analysis of this work, in
Chapter 5, we will need even fewer such details, given the particular structure
of the lexicon that we will focusing on.) Again, some verbs, like move, can be
used in a simpler sense that need not express the actually sending of carrying
of something; they may express mere movement, or some other more basic
component.
• Class 12 (Verbs of Exerting Force), as Levin’s descriptive label implies, adds
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an element of force to the manner in which x is acting on y, optionally leading
to the full putting or removing schema. (I. e., when movement is missing, the
senses are ‘reduced’ to the mere acting upon something with force: one can
push against something, for instance, without actually moving it.)
• Class 13 (Verbs of Change of Possession) implements, of course, what Jackend-
off (1983) would call the possessional variant, involving putting or removing
or, for instance, the buy and sell variant of that. (More precisely, Jackendoff
would say these cases involve the elements CAUSE and GO but in the Pos-
sessional rather than the Locational field. Compare the compositions we gave
earlier using cause and go elements (34, 57, 58), or the actual forms from
Jackendoff that we present later (starting on p. 161), which implicitly use the
Locational field; similar structures, but with the Possessional field, could be
proposed for verbs like give.)
• Class 14 (the Learn Verbs) can be thought of as the receiving of knowledge, a
kind of special, Agent-less possessional class.
The first major complication occurs in the next classes.
• Classes 15 (the Hold and Keep verbs) and 16 (Verbs of Concealment) might be
thought of as a static locational variant, i. e. for holding and keeping things, or
for keeping things locationally away from another entity (and for Class 16, for
concealing the things from others, which of course is something else in addi-
tion). For this last class, our schemata appear to be broad enough to include at
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least the essential components of these concepts, though it might not be obvi-
ous, pictorially for instance, how those components should be combined. One
component of verbs like keep is easy to handle: it simply involves the location
of something. Perhaps the other component is something like habitually doing
something to cause the thing to remain in that location. The ‘conceal from
others’ component is more problematic. We’ve implemented ‘from others’ as a
Source in Appendix B, which seems wrong, since the Theme in this case is not
something being moved from the Source, as the role names would otherwise
suggest. On the other hand, FrameNet (Baker et al. 1998) names this role the
‘Vantage Point’, and in keeping with one reasonable way of analyzing certain
perceptual verbs (see below), we might be justified as thinking of this as a
Source of something that could be perceived, but it’s being blocked. (The
fact that it’s not the Source of the designated Theme is something that would
have to be handled with something more sophisticated than our simple θ-sets;
compare our treatment of buy and sell , which has two Agents—each also a
Source and a Goal—and two Themes, similarly unspecified with respect to the
direction with which they are ‘traveling’ between the Agents.)
• Class 17 (Verbs of Throwing), clearly involves movement, with putting and
removing as extensions.
• Class 18 (Verbs of Contact by Impact) also involves movement, and adds the
addition of impact to the component acted upon (as when one bangs against
something), and Class 19 (the Poke Verbs) adds an effect (y pokes through z,
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etc.), but this ‘effect’ can be encoded as displacement (through z) or forceful
action upon something (jab z with y).
• Class 20 (the Touch Verbs) includes the static locational variant extending
towards the movement schemata. (I. e., they touch is perhaps most easily
interpreted as refering to a state, with x touched y refering to the movement
of x, or a part of x, into contact with y.)
• Class 21 (Verbs of Cutting) is clearly a specialization of acting-on that can go
towards movement; i. e., you can cut something (affecting it), or cut something
apart, or cut one element off of another element, etc. (Levin’s alternation 2.5.6,
our Table 3.2, p. 103.)
• Classes 22 (Verbs of Combining and Attaching) and 23 (Verbs of Separating
and Disassembling) involve movement that is possibly symmetrical, possibly
with instruments of various kinds, the latter also generally involving the move-
ment or attachment of something (tape, glue, nails, etc.) onto something else.
Another complication is found in the latter class: differ (in subclass 23.4), is
often abstract; it’s paired with diverge, which can be locational however, and
in a literal sense. To force differ into our schemata, we’ll need Jackendoff’s
(1983) Identificational field: to say that x differs from y is to say that x is not
at the same place, identificationally, as y.
• Class 24 (Verbs of Coloring) involves the movement of coloring or other fin-
ishing substances and/or the acting upon something via colorization (as when
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you tint or varnish something).
• Class 25 (Image Creation Verbs) involves image movement (as when you il-
lustrate something), possibly with an effect on the z acted upon (if incised or
etched with something, for instance).
Here’s where we’ll skip over some of the more problematic classes, to return to them
later.
• Class 35 (Verbs of Searching) clearly involves movement, though it’s movement
directed at a possibly mobile or hidden Goal, or one whose location is unknown;
thus an area may need to be searched to find such a Goal, and that area itself
shades off into something that might seem to be affected by the action, i. e.
acted-upon.
• Class 36 (Verbs of Social Interaction) is made up of verbs that essentially
involve two Actors doing something together, perhaps acting on each other,
and these can shade off into one Agent acting on the other entity, now more like
a Patient; the language facilitates this with alternations like Suzy and Marge
fought vs. Suze fought Marge (Levin’s Simple Reciprocal Alternation, 2.5.4,
our Table 3.2, p. 103.) The details of some of the verbs will have additional
Locational components, such as with x collided with z or x visited z.
• Next up are Classes 37 (Verbs of Communication) and 38 (Verbs of Sounds
Made by Animals), for verbs like ask or read or scream or bark. We’ll think
of them as having a specialized y—i. e., a sound, or a message being commu-
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nicated (in one direction or the other); they appear in the expected syntactic
constructions for concepts that have a Theme and a Recipient or a Goal, or
a Source.
More complications occur in the next classes.
• Classes 39 (Verbs of Ingesting), 40 (Verbs Involving the Body), and 41 (Verbs
of Grooming and Bodily Care) all include verbs involving movement of the
body or of some item or substance to or from, or into or out of, the body—but
some of the verbs simply involve doing something with the body, or almost
anything that just happens to involve the body. As we tried to suggest above,
the long-term goal here should be not to see whether our schemata can make
meaningful distinctions between all these verbs, but to see whether or not
there’s anything ‘in the verbs’ but not in the schemata that is relevant for
argument realization (or, later on, polysemy, though for the moment this is
a concern for the future). Some of the semantic components highlighted by
Levin’s classifications are clearly more important than others, depending on
the verb. Some of the Class 39 verbs, for instance, seem to focus more on
aspects of the social activity of eating, rather than on eating in and of itself:
Subclass 39.5 (the Dine Verbs) includes banquet , feast , picnic, etc. So in terms
of our schemata, this is an elaboration on doing something that only happens
to involve the taking-in of food, etc. But this is okay, and may even be useful
eventually in explaining the difference between banquet , feast , picnic, and eat ,
the former all requiring on, if the thing eaten is to be expressed at all, while
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eat forbids the use of the preposition:
(194) We banqueted/feasted/picnicked *(on) roasted turkey.
(195) We ate *on roasted turkey.
These, of course, are the sorts of distinctions that Levin was thinking of in
classifying her verbs in the first place.
Though Classes 40 and 41 generally concern acting on the body or doing
something with the body, some of them are further problematic in having
merely to do with sensing something with the body, for instance. The next
big set of complications, then, is with these classes. One might expect, in
retrospect, that a class that is characterized first of all simply as the verbs that
happen to involve the body in some way might in fact cut across the apparent
characteristics of Levin’s other ways of organizing the verbs, and that appears
to be the case here. As a result, our intent here to quickly characterize the
Levin classes at the topmost level, viewed against our schemata, isn’t going
to work. Even if we look at the next level of Levin’s subdivisions, we’ll find
a more mixed set of verbs. Class 40.1 (Verbs of Bodily Processes) contains
verbs that can optionally be used to express the movement of something from
the body (breath into the bag, Class 40.1.2, the Breathe Verbs) as well as those
that simply express something the human body does sometimes, typically
involontarily (So-and-so yawned, from Class 40.1.1, the Hiccup Verbs).
(There’s also a Class 40.1.3, the Exhale Verbs, whose verbs may be more
138
finicky about expressing an explicit Theme:
(196) He inhaled/breathed the fumes.
(197) He *inhaled/*exhaled/breathed a deep breath.
(adapted from Levin 1993, p. 218)
The contrasting verb breathe, again, is from 40.1.2.)
The other subdivisions of Class 40 include 40.2 (Verbs of Nonverbal Expres-
sion) and 40.3 (Verbs of Gestures/Signs Involving Body Parts), which involve
doing something with various particular parts of the body, with the action
possibly directed at something (198); in the case also of subclass 40.5 (the
Flinch Verbs), it may be happening as a response to something, also realized
with the preposition at (199); in other cases, either interpretation may be
possible (200):
(198) She pointed at that.
(199) She flinched at that.
(200) She laughed at that.
The ‘response-to’ element is also present for other verbs, including some of
those in subclass 40.6 (Verbs of Body-Internal States of Existence) and sub-
class 40.8 (Verbs of Bodily State and Damage to the Body), though the prepo-
sitional phrase may be headed by from, as in she was still trembling from all
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that she had just witnessed, or her feet were aching from all that walking. Verbs
in subclass 40.4 (the Snooze Verbs) are simple intransitive verbs, merely ex-
pressing being in a certain state, though English happens to express that state
in the present progressive (so-and-so is sleeping), making it seem like a case
of x doing something, rather than x being ‘in a particular state’; and this
is consistent with these verbs using Jackendoff’s (1983) Circumstantial field,
rather than the Identificational one. (Recall our introduction of these fields
in Sect. 1.1, p. 18.) The verbs in subclass 40.7 (the Suffocate Verbs) are quite
different: they’re all change of state verbs—our schema element y is a Patient
that ‘moves’ to a different Identificational state, in Jackendoff’s terms.
• Class 42 (Verbs of Killing) is similarly non-Locational, as one might expect,
and furthermore, in this case the ‘Identificational’ change happens to mean
going out of existence.
• Class 43 (Verbs of Emission) (for emit , glow , sparkle, etc.) is clearly movement
of light, and other things, from a Source.
• Class 44 (the Destroy Verbs) (destroy , demolish, etc.), combines acting on and
going out of existence, much like the kill verbs.
• Class 45 (Verbs of Change of State) is a kind of default class for all the other
verbs that simply refer to an Identificational change—again, a kind of ‘move-
ment’ but in a non-Locational semantic field, from a Jackendoffian viewpoint.
The next set of classes include a lot more verbs directly covered by our movement
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schemata—almost as easily as the Putting and Removing verbs were, in fact. But
there are a few more complications first.
• The verbs in Class 46 (the Lodge Verbs), are slightly richer semantically, but
still clearly locational, expressing variants of the notion of staying somewhere.
• Much of Class 47 (Verbs of Existence), in spite of the class name, involves
movement, else mere being (as if literally) in existence; Levin apparently chose
the class name (and chose to form the class) to draw attention to the way that
English can express certain actions as if they are characteristics of the state of
some locale (the state of its existence, so to speak), as in this place is crawling
with insects, instead of insects are crawling all over this place (Levin’s Swarm
Alternation 2.3.4, in our Table 3.1, p. 100). Much of the class actually includes
locational verbs (including remain and stay), verbs in which there is a change
of state occurring (bloom or grow or decay), or verbs in which the Theme is
sound (echo).
• Class 48 (Verbs of Appearance, Disappearance, and Occurrence) is for coming
into (or going out of) existence and/or ‘view’, but many of the verbs are
again often Locational (gush, rise, spill), though some of them (as in for
something to manifest itself ) may typically, or generally, not be Locational,
in Jackendoff’s terms.
The additional ‘easy classes’ (easily matched to our schemata, that is), whose class
names themselves express their locational aspect, come next—followed immediately
by more complications.
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• Class 49 (Verbs of Body-Internal Motion), whose verbs lack an external Agent,
or at least the language seems to construe things that way (for fidget and
squirm, etc.); Class 50 (Verbs of Assuming a Position: kneel , lie, etc.); and
Class 51 (Verbs of Motion: tumble, run, fly and many others) are all clearly
Locational.
• Class 52 (the Avoid Verbs) happens to present more or less the same problems
as our first real complicated case, i. e. Class 16 (Verbs of Concealment). The
syntactic subject of verbs like conceal is doing something to keep something
away from something else, or someone else, or their gaze, etc.; meanwhile the
subject of verbs like avoid simply is the ‘something’ that is behaving so as
to keep away from that something else, etc. (The avoided entity can also be
something one is trying to avoid doing ; the same is true of the corresponding
argument of keep from Class 15, which we grouped with Class 16.) Thus these
classes will need to be handled in a similar fashion.
• The verbs of Class 53 (Verbs of Lingering and Rushing) either involve doing
something (possibly unspecified) in a particular manner (hesitating , etc.) or
acting upon something else, causing it to behave in that manner (rushing
someone in their activities, for instance).
• Class 54 (Measure Verbs) offers additional complications. Some of the verbs
are clearly locational, though in a stative way (this page contains a lot of
words) or a habitual way (this room holds 30 people comfortably). There
are verbs like bill , charge, fine, or save, which have arguments somewhat
142
reminiscent of sell ’s (probably because the possible price of something is, or
may be, involved), but in this case there’s a Theme that appears to be a bill,
charge, fine, or savings, and so on. Other verbs refer to the assignment of such
values to an entity (it was priced at $100 ), the determination of some such
value (we measured the packaged), or the mere expression of it (it costs $100 ).
• Class 55 (Aspectual Verbs) is for verbs like begin and end. These offer a
complication present in a few verbs already encountered, though here the
complication is perhaps more obvious: we have an x̂ that is intended to be
an Actor, i. e. a typically animate entity doing something; begin and end ,
however, apply to any event starting or stopping, effectively a non-animate-
doing of something.
• Class 56 (the Weekend Verbs) refers to being somewhere for a period of time,
specifying i. e. both a Locational and a quasi-Locational aspect, of time rather
than space (a Jackendoffian Temporal semantic field).
• Class 57 (Weather Verbs) is largely for the 0-arity verbs like rain (or 0-arity
senses of those verbs), conceived of as things like fall(rain), i. e. describing
movement, but with an incorporated argument. More generally, though, as a
class, these verbs seem to be expressing something far less specific: something
like v-ing is happening, where v is the verb, or sometimes just v is happening,
where v = rain. (In fact, with this in mind, fall(rain) should seem redun-
dant; fall(rain-drops) would be better, since rain itself might be conceived
of as including, already, the element of falling.)
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So, looking at things mostly semantically now (which seems to be Levin’s intent
in this half of her book), we have a large number of verb types that nonetheless can
be seen as fitting more-or-less into a Locational schema, as Jackendoff and others
have long argued. But there have been half a dozen or so complications so far.
Some verbs, like conceal or shun, may or may not be literally Locational, and
there’s more to the expressed behavior than simply being or not being in a a certain
location (literal or figurative)—and more to the point, that behavior may affect
the interpretation and/or expression of arguments, as with conceal , whose Source
argument, if that’s what it is, is non-Locational, as discussed above. There are
of course verbs like differ that seem inherently non-Locational, though they may
pattern like other verbs that are often Locational (like diverge). It’s crucial that we
have a ‘doing something’ schema, since some verbs seem to express little more than
that—or rather, whatever else it is that they express is an elaboration on ‘doing’,
and not on anything else in our schemata. And some verbs, of course, are simply
change-of-state verbs, where the change is not Locational, though Jackendoff re-
uses his machinery for these cases by simply changing the semantic field label from
Locational to Identificational.
And of course, we skipped over a set of Levin verbs. Here, too, we have to
apply Jackendoff’s notion of semantic fields rather heavily to fit things into our
schemata.
• Classes 26 (Verbs of Creation and Transformation), 27 (the Engender Verbs),
and 28 (the Calve Verbs) have to do with creation or coming into being (with
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some verbs in there that are more like doing); Jackendoff would take the
phrase coming into being as evidence that we can think of this as being quasi-
locational, as if literally traveling from non-existence to existence, and he has
in fact an Existential field to handle some of these cases.
• For Class 29 (Verbs with Predicative Complements), some of its subclasses in-
volve doing, or acting in a certain way (as in so-and-so posed as as lifeguard).
But most name a Property, or some sort of classification, that is asserted to
apply to one of the verb’s arguments (as in they labeled him a failure). We left
the θ-role Property out of our schemata. But of course, a Property like red
or green is simply what Jackendoff treats as a location-like thing in the Identi-
ficational field, for a sentence like the light went from red to green. In spite of
everything we’ve said so far, we’re actually skeptical of the significance of this
correspondence for constructions that have no obvious Locational counterpart.
But we will make use of it in order to handle some of the remaining classes.
• Class 30 (Verbs of Perception), actually, is only problematic in a different sort
of way: to fix in place a representation for these verbs we’ll have to decide
whether they involve movement of a perceived thing to the perceiver, or of the
perceiver’s attention to the other thing; or perhaps both. Verbs in one subclass
(30.3, the Peer Verbs) require an oblique argument to define the path of one’s
gaze, etc., as in she looked into the room, suggesting, perhaps, that at least
for those verbs the appropriate construction is 〈Source, p Goal〉, with some
range p of prepositions, and with one’s ‘gaze’ etc. the implicit Theme. (Refer
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back to p. 94 for the construction notation.)
• Many verbs in Class 31 (Verbs of Psychological State) are relatively unprob-
lematic, with some entity acting on another in some psychological manner (The
babysitter teased the children; for some of the verbs though the Cause might
not be animate); for others it might be better to think of an entity coming
into a certain state (the events saddened her)—we’ll have to take that coming
into a certain state as another quasi-Locational event, i. e. an Identificational
one.
That leaves three more classes.
• Class 32 (Verbs of Desire) contains more verbs that should probably be an-
alyzed within multiple semantic fields at the same time. These are verbs
of wanting or longing, which have a quasi-locational component: some en-
tity doesn’t have something (or doesn’t have enough of it); and that quasi-
Locational (or Possessional) state then puts the entity itself into some sort
of state, or causes that entity to be an Experiencer of a certain feeling.
We might analyze this in two parts: first, the desired thing is not with the
Experiencer; and then that state of things acts upon the Experiencer (mak-
ing the Experiencer a special kind of Patient).
• And finally, Classes 33 (Judgement Verbs) and 34 (Verbs of Assessment)
have an entity making a certain valuation of something (so-and-so praised the
work), though some of the verbs can also be generic greetings (e. g. greet or
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welcome) or have a different sort of effect on the ‘something’ in question (e. g.
pardoning it); other verbs express the process of simply making an evaluation
(analyzing, reviewing, or studying it, etc.).
That, then, is a brief picture of how a quasi-locationalist, quasi-Jackendoffian
approach fares when applied across something as broad as the set of Levin verbs.
It probably appears that we have tried to grasp the complications that exist down
at a more fully detailed level of semantics only to try to squeeze them through a
comparatively simple space of highly general semantic relations. In a sense, though,
that is also what Jackendoff has been doing, and other, very different work in lin-
guistics is moving in a similar direction. Hale and Keyser (2002) try to explain the
complexities of argument realization in terms of just four possible X-bar structures.
Theorists like Baker (1997), considering syntactic behaviors cross-linguistically, and
building partly on the work of Dowty (1991), suggest that there are really just three
θ-roles (Agent, Theme, and Goal). It’s quite possible—at least some of the authors
just mentioned would consider it probable—that it’s the syntax that is ‘squeezing’
the semantics through a very tight space, with room for only a few basic distinctions.
The question we want to ask now is: did the simplifications and generalizations
of the above schematization cause much data to get lost? There’s an interesting,
highly indirect way of looking at this that we will present in the next section. It
turns out that by simply viewing, in a very crude manner, the distribution of θ-roles
across the verbs, we can come up with an additional piece of evidence that the
behavior of the verbs in argument realization (and perhaps polysemy, too), though
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apparently complex, is actually quite restricted.
4.2 Reverse-engineering the system
To appreciate a second way of filtering or reorganizing the data, which we present
below, it’s useful to consider the relative number of θ-roles (15 or so), θ-sets (over
300), and construction families (about 700), given the number of verbs (i. e. a little
over 3000 in Levin 1993). We might also want: the size of the largest θ-set (5), and
the size of the largest construction family (30-something, though about half are size
6 or smaller). What sorts of things can we discern from these numbers alone?
Well, there are about 215 = 32768 potential θ-sets, and barely 1% of those are
attested here. Perhaps that makes sense: we might expect Agent and Actor, for
instance, to be mutually exclusive, since we are using Agent to refer to (roughly)
an Actor that is actually acting upon something, and usually having an effect on
it. But given the existence of verbs like buy and sell that have two Agents, it’s not
logically the case that they have to be mutually exclusive.
But we mentioned that the attested θ-sets are no larger than 5 in size. That









And less than 7% of them are attested.
Moving to the construction families (about 700 in number, with over 300
θ-sets), it’s clear that a similar pattern will appear. The number of attested con-
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struction families is a tiny fraction of the number of potential ones, even given the
small number of attested θ-sets.
Note, too, that we haven’t even considered the question of the possible syn-
tactic realizations, which we could also analyze in a similar manner, although we’d
probably want to do so in a more sophisticated way in this case because with only a
small number of θ-roles, we’d probably want to limit the number of ways a particu-
lar θ-role could be realized, and limit the number of ambiguities in such realizations
(i. e. in order to refrain from giving each θ-role one of 2p sets of possible realizations,
where p is the number of prepositions).1
But there’s one more question that we can answer in a more empirical manner.
Since we are more or less given a set of θ-sets (of which we chose the θ-roles, of
course, but in a way that always was dependent on the apparent semantics of the
corresponding verbs), and since we are similarly given the set of construction families
(using Levin’s (1993) data in both cases), what does the distribution of the former
1Though it seems pretty clear what we are doing here in retrospect, it might be useful (as it was
to us) to think of these calculations as a kind of ‘Fermi problem’ in reverse. An example of this can
be found in Weisskopf (1986) (with some discussion in Walker 1977), though Weisskopf doesn’t
refer to Fermi problems by name. Weisskopf attempts to account for why the tallest mountains
on Earth are on the order of 10 kilometers high, imagining (for the sake of the estimation) that
mountains are blocks of silicon dioxide, and taking into consideration silicon dioxide’s molecular
weight and chemical bonds, etc. A normal Fermi problem (Morrison 1963) has the same character,
but goes from basic facts to an estimation of something seemingly far less basic. For instance:
Los Angelos is 3 times zones away from Washington, D. C.; there are 24 hours in the day; you can
deduce from that (if you don’t already know) that there are 24 time zones circling the globe. If
you can estimate the distance between Washington and Los Angelos to be about 3,000 miles, then
you now have an approximation of the the earth’s circumference: 24 time zones × 3,000 miles / 3
time zones = 24,000 miles.
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over the latter look like? I. e. how are the θ-sets distributed over the construction
families? Do things look even close to random? No, the following charts show that
that is not the case at all. To fit the huge amount of data on a page, we’ve applied
the union operator to each θ-family, so that each verb gets a set of θ-roles it uses
in one or more constructions. We then collected together the verbs that are thus
assigned to the same set of θ-roles. This is plotted on the top graph of the next
page (θ-role vs. verb class). We also did something similar with the construction
families; for each verb, we constructed the set of θ-role realizations; so for instance,
if in one construction a verb realizes a Goal in a prepositional phrases headed by
to, and in another construction realizes it as the object of the verb phrase (i. e.
not inside a prepositional phrase), then the verb’s set of realizations would include
〈to, Goal〉 and Goal. This is plotted in the bottom graph (θ-realization vs. verb
class). Of course, the detailed information in the graphs has been obliterated due to
their size, but providing that information here would have been somewhat besides
the point in any case; what matters here is that the graphs are quite sparse, and
on top of that, there’s a strong clustering in both graphs around the θ-roles (or
realizations) positioned near the center of the graph. (We used a quick-and-dirty
clustering algorithm to put like verbs near like verbs, and to put similar sets of
θ-roles (or realizations) near similar sets of θ-roles (or realizations).) The θ-roles
that are getting all the attention are Agent, Theme, Source, and Goal, and, in the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: θ-roles and -realizations vs. verb class. Here, ‘verb class’ means the subset of the Levin (1993) verbs that uses a






Searching for a system
Chapter 5
Tackling idiosyncrasy
So where do we stand now with respect to verbs and their argument taking behav-
iors?
1) From our charts, it looks like a very small number of θ-roles (4 or 5) might
‘cover’ in some way most of the grouping of arguments into θ-sets and θ-families.
Perhaps there’s some syntactic restriction on the total number and nature of the roles
(Hale and Keyser 2002, etc.); as we suggested in Sect. 4.1, underlyingly, arguments
may have only a very small number of distinct syntactic positions to attach to, and
perhaps it’s these distinct positions that ultimately determine the patterns we see,
putting a limit on the ability of semantic differences to lead to syntactic differences.
Since our goal here is merely to provide evidence that there is a systematicity at
work, though, we aren’t going to delve into any possible mechanisms of the Hale
and Keyser sort; we are simply going to show, in a completely different way (and in
a much more precise way below than in Sect. 4.1), that a small number of θ-roles
suffice to ‘cover’ the data.
2) We’ve known from the start, from our first contrastive pair rob and steal,
that however semantically determined these phenomena may be, there will be addi-
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tional complicating elements, given the existence of thematically identical verbs like
rob and steal that diverge in their properties. (On the other hand, these are proba-
bly rare, and will probably remain rare even when including thematically identical
verbs like buy and sell . Perhaps these form a kind of limiting case in some way,
with most verbs like the verb rob or like steal exhibiting semantic particulars that
make them a natural fit for the rob pattern, or for the steal pattern, rather than
being arbitrarily assigned to one or the other, as seems to be the case with rob and
steal themselves.) There are also phonological considerations, incidentally, implicit
in our very brief mention earlier of the apparent limits on the dative double object
construction, for instance (Pinker 1989, and citations therein).
3) Certain apparent idiosyncrasies remain largely untouched by anything we’ve
discussed so far; for instance, the choice of prepositions, or whether or not an ar-
gument needs to appear with a preposition—and our examples here probably just
scratched the surface.
4) And taking into consideration all the divergences of the type we’re interested
in, i. e. in the different sets of arguments a verb may use and in how they are
realized, there are a large number of ‘polysemy patterns’—about 700 θ-families, for
the approximately 3000 verbs we are looking at.
5) Thus the basic notion of a verb class (Fillmore 1970) needs to be firmly
separated from the particular classes Levin (1993) posited, and other classes of that
sort that attempt merely a kind of holistic grouping of verbs. There are a large
number (470, or 67% of 700) of the ‘true’ or ‘narrow’ verb classes with only one
member in them. Levin’s classes are at best family relations (Wittgenstein 1953,
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Rosch and Mervis 1975, Lakoff 1987), which in this case, as a simple matter of fact,
have no single set of constructions available to define the class, and in the worst
case might even lack a significant, common set of semantic components.
In fact, it’s probably worse than that. The notion of a family relation can be
convenient because in some cases it is simply an (apparent) empirical fact that people
categorize things in that way; if Lakoff (1987) is right, a word might be used in a
number of different ways, and those senses may lack a common, core semantic notion
that would cover them all—and yet somehow all of them seem inter-related anyway.
(They might seem, in fact, to present themselves as an instance of polysemy, not
homonymy). Wittgenstein used the various kinds of activities known as games as an
example of a family relation; Lakoff (1987) (building apparently on Brugman 1981)
argues something similar for the ways of using over
(202) Climb over the wall.
(203) Drive right over curb.
(204) Hang it over the window.
(205) Smear it all over the wall.
(206) Flip over the disk.
...
Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) also suggest that the resultative constructions (p.
105) form a family relation.
But there appears to be no similar empirical fact for grouping the Levin verbs
as she chose to do so—and thus, possibly no fact about language that we should
look for to say anything about the grouping Levin created, because it is indeed an
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artificial thing (an ‘artificial construct’ as she herself says, in the quote we gave
earlier, p. 88); it’s not a natural thing that calls out for an explanation (as Lakoff
evidently thinks the uses of over do).
So yes, returning to Fillmore and Levin, there is a cluster of verbs of change
of possession which share the property of expressing their Goal argument in a PP
headed by to, or alternately in the double object construction—to return to just
one example. But the verbs in that class also widely differ from one another with
respect to the other constructions. And so on for all of the other alternations that
Levin (1993) lists that are used by more than just a couple of verbs.
As a result, a fully meaningful notion of a verb class might be nothing more
that a set of verbs that truly do behave the same in respect to some small number of
criteria, but in other ways (generally) will diverge. This is in keeping with our charts
at the end of Ch. 3. Interesting things might be discovered by looking at the cases
where multiple verbs do seem to be indistinguishable by their θ-sets or argument
realization patterns, but these cases are somewhat in the minority (numbering about
230, or 33% of the 700 verb classes), and will probably grow smaller in number as
they are looked at more closely.
5.1 Words and Rules
We’ll review now some of the positions one might try to take with respect to the
data and analyses we’ve given so far. We mentioned the first and weakest positions
earlier. There’s the ‘less-than-associative account’: these apparent idiosyncrasies
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are in fact idiosyncratic, part of the mass of things (the listemes) that simply must
be learned one-by-one (and, i. e., listed in the lexicon). Thus a natural language
processing system must concentrate on acquiring somehow, for each word in the
language (especially the verbs), enough data to determine all the idiosyncrasies
governing the proper use of that word. The vast bulk of recent work in computational
linguistics, taking advantage of the amount of language data now available in digital
form to try to glean, from that data, what the idiosyncrasies a language’s words are,
are falling by default into a kind of less-than-associative approach.
We’ve already seen in a number of places, though, that this positions is cer-
tainly too weak, because it fails to account for the fact that a least some productivity
(found in its full form with the +ing suffix, for instance, and found with less-than-
full productivity with +ed) can also take hold with verb argument realization and
polysemy patterns. Thus there is an ‘associative account’ that one might attempt
to make. At the very least, there appears to be a tendency for verbs that realize
their arguments in a certain way to group with other verbs of like meaning, with all
of them realizing their arguments in a similar way. (Compare the patterns one finds
with irregular verbs—should one use the regular form sneaked, or snuck, patterning
it like shrink, shrank, shrunk (Pinker 1999)?) It also fails to explain regularities
such as the occurrence of Agents as subjects, etc. Let’s suppose, in spite of the last-
mentioned flaw, that a position that seems to handle certain vague patterns (such as
the irregular verbs) might be taken by some as a reasonably safe, first approximation
of what we are certain about in language. We’ll call this the ‘purely associative’
account. We’ll call an account enhanced with additional ‘linguistic particulars’ (the
157
linking of Agents to subject positions, etc.) a ‘linguistically associative’ account (or
perhaps a ‘language-based associative’ account, understood not to mean specific to
a particular language, but to natural language in general).
Note that, with everything we’ve presented so far, it would be very reasonable
to think that a ‘linguistically associative’ mechanism is all there is behind polysemy
and argument realization. The verb steal happens to realize its arguments in a
certain way—reflecting, of course, certain broad patterns of argument realization,
such as the realization of Agent as subject; other verbs that mean something similar
to steal may tend to realize their arguments similarly—but there might be other
models available, as is in fact the case: the verb rob exists, so some of the verbs
may behave like steal, others like rob. (And generally they would do so according to
which of the verbs they are most similar to, of course.)
Similarly, some of Levin’s Verbs of Putting will behave like put, with theme re-
alized as object, but with only certain broad patterns of argument realization, giving
for instance Agents as subjects, there are still other possibilities for the realization
of the other arguments of Verbs of Putting (i. e. the Theme and Goal; especially if
the Goal is Patient-like); so some verbs will behave like fill rather than put, and
others (spray, load, etc.) will behave like put sometimes and other times like fill.
Adding those ‘linguistic particulars’ is quite a challenge in itself. And yet the
purpose of this research has been to consider the possibility that this ‘linguistically
associative’ account is still too weak.
Consider Pinker’s (1998) claim that necessary and sufficient conditions are a
hallmark of rule-based rather than associative systems. This may be a kind of off-
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hand remark by Pinker, something not necessarily crucial to his argument. (Namely,
that there are in fact distinct subsystems involved here; whether or not they can
be accurately characterized as associative and rule-based is another matter. Then
again, the very title Pinker chose, for his original article, and his book, and for the
theory, is ‘Words and Rules’.) It seems fair to point out, however, that a system
may have certain hallmarks of necessary and sufficient conditions but still be so big
and complicated that it might go beyond what (for practical reasons) one want to
handle with a ‘good old-fashioned AI’ rule-based mechanism. Also, the rules of a
system may themselves accrue or fade in a complicated way, depending on the lexical
items acquired by the system. What if we uncover evidence of sufficient conditions
at work with argument realization and patterns of polysemy? (Well, that’s already
been done in at least some areas, as with Agents appearing as subjects.) What if
we uncover evidence that, in spite of cases like rob and steal, the correct semantic
encodings of verbs lead to the appearance of full productivity?
5.2 Limits to (ir)regularity?
With the above in mind, we should note first that there is a degree of pessimism with
regard to the possible systematicity of the lexicon that is found in varying degrees
in all the work we cite here that deals with the lexicon extensively. For instance,
earlier discussions might have left the reader with the impression that at this point
there are quite a number of potentially idiosyncratic decisions that have to made
almost verb by verb to come to a reasonable Jackendoff-style decomposition of a
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semantic structure. This is more or less correct.
Jackendoff (1990), as we mentioned, attempts to produce what he calls a kind
of ‘minimalist’ lexicon—a ‘minimalist’ lexicon being, in this context, one whose en-
tries would specify phonological structure (i. e. what the word sounds like), part of
speech information (i. e. whether a words is a noun or verb or adjective, etc.), con-
ceptual structure (the semantic representation), and nothing else.1 But Jackendoff
backs off from the ‘minimalist’ goal quite a bit, in the face of (what he sees as)
seemingly unsurmountable challenges. The first problem is linking: the lexicon can
be minimal only if argument realization can be fully predicted from the semantic
forms. And the second problem, naturally enough, is polysemy: for a truly minimal
lexicon, there should be a minimal number of semantic forms for each word, with
others created automatically as necessary according to the procedures that define
the patterns of polysemy. Both of these are real problems. Jackendoff does have
some success at minimalization, succeeding, via use of a θ-hierarchy, to systematize
at least the gross aspects of linking regularities (eliminating as a possible word *ben-
ter, the ‘backwards enter ’ used in the room bentered her, meaning she entered the
room—Jackendoff’s adaption of Carter’s (1988) examples).
But he needs to use 〈〉-brackets on argument markers (designating optionality)
to distinguish devour from eat, as in:
1Jackendoff, of course, is playing off Chomsky’s use of the term minimalist, as in Chomsky’s
Minimalist Program (1995).
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(207) He ate his meal.
(208) He devoured his meal.
(209) He ate.
(210) *He devoured.
—the argument markers being the letters ‘A’ that he uses to the mark the elements
















, [GO([Thing ]A , [TO [IN [MOUTH-OF [ ]
α]]])])]
]
Note the 〈〉 around only the ‘A’ marking the entity devoured; the superscripts are
co-indices, showing in this case, that the Agent (the first argument of CAUSE) is
also the Goal of the Theme, both being marked with an α.
Underlining stipulates optional pieces of semantic structure to distinguish e. g.
senses of open:
(213) The door opened.




[CAUSE([Thing ]A , [GO([Thing ]A , [TO [OPEN]])])]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
]
I. e. Jackendoff has no theoretical explanation for why the intransitive concept of
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Figure 5.1: Pustejovsky’s (1995) entry for float has only the qualia element float(),
gaining move(), and at(), as here, when it combines with into. But we lack a
system for actually generating the full set of such lexical entries, or even predicting
in full which ones might compose. (Pustejovsky’s agentive covers territory that
is often too broad for our Agents to participate in, as we’ve defined them; we’d call
the element marked ‘ 1 ’ an Actor or Actor/Theme, since it isn’t necessarily acting
on anything. So would Jackendoff, presumably.)
simply marks the pieces of meaning that are added with the transitive version (the
specific causer-of-the-action, i. e. the Agent or Cause component) as optional.
Pustejovsky (1995) appears to have an even more open-ended set of conceptual
elements (he refers to them as qualia), combining them through co-composition:
the figure below shows his structure for float into, derived from float and into,
naturally enough. But whereas Jackendoff (1990) constrains things (in theory, at
least) through adjunct correspondence rules and explicitly stipulated combinations
of conceptual structure (stipulative though they may be), Pustejovsky’s presentation
of the material lacks even a notational device for doing the stipulations.
Levin’s own variant of conceptual structure (intentionally much simpler than
Jackendoff’s) also leaves many possible regularities unexplained; Levin and Rappa-
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port Hovav (1998) propose structures with slots for verb-specific semantic roots and
conclude that much depends on which semantic roots fit in which structures. Here
are some of their structures, and example roots (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005).
<state>, <place>, and <manner> become <dry>, <bottle>, and <jog>,
respectively, giving verbs dry , bottle, and jog .
(216) [[x ACT] CAUSE [y BECOME <STATE>]]
(217) [[x ACT] CAUSE [y BECOME IN <PLACE>]]
(218) [x ACT<MANNER>]
They suggest that there exist lexical rules that cause a root of a certain type that ap-
pears in certain structures to appear in other structures as well. And they introduce
some rules of argument realization to govern which arguments appear as subject or
object. Unfortunately, beyond some discussion of the existence of different types of
roots (e. g. of states, places, and manners, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005), their
nature and distribution is—and they stress this—essentially uninvestigated.
We mentioned Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)’s pessimistic statement about
bleed and burp, namely, that the causative uses
(219=105) The doctor bled the patient.
(220=106) The father burped the baby.
are simply idiosyncratic—not the result of some regular process. They even go so far
as to suggest that they could be seen as something akin to the ungrammaticalities
that are common in real speech (Pinker 1989), violations, according to Pinker, of the
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criteria that govern the make-up of his narrow conflation classes, but not the broad
classes. Pinker suggests, though, as we mentioned early on, that those committing
such errors recognize them as errors in retrospect. I. e., they’re genuine performance
errors. And if there are no other verbs behaving like bleed and burp, that could
be because there’s something about the concepts that those verbs express (in their
causative use) that is not easily duplicated.
We’ll go a bit deeper into Jackendoff’s representations in section 5.4. We
won’t go any deeper than this because we only want to point out the degree to
which these accounts fall short of (in Jackendoff’s words) a ‘minimalist’ account of
the phenomena—which is something each of the authors are very much aware of. As
we’ve been saying, it may seem that the language data really is just messy: messy
enough that it might in fact be reasonable to think the regularities really don’t go
much deeper than whatever is allowed already, as it happens, by these systems.
In fact, we know of only a couple of general approaches that might lead one
to try to counter the ‘linguistically associative’ account. One is to take very seri-
ously the notion that any learning device has to have a built-in bias of some sort
(Mitchell 1990), and hypothesize biases that would affect the kinds of argument
realizations and polysemy patterns that are available in a very specific way. One
such approach, speaking very generally now, is the theoretical one that attempts to
draw on work in syntax, trying to extend apparent regularities in syntax to mat-
ters of argument realization and polysemy, i. e. work such as Hale and Keyser’s
(Hale and Keyser 2002, etc.): if they’re right, there’s a unity to syntactic structure
and argument structure, and an associative model has the extra burden of not just
164
accounting for the ‘easy stuff’ (the nominally non-rule-governed stuff of Pinker’s
words-and-rules approach) but all the syntactic regularities that would (following
Hale and Keyser) be related and would (following Pinker) be rule-governed. (Specif-
ically, Hale and Keyser attempt to link argument realization regularities to, among
other things, and barely scratching the surface here, the X-bar structures we very
briefly introduced in Sect. 1.2.2.) Of course, other researchers are trying to embed
rule-governed stuff inside a connectionist model (Smolensky 1988, Smolensky 2006);
even if that ends up being successful, though, the details of the regularities will still
need to be worked out—from a Mitchell (1990)-like viewpoint, it could be argued
that this is really all that the generative approach to language (implicit in the ‘rules
half’ of Pinker’s dichotomy) is trying to do.
The other general way we know of for approaching these matters is to simply
look in a much more general way for signs of broad regularities. And that’s the
approach we are taking here. What follows are the initial results of a conceptually
simple investigation, applied to Levin’s (1993) alternation data; the results suggest
that, notwithstanding the complications we’ve introduced throughout this work,
there is in fact a strong and general regularity in the lexicon—one that isn’t, in fact,
reflected yet in a system like Jackendoff’s, or Pustejovsky’s, nor that of Levin and
Rappaport Hovav.
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5.3 ‘Linking’ linking and polysemy
So what can we do to show that there is more systematicity here than the above
authors have been willing to commit to?
The most straightforward approach, when confronted with the divergences in
verb behavior that we have presented in the preceding chapters, is to try to refine
the components of one’s semantics, such as the θ-roles, until the divergent behaviors
are all accounted for—or written off as mere accidents. In our terms, this would
amount to a gradual enlargement of the set of θ-roles until each legitimate θ-set has
only one way of being realized by any verb that utilizes it—except for those that
are ‘written off’ as idiosyncratic.
Obviously, a simple mapping from θ-sets to their realizations (i. e. construc-
tions) is not going to be achieved with the rather general θ-roles we’ve been using.
There will tend to be realization divergences for each of the alternations we grouped
together in Table 3.1 (p. 100), for instance. In fact, we’ll have a one-to-many map-
ping from the full set of θ-sets (left, Fig. 5.2) to the set of constructions that realize
those θ-sets (right, same Figure) for almost every verb in the lexicon—given that
almost all of them (98% in fact) use at least one θ-set that has multiple realizations,
given the set of 14 θ-roles we are going to use below. The example in Fig. 5.2 shows
a divergence for fill and put.
Getting rid of this one-to-many mapping has thus seemed much too hard—
so many different θ-roles seem to be needed. This has been used as an argument

















e. g. x filled z with y





Figure 5.2: The one-to-many mapping from θ-sets to constructions, here showing a
divergence for put and fill .
there just are a lot of idiosyncrasies that have to be stipulated by other means
(as with Jackendoff, perhaps). Such complexities are one reason that Jackendoff
works with conceptual structures, and their seemingly richer, more potentially useful
formal properties; argument realization derives from those structures, not semantic
roles labels attached to positions in those structures. (Though Jackendoff would
allow you to produce a set of such roles defined in terms of the structures, if you
wanted to do so.)
And in any case, we’ve seen that thematically identical verbs such as rob and
steal can’t really be distinguished by θ-roles anyway: no matter how specific the
role names are, the two verbs will get the same θ-set. (Or at least, they ought to, if
they reflect all and only the role semantics.) And of course there are at least a few
other pairs of thematically identical verbs, like buy and sell.
But what if one goes ahead and partitions the verbs by θ-families anyway,
using general θ-roles, and without a concern for the size of the partition? (Large,
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compared to Levin’s set of a mere 190 or so classes.) We show here that this is exactly
what one should do; that there is a kind of indirect ‘way in’ with this approach, a
‘way in’ to seeing that there are indeed systematicities here; this basically involves
ignoring certain divergences while attending to others. It’s an approach that in a
way is complementary to the one that attempts to tackle divergences by refining
θ-roles, or by concentrating strictly on purely syntactic regularities.
5.3.1 A complementary approach
What is this complementary approach? No one seems to have noticed that there even
is one, in fact; or if they noticed it, apparently it didn’t seem to be worth looking at.
Pictorially, the conventional approach can be seen as an attempt to fix the problems
that arise when one’s analysis of verbal syntax and semantics leaves two different
sets of verbs intersecting in some sort of syntactico-semantic ‘space’, even though
they diverge in their behavior in that space, even inside the intersection—the facts
showing distinct classes ‘pointing’ in different directions on one plane, so to speak,









(Put θ-sets, like {Agent, Theme, Goal}, inside the ovals; each oval has all the θ-sets
some verb utilizes, but the frames in the intersections are realized differently by
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verbs attached to different ovals.)
A simple picture; but it suggest to us another way of going at these things. The
conventional course concerns itself, so to speak, with those arrows in the intersections
pointing in different directions—e. g. with the fact that rob goes one way, and steal
another, on the θ-set {Agent[/Thief], Source/Patient[/Victim], Theme[/Loot]}.
And this, of course, is considered a problem, if one wants to explain argument
realization in terms of semantics (e. g. the θ-set). But the picture makes it quite clear
(to us at least) that looking to see if the elements in the intersections go in different
directions isn’t the only question; instead, one could look to see if the elements that
go in different directions always belong to different families (i. e. different ovals). In
other words, for each divergent realization (say, the one represented by the dotted




(Seeing argument realization as a problem of linking—seeing it, i. e., as a linking
of verb arguments to particular positions in syntactic structure; and seeing θ-sets,
enclosed within the circles above, as a representation roughly of the different senses
of the verb—we’ll see why that’s a rough characterization in a moment; then if we
can show ‘diverging circles’ for each pair of ‘divering arrows’, we’d be suggesting a
link, so to speak, between linking and polysemy.)
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Here again, then, are the examples of this pairing of divergences that we
presented seen earlier; this time we’ll include the rest of our formal apparatus. In in
Fig. 1.1 (p. 10), we contrasted the behavior of fill and pour with children, marbles,
and a bowl as arguments; here’s the same example with workers, gravel, and bins:
(221a) *The workers poured/*filled gravel into the bins.
b) The workers filled/*poured the bins with gravel.
(222) Gravel completely fills/*pours the bins.
We saw the pattern again with fill and insert (ps. 67-67). Those verbs, too, realize
a shared θ-set {Agent, Theme, Goal} in different ways; but only fill can realize
{Theme, Location}:
(223≈112) They filled the space with air. {Agent, Goal, Theme}
(224=113) They inserted the cards into the slots. {Agent, Theme, Goal}
(225≈115) Air fills this space. {Theme, Location}
(226=117) *The card inserts this slot. {Theme, Location}
Thus, we have another divergence in argument realization (here, on {Agent, Theme,
Goal}) accompanied by a divergence in θ-family membership. (Insert ’s family, but
not fill ’s, lacking {Theme, Location}.)
So what about rob and steal? Here, too, we get paired divergences: steal
seems to use two θ-sets that rob doesn’t use; thus rob and steal do in fact belong to
distinct θ-families.
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(227) They stole/*robbed $1000. {Agent, Theme}
(228) *They stole/*robbed away from the party.
{Actor/Theme, Source}
So we have divergences in argument realization co-occurring with divergences
in what we will loosely call patterns of polysemy (fill, but not insert having a stative
sense, as in air fills this space). Formally, we have in each case, first: at least one θ-
set in the intersection of the θ-families for two verbs; and those verbs have divergent
realizations for that θ-set. In symbols, let Θv be the θ-family of verb v, and let Cm∈Θv
be the set of realizations of m ∈ Θv. (We’re thinking of m as loosely representing
a ‘meaning’ of v.) Note that Cm∈Θv is a set: in general, a verb may realize a θ-set
in multiple ways. Here, for instance, are the ways that give might be said to realize
the set {Agent, Theme, Recipient}:
(229) *They gave that money to the charity.
(230) They gave the charity that money.
(Which is another instance of the dative alternation, Levin’s alternation 2.1, listed
in our Table 3.1, p. 100.)
To distinguish two sets S and T formally, let S ⊖ T be (S − T) ∪ (T − S), i. e.
the symmetric difference of sets S and T, containing all the elements in S but not
in T, and in T but not in S. We will also override the meaning of C and apply it to
θ-families (via their verbs) as well as θ-sets: Cv is the realization of Θv, i. e. the set
of constructions realizing each of the θ-sets in Θv. To allow a one-to-one mapping
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from Θv to Cv, in spite of the existence of multiple realizations for some θ-sets, we’ll
require that Θv be a multiset where necessary: according to the example above (229,
230), Θgive has two copies of {Agent, Theme, Recipient}, each realized a different
way. (Similarly, the multiset Θfill in Fig. 5.3, which we’ll describe in a moment, has
two copies of {Theme, Goal}; we’ll also see in a moment that we use these multisets
to handle a particular feature of certain multiply-realized θ-sets.)2
With these definitions, the pattern of paired divergences we saw above (221–
230) can be formalized as follows. For all u and v,
The Rule of Co-occurrences:
(231) * ∃(m ∈ Θu ∩Θv)[Cm∈Θu ⊖ Cm∈Θv 6= ∅] ⇒ Θu ⊖Θv 6= ∅
⇒ Θu 6= Θv
I. e. the existence of diverging realizations on any θ-set m for any verbs u and v
(Cm∈Θu ⊖ Cm∈Θv 6= ∅) implies (judging from the examples seen so far) that u and
v have different (though overlapping) θ-families: i. e. Θu 6= Θv. We hypothesize,
in fact—as we’ve already shown by calling this a ‘rule of co-occurrences’—that this
is a general rule, and not just a tendency, and that it applies in a non-trivial way,
given an appropriate assignment of θ-roles. Most of the rest of this chapter, then,
and much of the one that follows, will be concerned with supporting that claim and
clarifying exactly what it means.
2We failed to mention it earlier, but the reader may have noticed that we allow our θ-sets to
be multisets, too; Levin’s With-drop alternation 1.4.2, in our Table 3.1, p. 100, has two Actors in













































e.g. x put y in/on/... z
e.g. x filled z with y
e.g. x filled z
e.g. y fills z
e.g. y filled z















































Figure 5.3: A diagram representing a one-to-one mapping from all valid θ-families
to their construction families. Shown are, left, θ-families Θfill and Θput ; right, their
corresponding construction families Cfill and Cput , plus example skeletal sentences
(for put, with some range p of prepositions). (For other reasons, we also require
a one-to-one mapping from each θ-family to its realization; hence the multiset for
Θfill .)
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We said that we think of Θv as a rough way of representing the senses of
verb v. This makes it useful to approach our hypothesis by way of a corollary; the
justification of its label (‘Isomorphism’) will appear in a moment.
(Corollary) Isomorphism:
(232) * Each θ-family has only one possible realization.
(Proof: by way of a contradiction, suppose instead that Θu = Θv for verbs u and v,
but Cu 6= Cv. Then
(233) *∃(m ∈ Θu ∩Θv)[Cm∈Θu ⊖ Cm∈Θv 6= ∅]
—i. e., there must be at least one θ-set m which u and v realize with different con-
structions. But then the Rule of Co-occurrences (231) applies immediately, leading
to Θu 6= Θv, a contradiction. (Thus 231 ⇒ 232.))
Thus, though the mapping from θ-sets to constructions is one-to-many (as
diagrammed on p. 167), the mapping from θ-families to construction families may
be one-to-one, even with general θ-roles—as in Fig. 5.3. (Construction families
map many-to-one to θ-families by definition, since the former are just versions of
the latter whose members have been ordered and decorated, e. g. with prepositional
information. The above proof shows that the inverse mapping is also many-to-one;
thus the mapping is really one-to-one.) To get the isomorphism, though, we’ll have
to assign the ‘right’ set of θ-roles—and they’ll have to be the ‘right’ ones in two
different ways. First, they need to make all the distinctions that appear to be
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necessary to create the isomorphism; but we also will insist that they be faithful to
the concepts being expressed by the verbs, of course. Suppose, for instance, we were
to assign {Agent, Theme, Source} to remove and swindle, as in:
(234) They removed the money from the vault.
(235) They swindled their clients out of $1,000,000.
Suppose further, for the sake of the argument, that remove and swindle happened
to have the same θ-families, but—contrary to isomorphism—different construction
families as well, as this divergence on {Agent, Theme, Source} suggests would in-
deed be the case. But only swindle specifically implies that the Source argument is
also victimized by the expressed event (or tricked, or cheated, or something like
that); thus we’d be fully justified in changing the role of that argument from
Source to Source/Patient—i. e. the more general of the names we’ve given the
corresponding arguments for rob and steal . Then the divergence above (234, 235)
would disappear—different θ-sets are now involved, so there’s no longer anything
to diverge—and, unless there are divergences elsewhere, the isomorphism would no
longer be threatened.
Note that in a purely formal way—that is, without any concern over the num-
ber or meaningfulness of the θ-roles—this same process could be applied to all prob-
lematic divergences, guaranteeing that an isomorphism is always formally possible.
But we noted earlier that there exist (what we defined as) thematically identical verb
pairs, like rob and steal or buy and sell (p. 78); as we argued there, for these verbs
we won’t be able to refine the θ-roles in a way that will distinguish the apparent
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realization divergences, except by adding non-thematic material to the θ-roles. For
instance, we could start by giving buy and sell highly specific θ-roles, like Buyer,
Seller, Goods, Money; and since that still doesn’t distinguish the verbs, we could
‘cheat’ and give buy the roles Buyer/Topic, Seller, Goods, Money, with sell taking
the roles Buyer, Seller/Topic, Goods, Money. But in calling one argument or the
other ‘Topic’ we are merely labeling it with what is more or less the default discourse
role of grammatical subjects (Mithun 1991); we might as well mark it ‘Subject’ and
do away with the semantic components entirely. So with these thematically identical
verbs, realization divergences ought to be maintained, and isomorphism, then, will
exist only if the Rule of Co-occurrences applies to these verbs too.
There are two more important complications to discuss. We use the term di-
vergence co-occurrents to refer to divergences in one realm that are accompanied
by divergences in the other. The first realm is argument realization, and the di-
vergences are just different constructions realizing a particular θ-set. Given that
we loosely equate θ-sets with the senses of a verb, one can guess that in the other
realm, the most important type of divergence co-occurrent (for us) is: i) a difference
in polysemy (here, existence of a stative sense for fill but not put):
(236) *Air completely fills/*puts this space {Theme, Location}
But in this second realm a divergence co-occurrent may also be seen as merely ii) a
difference in argument optionality:
176
(237) He filled the glass {Agent, Goal}
(238) *He put into the glass {Agent, Goal}
Thus, in less formal, but still precise terms, our rule of co-occurrences says that
divergences in argument realization are accompanied by divergences in polysemy,
or argument optionality. (Thus, for thematically identical verbs: if they diverge in
argument realization, they must have divergence co-occurrences.)
There is one more important caveat, though. We stated that the θ-sets are
multisets in general, but the formalisms above rather hide the consequences of that.
First of all, given multisets Θu and Θv, with m ∈ Θu ∩ Θv, we must take care
to define Θu − Θv so that if the multiplicities of m in Θu and Θv are j and k,
respectively, then the multiplicity of m ∈ Θu −Θv is the maximum of j − k and 0.
Consider the following situation for hypothetical verbs u and v:
(239) Θu = {{α, β}, {α, β}}, Cu = {〈α, β〉, 〈β, α〉}
(240)* Θv = {{α, β}}, Cv = {〈α, β〉}
Common-sense suggests we should probably want to say that u and v realize {α, β}
differently (only u does so as 〈β, α〉), and indeed, according to our formalization of
the Rule of Co-occurrences, this is the case, since Cu ⊖ Cv = {〈β, α〉} 6= ∅. And
as the rule predicts, Θu 6= Θv. But is this a difference in polysemy or argument
optionality? Clearly, it isn’t a case of argument optionality: both verbs realize the
same arguments in the same combination (α and β). And on the surface there
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doesn’t seem to be a difference in polysemy here either, since both lexemes have
only the one (generalized) verb sense, encoded as {α, β}; u just happens to have
‘two copies of it’.
In fact, we’ll argue in a moment that, contrary to the current line of argument,
it is still possible to interpret the Rule of Co-occurrences as non-vacuous even over
elements of multiplicities > 1, for many of the affected verbs, at least. But first we
want to present some of the data that caused us to set things up this way to begin
with.
We saw a moment ago (229, 230) that give participates in the dative alteration;
other semantically similar verbs, as one can guess by now, don’t:
(241) *They gave/donated that money to the charity.
(242) They gave/*donated the charity that money.
This, in fact, in the essentials, is just like our hypothetical case of verbs with multiset
θ-families (239, 240); here, we have something like:
(243) Θgive = {{Agent, Theme, Recipient}, {Agent, Theme, Recipient}, ...}
Cgive = {〈Agent, Theme, to Recipient〉, 〈Agent, Recipient, Theme〉, ...}
(244) *Θdonate = {{Agent, Theme, Recipient}, ...}
Cdonate = {〈Agent, Theme, to Recipient〉, ...}
This alternation (between 241 and 242), which give, but not donate, participates
in, is the one considered more dependent on certain sound characteristics of the
verb than anything else (see for instance Pinker 1989): verbs that sound like they
178
come from Latin, as donate does, are much less likely to participate in it. There
doesn’t seem to be a semantic basis for the difference, so trying to connect syntax,
semantics and polysemy becomes more problematic. Multisets, then, are a way of
setting aside these problematic cases.
On the other hand, just because our general θ-roles give the same θ-set to two
constructions that a verb appears in, thus failing to signal any meaning-differences
with which to distinguish those senses of the verb, it doesn’t mean that those con-
structions really do express a single sense of the verb. Though we argued that the
differences within our ‘argument preserving alternations’ (Table 3.1, p. 100) are of-
ten quite minor (or even non-existent, p. 91), in fact for many of them the two
constructions can clearly express something different, depending on the verb. The
conative (Levin’s 1.3) is one such case:
(245) *They swatted (at) the flies.
(246) *They shot (at) the fleeing suspect.
With some instances of the oblique form of the alternation (with at), the entity
being swatted or shot at, etc., isn’t necessarily hit or touched, etc., during that
event. This is especially true with a verb like shoot : there’s a big difference between
being shot at and being shot. Hence there are two things being expressed here—at
least with that verb.
Similarly, in one variant of the locative alternations (Levin’s Spray/Load al-
ternation, her 2.3.1)—
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(247) *They loaded the boxes onto the truck.
(248) *They loaded the truck with the boxes.
—a ‘holistic’ effect has been suggested (references in Levin 1993): certain effects of
the event described by the verb may be predicated more of a direct object than a
oblique, again depending on the verb. In the examples above, all else being equal,
the loading of the truck to completion is more likely to be expressed as in the second
case (248); in the first example (247), at least, it’s the loading of the boxes, not the
truck, that should be considered complete.
Similarly, with the Through/With alternation (Levin’s 2.9), the meaning of
the expression strongly differs depending on the preposition used:
(249) *They poked/pierced/jabbed the stick through the material.
(250) *They poked/pierced/jabbed the material with the stick.
Used with the preposition with, only pierce implies that the instrument used went
through the material (as one can check in 250).
Thus, though the primary reason to use multisets was to accommodate alter-
nation sensitivities that seem to have little if any semantic basis, nonetheless, there
are also many cases in which there are real semantic distinctions that just happen
to be masked by the highly general θ-roles we use—offering justification, at least in
those cases, for the multiple elements in the θ-families.
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5.3.2 Constructing the isomorphism
Since the isomorphism is formally always possible given enough θ-roles, what matters
here is their number, their generality, and the number of θ-families. Is there a general
(and small enough) set of θ-roles (relative to the number of verbs), such that many
θ-sets are realized in multiple ways? Perhaps there are also a significant number of
θ-families with multiple verbs, which might then theoretically have required different
realizations, thus destroying the isomorphism? Our rule of co-occurrences is fairly
straightforward to check, as it happens, given that isomorphism is a corollary. From
Levin’s (1993) data, which we presented, as she does, in terms of her alternations
(Chapter 3), we can extract, in our terms, a θ-family for each of the 3000+ verbs
of English. For each alternation, Levin lists a set of verbs that participate in the
alternation; thus, each of those verbs gets both the θ-sets, and the corresponding
construction, designated in the Section 3.1 tables. Since, in our terms, an alternation
is typically a pair of constructions, Levin also lists, for each construction in that pair,
the verbs that appear only in that one construction (of the two). This gives us other
θ-sets and constructions to assign to other verbs. The end result is a θ-family and
a construction family assigned to each of the 3000+ verbs; it was the result of this
process that allowed us to construct Fig. 3.3 (the histogram of construction-family
size, p. 118).
Each Levin verb, then, effectively induces a pairing between a θ-family and
a construction family, and we can quickly iterate over the θ-families and count
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Figure 5.4: θ-roles used in the isomorphism; we’ve dropped some traditional role
names (like Recipient) for some broader terms (like Goal, which we also use for
other reasonable names we presented earlier, like Result). The role name Predicate
is intentionally general: for verbs that take sentential arguments, those arguments
can sometimes vary widely in their type. The internal argument for know , for
instance, can name a state (She knows the door is locked) or an event (She knows
her friend is driving across the bridge right this moment) or an embedded question
(She knows what to do in that situation) among other things. For better or worse,
we aren’t distingishing these at this moment.
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construction family. Of course, since Levin did not actually give θ-roles to the
constructions suggested by her alternations, we had to provide those ourselves; the
θ-roles in Tables 3.1–3.5 (p. 100–108) were supplied by us by hand, in fact. Such
θ-role assignments, given a smallish, general set of them (see Fig. 5.3.2), and given
substantial familiarity with them, is fairly straightforward for most of the verbs and
most of the roles. We gained that familiarity in previous work (Dorr et al. 2001),
and the θ-role assignments used here were probably influenced in many ways by that
work (see also Dorr (1992)); many systematic changes, though, are necessary to do
what we are doing here. We mentioned the problem briefly earlier, but in a way
that may have suggested that it was merely a deviation from Jackendoff’s concept
of thematic relations, specifically for the assignment of the Theme role. In fact, in
that earlier work the overall scheme of θ-role assignment is highly inappropriate for
the current task, because it’s effectively tied to syntax rather than semantics; the
Source/Victim argument of rob, for instance, is given as Theme, since it is realized
as an object, and since Themes also stand for Patients in that system. The Victim
argument of rob is thus equated with the Loot argument of steal , and the actual
semantic roles of the arguments are thus obscured. (There are some alternate θ-
role assignments listed in Dorr et al. 2001; these in fact come from our initial steps
toward the present task.) Some additional work that we’ve done, and other work
that we are preparing to do, to check that we haven’t achieved an isomorphism only
by assigning unusual roles to verb arguments, is discussed in Section 6.1.
Levin, as we saw, fit 3000-plus verbs into 192 overlapping classes. Our as-
signment of θ-roles created over 700 construction families, forming the basis of a
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much more narrowly defined set of (disjoint) verb classes (each i. e. corresponding
to a construction family). (By comparison, Saint-Dizier’s (1996) classifications for
French produced 953 classes for 1700 verbs.) This assignment of constructions, and
hence θ-families, initially used about 25 different θ-roles (partly inherited as a set
from Dorr et al. 2001). We could have kept them all, but we noticed that some role
distinctions weren’t crucial to the isomorphism; for instance, we originally had a
5-way distinction between elements ‘changing hands’ in change-of-possession verbs,
information being expressed by verbs of communication, sounds being emitted by
various verbs of sound, items being perceived by certain perceptional verbs, and
ordinary locational Themes; in our final isomorphism, each of these is just given as
Theme.
And in the end, far fewer than 25 θ-roles were needed for the re-classification:
we created an isomorphism with 89% of the apparent construction families, using 14
θ-roles (Actor, Agent, Beneficiary, Experiencer, Goal, Instrument, Location,
Manner, Patient, Path, Predicate, Property, Source, Theme; see again Fig. 5.3.2);
that 89% of the construction families, then, is the portion utilized by the verbs that
obey the rule of co-occurrences (80% of the 3000+ Levin verbs). The 14 roles give
rise to 342 θ-sets ({Agent, Theme, Goal}, {Theme, Location}, etc., all of them
in use in our isomorphism), 33% of which, as we mentioned, have more than one
realization. The distribution of verbs across the families is as we sketched earlier
(i. e. qualitatively similar to the distribution of the verbs in the intersective Levin
classes, Fig. 3.2, p. 116). For the full set of construction families, 553 (68%) have
only 1 verb; 1 family has 198 verbs. As for the distribution of θ-families according
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to the number of θ-sets in the family, the most common size is 4—i e. 4 θ-sets
in a θ-family. (Which can be predicted, given isomorphism and the histogram in
Fig. 3.3, p. 118—though that chart includes the 11% of the construction families
not in our isomorphism yet.) The complete list of construction-families, for the
entire isomorphism, with the assigned Levin verbs, and some notes on the more
questionable θ-roles assignments, is given in Appendix B.
So, though the classes have splintered into very small sets, the small number
of θ-roles and the significant number of divergent realizations (existing i. e. for 33%
of the θ-sets, but for practically all of the verbs) suggests that the isomorphism is
non-trivial, reflecting a link between patterns of argument realization and polysemy
that wasn’t as visible before. And we think there’s more. For the construction
families we set aside (11%) thematically identical verbs therein potentially threaten
the isomorphism, as rob and steal, and buy and sell, would if each pair didn’t have
a divergence co-occurrent. But investigation of that 11% of the verbs showed that
there are no verbs even close to being thematically identical. Thus, we will in
principle always be able to find semantic distinctions with which to enlarge the set
of θ-roles, eliminating any apparently problematic divergences—i. e. ones that lack
a divergence co-occurrent, thus breaking the isomorphism. (Interesting, though, it
doesn’t look like we’ll really need many more roles to build a complete isomorphism;
we’ll discuss this briefly in the next chapter.)3
3Note that for this use of θ-roles, we needn’t be too concerned about the potential difficulties
of producing a fixed, all-purpose set of them. Since the verbs form an open set, the θ-roles can
also form an open set, as long as their number remains small with respect to the number of verbs.
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Thus, assuming that the remaining 11% of the construction families can be
taken care of (and above paragraph suggests they can), the rule of co-occurrences
will hold—and non-trivially, given the small number of θ-roles, and given the phe-
nomenon of verbs, given those θ-roles, almost universally expressing (at a rate of
98%) at least one θ-set in multiple ways; and a difference in argument realization is
thus shown to be a sufficient condition for a difference in polysemy, or in argument
optionality. (That’s what the rule of co-occurrences says.) Recall that (Pinker 1998)
associated sufficient conditions with systems more rule-governed than associative.
On the one hand, it seems to us that the words vs. rules paradigm probably over-
simplifies the possible distinctions between the two. On the hand, if the notion of
a ‘rule’ is to have any meaning, it seems to us that a fully productive mechanism
ought to be treated as following a rule; so in that way Pinker is right to make the
distinction. Interestingly, Pinker’s earlier work (Pinker 1989) was in the formation
of lexical rules for exactly the kind of phenomena we have been looking at here. But
it was Rumelhart and McClelland’s (1986) work on connectionist accounts of past
tense verb forms that motivated Pinker’s later work on the existence of distinct rule-
governed behaviors in that area (contra Rumelhart and McClelland); thus Pinker’s
focus shifted to suffixation, etc.
5.4 Idiosyncrasy’s last stand?
So what is the status now of the apparent idiosyncrasies that Jackendoff and Levin
and Rappaport Hovav each thought would simply have to be stipulated in the lexi-
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cal entries for each of the affected verbs? It turns out that much of their claims of
idiosyncrasy are safe, at least for now—but not entirely. And we should note just
why this happens to be the case, and what it is that is in common between each of
those authors’ claims: namely, and possibly contrary to first appearances, the id-
iosyncrasy they each refer to is in what we are loosely calling ‘patterns of polysemy’,
and not in argument realization per se, for which our claim of isomorphism would
come into play and assert the existence of a co-occurring difference in polysemy, thus
undermining their claims of idiosyncrasy. For the particular example of Levin and
Rappaport Hovav that we looked at, it is easy to see why their claim gets to escape
our potential criticism: they merely suggest that causative constructions exist for
some verbs idiosyncratically, given its nonexistence for other similar verbs.
(251=219) The doctor bled the patient.
(252=220) The father burped the baby.
(253) *The pollen sneezed the asthma patient.
(254) *The nurse sneezed the asthma patient as a test,
using a variety of dusts and pollen.
Thus, it’s a divergence in θ-families: burp’s, but not sneeze’s, includes Agent. Since
our rule of co-occurrences goes from argument realization divergences to θ-family
divergences, not the other way around, nothing follows from Levin and Rappaport
Hovav’s example.
For Jackendoff, things are more complicated, and potentially more problem-
atic, because of the ground he intends to cover with his mechanisms, which govern
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linking as well as (what we have been referring to as) divergences in polysemy. For
his examples of optional conceptual structure, such as in
(255=215) [CAUSE([Thing ]A , [GO([Thing ]A , [TO [OPEN]])])]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
,
the additional pieces of conceptual structure are likely to correspond to an additional
argument, and thus an additional θ-role, and an additional θ-set in the θ-family—
again, a difference in ‘polysemy’ (or argument optionality), not argument realization
per se, according to our formalism.
His optional argument markers, by themselves, have a similar effect: when the
element isn’t realized, it is implied; in our simple way of distinguishing things by
θ-families, the difference between a piece of conceptual structure implied or simply
missing is ignored, so this looks just like another case of divergent polysemy.
Something similar is arrived at with Jackendoff’s stipulation of argument
markers in general, combined with his adjunct rules. Jackendoff presents the fol-
lowing conceptual structure as a representation for fill :
(256) INCH[ BE([ ]〈A〉, IN([ ]A ))]]
(from Jackendoff 1990, p. 253)
INCH is short for inchoative; it’s Jackendoff’s operator for turning statives (257)
into events (258) (leaving out the representations of completely and slowly). (In
Jackendoff 1983 the eventive INCH[ BE ] would have been realized as some instance
of CAUSE[ [GO[ TO ]]].)
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(257a≈83) Pure oxygen completely fills this space.
b) BE([PURE-OXYGEN], IN([THIS-SPACE]))
(258a) Pure oxygen slowly filled this space.
b) INCH[ BE([PURE-OXYGEN], IN([THIS-SPACE]))]
With the optional argument (of 256) unexpressed, this gives sentences like:
(259) This space filled slowly.
Jackendoff also has adjunct rules for realizing non-arguments, and specifically sanc-
tions their use on optionalized arguments as if they were non-arguments; there’s a
rule that applies specifically to the INCH[ BE ] form, sanctioning sentences like:
(260) This space slowly filled with pure oxygen.
This has the same arguments as before (258), but with a different realization.
(That’s one of the things Jackendoff’s adjunct rules are for.) There doesn’t appear
to be anything to prevent a structure that has the first argument of the INCH[ BE ]
form as a non-argument only; let’s assume it has the θ-set {Theme, Goal}, and un-
derline the roles that are marked as arguments in Jackendoff’s structures. For the
hypothetical INCH[ BE ] with a non-argument first element, this would result in




—whereas Jackendoff’s actual structure (256) effectively says that both represen-
tations (261a, 261b) are valid, each for different realizations of the arguments. To
repeat, Jackendoff’s general argument realization rules, applied to the first variant
(261a), can only produce the intransitive form (259); his adjunct rule, applied to the
same variant, realizes the Theme as an oblique (260); the general realization rules
applied to the second variant (261b) produce the earlier transitive form (258a). The
hypothetical verb with only the first variant (261a) and another verb with only the
second (261b) would diverge in their realization of {Theme, Goal} (260 vs. 258a);
but because the adjunct rules are optional, the hypothetical verb would also realize
{Goal} (i. e. as in 259), as our rule of co-occurrences requires.
But what might happen when Jackendoff’s markings of optional structure are
combined with his markings of argumenthood (or non-argumenthood)? Here’s where
Jackendoff’s system starts to break down, given our Rule of Co-occurrences. Let’s
mark optional pieces of structure by underscoring with a dotted line; theoretically,
we could have two verbs u and v with strictly distinct markups of θ-set {α, β}, as
in:
(262a) u: { α , β}
b) v: {βα , β}
...
Both verbs realize {α, β}, but differently (just as {Theme, Goal} is realized dif-
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ferently in 258a and 260). Here, one verb (v) realizes {α, β} as two arguments,
while the other does so as an argument plus an adjunct. But v’s piece of concep-
tual structural for α is optional, and u’s α may be unexpressed because it isn’t a
syntactic argument; thus both verbs also have a realization for {β}. (It will be the
same realization in both cases, according to Jackendoff’s general realization rules for
arguments; compare {Goal}, which can be realized as in 259). Thus the divergence
of u and v on {α, β} is not met by another divergence—both u and v would have
θ-family {{α, β}, {β}}, but realize it with different construction families—and our
rule of co-occurrences is violated, and there is no isomorphism.
So Jackendoff’s mechanisms almost obey our rule, but not quite. He comes
close, but by accident: he effectively encodes realization divergences via the combi-
nation of productive adjunct rules and argument optionality, or the optionality of
pieces of conceptual structure; he gets the co-occurring divergences, when he gets
them, because whenever the adjunct rules apply, their optionality also allows (in
our terms) an alternate θ-set to be realized, in which the adjunct rules are not uti-
lized. We suspect that the problem is that Jackendoff’s structures are the same, in
their semantic form, regardless of whether an adjunct rule is used, or isn’t used, or
doesn’t apply in the first place (because all the relevant elements of the structure
are marked as arguments). Our co-occurrence rule, however, suggests that the di-
vergence in argument realization is due to some actual difference in the encoding
(semantically or otherwise), and that some other productive process working off of





Thus the apparent idiosyncrasies in argument realization and polysemy have a sus-
picious character: if the ones that concern realization divergences really are idiosyn-
cratic, then they are echoed at each point with an ‘idiosyncrasy’ in polysemy (or
argument optionality). So on the one hand, certain things in language clearly are
arbitrary—starting with the historically contingent names we give to concepts. In
some cases, the language we happen to be acquiring may also give us radically differ-
ent ways of encoding similar concepts, and in the extreme case give us thematically
identical concepts that can be expressed in different ways, possibly utilizing different
names, as appears to be the case with rob and steal . Then we have an encoding of
the concept that can be expressed with rob in one construction, or with steal in a
different construction.
On the other hand, from that choice of encoding, it appears that we can ex-
pect a difference in the set of senses that will get the same label (i. e. either rob or
steal). We propose that this occurs because the encoding is a fairly deep one, at
an effectively semantic level (rather than, say, a shallow one that simply designates
argument order and prepositional requirements, as i. e. the traditional subcatego-
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rization frame does.) Argument realization then follows from the semantics via some
set of more-or-less general rules, and polysemy follows from the same semantics via
its own rules, thus creating the patterns that have long been noticed in both areas.
The catch, of course, is: what are the semantics precisely, and what are the rules?
Our co-occurrence rule merely suggests, following the argument we just gave, that
such rules and semantics exist; it doesn’t, of course, really tell us what they are.
(Though our θ-sets may in fact suggest something important about the semantics,
though only at a general level, since they are fairly general θ-roles.)
But perhaps we are getting ahead of ourselves. It is a rather curious thing that
our co-occurrence rule hasn’t been formulated by other researchers much earlier,
given our earlier discussion (p. 64) of the degree of interest in recent years in lexical
semantics and the syntax/semantics interface. But none of these researchers appear
to have really looked to see how extensive such interactions might be—or at least,
not in a quantitative way. In the next sections we will consider the possibility that
we, going the other way, might have been looking too hard, and only really seeing
just what we wanted to see.
6.1 Prospects for completing the isomorphism
Let’s start by emphasizing that the rule of co-occurrences is in fact falsifiable. In
fact, logically, it is highly falsifiable. It is certainly possible, logically, that a lan-
guage might have many, many thematically identical verb pairs (like rob and steal,
or buy and sell), and that many of these pairs could have distinct construction
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families; and they could also have—contrary to all the cases we have looked at—
identical θ-families under any semantically faithful set of θ-roles. (Even a few such
pairs violating isomorphism would force us to qualify our results by saying an iso-
morphism tends to form; and we wouldn’t necessarily be surprised to find a few such
violations—though we haven’t yet.)
Linguists seem to tend not to believe that much real synonymy exists, though,
and might also extend that belief toward the existence of thematically identical
verbs. That may be partly because they haven’t considered that apparent opposites
like buy and sell are similar to rob and steal (i.e. thematically identical); but in any
case, the number of cases of both real synonymy and thematic identity does in fact
seem to be small. We had to do a partial check of this, as we mentioned in the
last chapter: before we could put much value in our isomorphism, we had to search
carefully for potential thematically identical verbs in the section was left out (the
11% that lies outside the isomorphism)—since the existence of such pairs outside
the isomorphism would signal exceptions to the rule of co-occurrences, unless we
could find new senses for them that were missing from our database, in which case
they might cease to be thematically identical. But this was one case where the data
seemed to go easy on us, since we didn’t find any verbs that even came close to
being thematically identical.
Again, for the verbs that seem to diverge in argument realization, but are
merely similar in meaning, we will always be able to assign θ-roles in such a way
to make their θ-families different (enlarging the set of θ-roles if necessary), thus
preserving the isomorphism. Interestingly, though, very few new θ-roles seem to be
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needed. This was a surprise. We had conjectured (Thomas 2007) that we might
need quite a few more roles, given the number of verbs left outside the isomorphism.
We envisioned getting less and less ‘mileage’ out of every new θ-role, inventing
narrowly-tailored roles to handle just one or two verbs as we painstakingly enlarged
the size of the isomorphism, for all the Levin verbs, and for verbs beyond Levin. But
a closer look at the verbs we left out of the isomorphism covered by those thirteen
θ-roles we used (Fig. 5.3.2) suggests that that is not the case at all. We apparently
need one more role to distinguish senses of for. (Jackendoff 1990 discusses several
senses of for but still misses some found in Levin 1993.) But it appears like we
would only need 2 or 3 more roles for other cases like that.
Can we provide other evidence that we didn’t miss senses that might break
the isomorphism, or evidence that we didn’t skew the semantic analysis in some
way, creating perhaps θ-families whose words’ semantic similarity was either under-
or over-estimated? As it happens, there are a couple of large-scale lexical resources
being constructed that can help us test this in the future. Here’s some data on some
preliminary comparisons.
The PropBank project (Palmer et al. 2005) supplies argument realization in-
formation (subcategorization frames) for verbs. They characterize the specifications
given, in fact, as semantic roles. Unfortunately, this is misleading. Propbank is try-
ing to close gaps in the analyses found in the Penn Treebank (Marcus et al. 1993),
the collection of parses that is the gold standard against which to test current pars-
ing systems. The Penn Treebank parses are surprisingly shallow when it comes to
argument structure. To se this, we’ve given three sentences below that, on the sur-
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face, only differ in whether the verb in use is put , read , or move. But the possible
bracketing of the sentences also differs depending on the verb. To make things some-
what easier to interpret, we’ve supplied some θ-roles, based on the interpretations
available for move. (For the sake of the argument, imagine, in the case of read, that
a reference to a book one is reading is primarily a reference to an abstract thing, a
Theme, that one is absorbing, in a quasi-literal way. See Pustejovsky 1995 for a way
of handling the interpretations of book—shelving a book, reading a book, writing a
book, etc.) We’ll use a modifier that we’ll call a Location to refer to the spot where
the moving, putting, or reading event takes place—which is distinct from the Goal
onto which the Theme of the event might be put , etc.
(263a) *Sue moved the book on the table.
(263b) *Sue [moved [the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸








(263d) *Sue [[moved the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸




(264a) *Sue put the book on the table.
(264b) *Sue [put [the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸








(264d) *Sue [[put the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸





(265a) *Sue read the book on the table.
(265b) *Sue [read [the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸








(265d) *Sue [[read the book
︸ ︷︷ ︸




Thus there are three possible parses with move (263b–d), only one of them possible
with put, the other two possible with read. But to choose the correct analysis, the
argument realization requirements of the verb in use needs to be known. (The verb
put requires three arguments, thus eliminating as possible parses the parses with
only two arguments; read doesn’t allow three arguments here, eliminating the parse
that has three arguments; move accepts but doesn’t require three arguments, leaving
all three parses as possibilities.) But the builders of the Penn Treebank decided that
it was too hard to make a large treebank that handled these distinctions, and thus
chose to ignore them.
And that creates a gap in the Penn Treebank’s utility as a source of linguistic
data; and this is the gap that PropBank is working to close. Unfortunately, while
choosing to do this—and in spite of the name ‘Propbank’, suggesting proposition,
in turn suggesting something to do with semantics—PropBank’s creators also chose
not to make any general, lexicon-wide decisions about the actual conceptual roles
of the arguments they are listing, believing that that is still too difficult a question
to deal with at this time.
197
Thus arguments, in fact, are labeled first and foremost according to syntactic








Note that fill ’s Arg1 is really the Goal, with Arg2 the Theme, while put ’s Arg1 is the
Theme, and Arg2 is (a kind of) Goal. So the Theme is a ‘Substance’ in one case, a
‘Thing put’ in the other, and the Goals are either a ‘Container’ or simply a ‘Where
put’. Even the Agent of put is given the verb-specific name ‘Putter’.
Furthermore, there is often just one entry for what we would call a verb’s
θ-family; so one can’t tell whether an argument is obligatory (as put ’s Arg2 more
or less is) or optional (as fill ’s Arg2 most certainly is—when the Agent is present).
Thus all that PropBank directly gives us is, perhaps, the size of the largest θ-set in
a verb’s θ-family.
So there isn’t much we can test here directly. But we can see how often
our largest θ-set in a θ-family matches in size the number of arguments specified
by PropBank. First of all, only 2009 (66%) of the Levin verbs are in PropBank.
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This is one of the challenges of a corpus-based approach. (PropBank is trying to
supply analyses for precisely the corpus for which the Penn Treebank trees were
constructed.) One can process tens of millions of sentences and not come close
to capturing the lexical knowledge of a literate adult, such as the one who put
together the database (i. e. Levin 1993) that we built our isomorphism with. (And
very, very few of the Levin verbs—probably less than a dozen—seem rare to us;
the overwhelming majority of the Levin verbs not in PropBank would certainly be
instantly recognizable to any reasonably literate speaker of English.) For 866 (43%)
of those 2009 verbs in the intersection of Levin (1993) and PropBank, the number
of arguments listed in Probank was the same as the size of the largest θ-set we had
assigned to the verb based on the data in Levin. We gave 781 (39% of 2009) a θ-set
that is larger than the set of arguments listed in PropBank. Thinking of the θ-sets
as loosely representing a ‘sense’ of a verb—which, again, is exactly how we’ve been
thinking of them—PropBank thus seems to be missing senses for those 781 verbs.
We confirmed this to be more-or-less true fairly quickly, by looking at some of the
θ-sets we created that PropBank couldn’t account for. Though Levin lists a few
things that seem ungrammatical in our idiolect, and thus we would expect to find
a few cases in which we would agree with PropBank over Levin, this didn’t happen
at all with the spot-checking we did of the θ-sets in question, convincing us that
the results of any thorough test would go overwhelmingly in Levin’s direction—
showing i. e. that in these cases it’s generally PropBank that ought to be changed
to conform with Levin’s data, and not the other way around. That leaves 362 verbs
(18%) whose PropBank data implies that a corresponding θ-family in our database
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might be missing a sense, and future work will concentrate on those verbs to look
for possible exceptions to our rule of co-occurrences.
Another important resource is FrameNet (Baker et al. 1998). It has proved
more promising so far. On the one hand, it puts rob and steal in different semantic
frames, potentially obscuring the fact that they really should be treated as themat-
ically identical. On the other hand, their arguments get semantically consistent,
if overly specific, role names: in our notation, their θ-family would include the set
{Perpetrator, Goods, Victim}.1
Going back to those overly specific role names themselves, one can see another
problem: there are no less than 391 different role names in FrameNet—or possibly a
bit over 350, if we take into consideration that some of the names are ‘compositional’:
impactor is one name, as well as impactee, so they may break up into impact, +or,
and +ee. It seems likely that there will be, from our perspective, many overly
specialized distinctions between verbs that will make our co-occurrence rule harder
to break: fine-grained roles mean fewer shareable ‘θ-sets’, hence fewer possible co-
occurrence rule violations. It also makes it much harder to directly compare the
FrameNet argument semantics with our θ-roles; the starting numbers are a little
worse here, too: only 1478 (48%) of the Levin verbs have analyzed arguments in
1But the Goods is not considered a ‘core’ role of Robbery (which is rob’s semantic frame), while
a Source distinct from the Victim is considered part of the core—another case of the syntactic
facts affecting the semantic judgements. (Rob a bank, you are taking from a Source; rob a person
to take from a Victim. Actually, in neither case does the syntax require you to name the Goods
taken.) On the other hand, Goods is a core role of Theft (steal ’s semantic frame), as is Victim;
so already one can see the problem that we are about to introduce in another way: we’ll have to
figure out which FrameNet roles map to our roles.
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FrameNet (vs. 66% in PropBank). But we can do a preliminary check of our basic
idea of isomorphism using just the FrameNet data. And ‘right out of the box’, i. e.
using the semantic roles assigned by FrameNet, we can build an isomorphism with
91% of the verbs—which is not surprising, given, the large number of those roles.
However, 89% of the verbs still diverge from one another on at least one realization,
and the co-occurrence rule holds for 88% of those verbs, too. (By comparison, with
our current θ-role assignments, the co-occurrence rule holds for 80% of the 3000+
Levin verbs; 98% of the Levin verbs diverge from one another in realizing some
θ-set, and the rule holds for 80% of those verbs, too.) This is evidence, then, of the
genuineness of our isomorphism for the Levin verbs, though additional work ought
to be done to systematically replace those FrameNet roles with more general ones—
hopefully not much more than a dozen or so in number—so that the isomorphism,
if it still exists, will be less trivial. Note, though, that the most direct approach
here—just going through all the cases and deciding, for instance, that Perpetrator
is really just a special case of Agent—isn’t much different from what we did in
assigning Agent to the corresponding Levin verb arguments in the first place (i. e.
looking at the set of verbs Levin grouped together with rob and steal and deciding
that the argument naming an entity harming another entity in some way was an
Agent). The main interest in doing this, obviously, will be in seeing how often, if
ever, the FrameNet role names seem to be something other than specializations of
the role names we picked.
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6.2 Prospects for generating the lexicon
But tests like the above—though they have the additional benefit of aligning the
present work with other resources—are not the only way to strengthen the work
already done. To fully evaluate our rule of co-occurrences, and to more completely
test it against whatever data we can find, our hunch is that we need, just as strongly,
and probably more so, a deeper theory of why those co-occurrences occur.
We should emphasize something that we did not claim above, when we sug-
gested that it appears that we might need very few θ-roles even to build an iso-
morphism for all the verbs of English. This is not to suggest that only 14 or so
θ-roles are needed to explain how the isomorphism comes into being. In fact, we’ve
assumed all along that each realization divergence, though met with a divergence in
polysemy or argument optionality once the ‘right’ θ-roles are assigned, has a deeper
explanation that is dependent on semantic distinctions not captured by those θ-
roles. Thus we fully expect—though maybe we’ll be surprised here as well—that
the θ-roles will rampantly bifurcate as soon as one attempts this deeper explanation
of the isomorphism.
Thus, even during attempts to unify and test our data with whatever has been
captured in PropBank or FrameNet, future work here also will need, we believe, to
try to make that refinement of the semantics that (we hope) will eventually explain
why the isomorphism exists in the first place. And here is a sketch of our initial
efforts in that direction. First, we’re going to assert that this semantic refinement
should in fact proceed by way of θ-roles, conceiving them broadly as we have been
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all along, as simply the semantic roles played by the (logical) arguments of verbs.
We have also attempted to do something with semantic structures, i. e. predicate
decompositions roughly comparable to Jackendoff’s (1990) conceptual structures.
As a practical matter, this proves unwieldy: like a programming language that just
won’t let you do what you want to do easily, predicate decompositions, we have
found, are not easily adjusted as attempts are made to refine the semantics. (We
attempted to implement the forms in a Prolog-style manner, with representations
for the core senses of verbs receiving additional structure in order to represent other
senses.) Thus, we argue, a return to θ-roles is required; and we believe this even
though at first it seems like it will be quite awkward to refine them in the appropriate
manner—after all, many of the finer distinctions between verbs seem to be fall, so





When Jackendoff published his (1990) refinement of conceptual structures, culminat-
ing in his attempt to give a more regular account of argument realization—which we
discussed earlier (i. e. end of Ch. 5)—at least one computational linguist appears to
have been underwhelmed. Wilks (1992) refers specifically to a certain set of workers
in artificial intelligence (AI) and computational linguistics (CL) and suggests:
Those in AI and CL who used to make a living 20 years ago writing down
these kinds of fantasy codings and making the parentheses match will
feel a strong pang of nostalgia if they open this book ... There is no men-
tion of those hundreds of Schank’s students, and his student’s students,
slaving over such codings (e. g., the systems described by Schank (1975),
Schank and Riesbeck (1981); or compare Wilks (1973)) ... [A]utomatic
construction is now the name of the game, of course ...
His reference to ‘automatic construction’ is interesting: he means the automatic
acquisition of lexical entries, by trolling over large amounts of corpora, or by at-
tempting to extract them from gold-standard analyses like those of the Penn Tree-
bank. With natural language processing systems needing information on thousands
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of words, this is a natural way to go; and if the link between semantics and syntactic
structures is as strong as our work here suggests it is, one might even be able to
infer a lot of important semantic information from the bare text (or the derived tree
structures).
And Wilks is right about Jackendoff ignoring Schank. (Jackendoff skipped
over Pustejovsky, too, though he fixed that later (Jackendoff 2002).) But Wilks
himself appears to be ignoring (or rather, minimizing) the very different goals that
Jackendoff has: Jackendoff is trying to explain why language is the way it is, and
has been continually refining his conceptual structures accordingly (which were orig-
inally built on the ideas of Gruber 1965, 1976) in order to better reflect the way that
language expresses them. Jackendoff would probably find it pointless to engage in
the ‘simple’ act of linking together all the conceptual dependencies that are sug-
gested by the thoughts expressed by language, if this is done independent of the
potentially peculiar constraints a particular language (or languages in general) may
put on those expressions—i. e. the sort of things most linguists are conventionally
interested in. Wilks does allude to this:
But Jackendoff seems to have done a lot more work ... par-
ticularly on the explicit relationship of the lexical codings to
related syntactic structures ...
Wilks might have been mostly just lamenting the gaps that often exist between
the linguist and AI researcher trying to specialize in natural language, as one can
probably find with any cross-disciplinary field. And we know exactly what he means
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by referring to people ‘slaving over such codings’. But we happen to think—and our
own ‘slaving over such codings’ has reinforced, rather than weakened our belief—that
Jackendoff’s focus on the specifics of language is a crucial one, even for AI, because
without the additional theorizing of the sort we have tried to do here, systems just
aren’t going to be using natural language naturally; at best, they will sound like an
unusually studious non-native speaker. But that we mean someone who has figured
out what the words mean, knows more or less how to pronounce them, and even
manages to get the argument realizations right most of the time—as long as no
extrapolation is needed from the things that have already been heard and analyzed
properly. And at worst, assuming every other aspect of natural language processing
has been solved, the system may sound like the non-native speaker who hasn’t been
able to memorize many of the seemingly verb-specific requirements for argument
realization. Such a speaker is likely to swap rob for steal, or swap the corresponding
constructions for any of the other thousands of pairs of words of similar meaning
that happen to diverge in argument realization. We’ll understand what the person
means, usually, but it may be challenging, because the speaker effectively gives us the
arguments of the verb—if we’re lucky—but leaves it up to us to put them together,
without the help of syntax, which normally makes most such things automatic.
Actual systems will fall somewhere in between these cases, of course, since, though
the mechanism for getting the system to extrapolate naturally is still unknown,
recall of the verb-specific information itself isn’t (as much) a problem, so—as many
computational linguists are effectively doing today—one can always try to hide the
system’s shallowness by increasing the size of the database.
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Within linguistics itself, there’s an interesting gap. The usual breakdown of
the parts of the study of language includes syntax (concerning how words group to-
gether to form phrases and sentences), morphology (on how stems and affixes group
together to form words), phonology (on how the sounds of the language combine),
semantics (on the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences), and pragmatics or
discourse (which are concerned, roughly speaking, with the way sentences are used
in conversation and other types of speech). This makes the study of things like
argument realization and polysemy look cross-disciplinary even within the field, in
spite of the work of Levin (1993), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995, 2005),
and others, and the long line of work they build on.1
We’d like to close with a much more general remark about computer science
and natural language. There’s an aspect of generative linguistics that can seem quite
remarkable to a computer scientist: to a surprisingly large degree, a lot of work in
generative linguistics feels like an extended consideration of the various ways of
building an interesting, and fairly large, computer program. There are various data
structures to be designed, a large complicated database (the lexicon) to be built,
and of course a number of subroutines, many of which, if they are designed with
sufficient care and foresight, might be used, given the appropriate parameters, to
do an interesting range of somewhat different tasks. The work among linguists to
improve their theories, and to consider what might make one theory better than
another (as in Chomsky 1995, and also work introducing that general program,
1Fromkin and Rodman (1993), in fact, give only a brief remark on polysemy (mentioning that
it is hard to distinguish sometimes from homonymy).
207
such as Hornstein et al. 2005) should resonate strongly with anyone who has taken
an interest in trying to turn fairly large computer programs into code that is more
elegant, perhaps more powerful, and certainly more easily adapted to newer, similar
tasks. Yet there remains a gap—probably growing—between the theoretical linguists
and the computational linguists, with very few of the latter showing much interest
in trying to implement the theoretical ideas with full vigor. And unfortunately, the
work we’ve presented here on the English verbs concerns only a very small part of
language, and seemingly not even a part that might most directly be utilized to try
to close that gap. We regret that, and hope that it is partly a reflection of the early
stage at which this work remains.
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Appendix A
Homonymy in Levin 1993
A recurring issue in the relation between words and their meanings is the nature of
the distinction between polysemy and homonymy. Levin (1993) made no attempt,
in her categorization of 3000-plus verbs, to distinguish between the two phenomena:
verbs are found in multiple classes, and it’s up to the readers to decide (if and when
it matters to them) whether a potential instance of a verb in two classes is really
a single verb, or two very different verbs that just happen to be spelled the same.
In fact, that’s why we’ve been saying there are ‘3000-plus’ Levin verbs, rather than
giving a precise number—it’s not immediately obvious just how many verbs really
are there, until one makes the choice between polysemy and homonymy for every
multiple listing of a verb.
Our assignment of θ-roles, and the establishment of an isomorphism between
argument realization and polysemy, effectively forced us to make just those kinds of
decisions; as we said earlier, we wanted to allow for the existence of polysemy in as
many cases as possible; otherwise we might oversimplify the task by treating things
as accidental that really weren’t. And as it happens, our results suggest that very,
very little of the verb-class overlap should be attributed to homonymy. Here was
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our initial list, with quick-and-dirty glosses, of the verbs we felt compelled to treat
as homonyms—because the semantics implied by our θ-role assignments seemed to
rule out treating them as being truly related.
1. bark1 — to make a particular kind of sound
bark2 — to scrape (e. g. one’s skin)
2. belt1 — to hit
belt2 — to secure with a belt
3. board1 — to stay
board2 — to attach boards to
4. bolt1 — to secure with a bolt
bolt2 — to run away
bolt3 — to swallow
5. bore1 — to drill
bore2 — to cause boredom
6. bound1 — to form bounds
bound2 — to move e. g. in leaps and bounds
7. box1 — to put in a box
box2 — to fight in a particular manner
8. charge1 — to bill
charge2 — to move forcefully toward
9. cling1 — to adhere
cling2 — to make a clinging noise
10. clip1 — to cut off
clip2 — to attach with a clip
11. clog1 — to hinder flow
clog2 — to walk about wearing clogs
12. coach1 — to instruct, acting as a coach
coach2 — to travel by coach
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13. file1 — to put away e. g. in a filing cabinet
file2 — to abrasively shape etc., with a file
file3 — to move in a line
14. flush1 — to remove in a certain manner
flush2 — to turn red
15. hail1 — to greet with praise, etc.
hail2 — for hail to be falling
16. jar1 — to irritate
jar2 — to put in a jar
17. pad1 — to add e. g. padding
pad2 — to move on foot
18. peep1 — to give a brief look
peep2 — to make a peeping sound
19. pitch1 — to throw
pitch2 — to cover with pitch
20. poach1 — to steal
poach2 — to cook
21. punt1 — to propel by kicking
punt2 — to move via a small boat (e. g. a punt)
22. ring1 — to put or to be around, e. g. forming a ring
ring2 — to make a ringing sound
23. seal1 — to close up or secure
seal2 — to hunt for seals
24. spit1 — to expectorate
spit2 — to put on a spit
25. spot1 — to sight, perceive, etc.
spot2 — to become soiled or marked with spots
26. stalk1 — to trail after
stalk2 — to remove a stalk
27. tack1 — to attach e. g. using a tack
tack2 — to zigzag
28. tilt1 — to lean
tilt2 — to joust
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29. tip1 — to propel with a tap
tip2 — to leave a gratuity
30. toast1 — to bake the surface of
toast2 — to acclaim
31. wax1 — to cover with wax
wax2 — to increase (rather than wane)
One more pair is only spelled, not pronounced, the same:
32. wind1 — to twist or curl
wind2 — to ‘take the wind out’
With these verbs distinguished we can give an initial count of the Levin verbs:
there are 3063 of them. In fact, there are probably a handfull of others, too: we found
additional probable homonyms much later, when refining our θ-role assignments. We
point them out as they occur in Appendix B.
In any case, the exact number of homonyms remain small, and this appears
to confirm that Dang et al. (1998) threw out a huge amount of data, thinking it
more likely that the behaviors characterizing classes of a few members would be the
results of homonymy than of regular polysemy. An incorrect assumption, judging
from the combination of the data above, our analyses of the distribution of verbs in
Ch. 3, and our isomorphism.
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Appendix B
Construction families in the isomorphism
Here are the 700+ construction families that have a unique θ-family. Recall that we
are using only a very general set of 14 θ-roles (abbreviated as below). Some of them
then must be taken quite broadly. Some cases of Agent would be better described
as Cause if that role-name were added to the set, for instance; in other cases we’re
not even sure yet what role name we would give an argument, if we were to enlarge
the set for that argument in particular. Overall, the assignment of θ-roles is a lot
like our quick discussion of the Levin verb classes in Sect. 4.1: for verbs that clearly
involve movement (literally or figuratively)—or don’t involve movement, but have
one entity acting on another—the assignments are usually straightforward; for the
other cases there often just isn’t any easily accepted way of doing things yet. (Recall
the decision made in the PropBank project (Sect. 6.1) not to even try to give general
θ-role names to verb arguments.) Our focus, then, has been on making sure that
the existence of true Themes—the entities whose motion or position is being referred
to by the expression—is always reflected faithfully in the assignment of role names.
(This is what distinguishes the assignments below from many of the ones given in
Dorr et al. (2001), on which this work was initially based.) For the other cases, we
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want to look out for any arguments that seem better Agents, Themes, Sources or
Goals than any of the other arguments, and try to make sure they get the Agent,
Theme, Source, or Goal role, respectively. (Compare Dowty 1991). Unfortunately,
this itself isn’t unproblematic, since there may be more than one plausible way of
trying to force an event onto a rather restricted set of θ-roles. Deciding whether or
not one should think there’s a Theme in play can be problematic, too, if the potential
thing ‘in motion’ is merely a gaze or a thought or someone’s attention, for instance.
The reader should also keep in mind that the data from Levin includes rela-
tively precise listings of verb behavior with respect to pairs of constructions (i. e. as
found in alternations) and very imprecise, highly smoothed-over information that
may or may not be implicated for a verb given its membership in a Levin verb class.
In an important way, the partitioning given below, of verbs into verb families, is the
end point of this first phase of the research, but the starting point of another phase
that clearly hasn’t begun yet. The θ-assignments will be the starting point of future
research to refine the semantics, for the task of explaining why the isomorphism
occurs, rather than just signaling, as here, its existence. Most θ-role assignments
were done originally to a set of verbs that appear in a Levin class, or appear listed as
utilizing an alternation. Thus the extraction of the verbs that use the same θ-family,
and the same construction family, came second; since Levin assigned her verbs to
more than one class, this extraction created a new set of verb classes (the ones listed
here) which quite often pull out the finer-grained meanings that Levin chose to not
to focus on; and often the semantics, and other properties, assigned to the larger
class (via the θ-roles) are no longer appropriate to the smaller class. (They were
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probably never really appropriate to all members of the larger class to begin with.)
This is especially true for things like argument optionality; optionality may vary to
different degrees among members of a class, making it much harder to decide things
on a verb-by-verb basis. We’ve made additional passes over all the classes listed
below in order to try to ‘fix up’ the semantics of these finer-grained classes, but
that’s really something that will be much more rewarding in the future phases of
this research, i. e. on the possible causes of the isomorphism. Until then it’s just too
hard to decide what θ-sets to give in some cases—there aren’t enough constraints in
place at this point to guide our decisions. (Something like that is partly responsible
for the lack of consensus so far on what a complete set of θ-roles might look like.)
Many of the θ-role assignments below, then, can certainly be improved upon,
and there are undoubtedly some things that still need to be ‘fixed up’. The line
between Agent and Actor is especially fuzzy at the moment, since it is not always
clear whether we should consider the Actor to be acting on something (making it
an Agent) or not; so we have not attempted to draw the line here in a completely
robust fashion. Even normally distinct roles turn out to be not-so-distinct in some
cases. Should an argument be construed as something ‘coming out’ of a certain
process? (That makes it sound like a Theme.) Or is it the result of the process?
(That makes it a Goal, since we’re listing Results as Goals here.)
The big issue, of course, is that in theory these changes can drastically affect
the formation of the isomorphism; in practice, though, none of our late-in-the-
process ‘fixing up’ activities have ever altered the isomorphism in a big way, though
our alterations probably changed at least half of the families below. Apparently,
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variations in polysemy and argument optionality among the verbs is great enough
to protect the isomorphism from such tinkerings.
In any case, we’ve ordered things here so that the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ cases come
intermixed. (Just as they did in our discussion of the Levin classes in Sect. 4.1;
see the next Appendix for the precise order of our presentation.) Homonyms are
numbered as in Appendix A. Complex verbs tagged with numbers might not be
listed there directly; they’ll be related to the stem verb with the same tag. The
















1. {fog , hail2 , lightning , mist , mizzle, rain, sleet , snow , storm}
〈it〉
2.1. {abut , adjoin, intersect}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Th〉
2.2. {meet}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Th〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
3. {calve, cub, exhale, fawn, foal , kitten, lamb, pup, whelp}
〈Sr〉
4.1. {differ}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
4.2. {doff , shed}
〈Sr, Th〉
4.3. {reek , stink}
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, of Th〉
5. {cost}
〈Th, Pp〉
6.1. {begin, cease, commence, continue, proceed , start}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Pd〉, 〈Th, to Pd〉
The Theme here should be taken as something extended through time.
6.2. {complete, discontinue, initiate, quit}
〈Th, Pd〉
6.3. {end , finish, resume, terminate}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Pd〉
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7. {blister , deteriorate, molder , molt , swell}
〈Pn〉
8. {faint}
〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, at/from Sr〉
9. {last}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Pa〉, 〈Th, for Pa〉
10.1. {abound , bustle, swarm, throng}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
10.2. {teem}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈with Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
11.1. {appear , arise, dawn, emerge, erupt , flow , materialize, result , supervene,
surge, wax2}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
11.2. {belch}
〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
11.3. {blaze, flame, flare, flicker , gleam, glimmer , glint , glisten, glitter , glow ,
incandesce, scintillate, shimmer , sparkle, twinkle}
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
11.4. {din, echo, resonate, resound , reverberate}
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, through/in Lc〉
11.5. {emanate, exude}
〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
11.6. {fizz}
〈Sr〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉
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11.7. {foam}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉
11.8. {leak , radiate, seep}
〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
11.9. {ooze, spout}
〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
11.10. {stream}
〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,




〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
12.1. {avoid , dodge, duck , elude, evade, shun, sidestep}
〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, Pd〉
12.2. {doubt , expect}
〈Lc/Th, that Pd〉, 〈Lc/Th, Pd/Th, to Pd〉
12.3. {know}
〈Lc/Th, of/about Pd〉, 〈Lc/Th, that Pd〉, 〈Lc/Th, Pd/Th, to Pd〉
Location/Theme is intended to reflect that know is stative, so the subject isn’t an
Actor, let alone an Agent. The subject isn’t doing anything; it just knows.
13. {erode, moult , rot , smolder , stagnate, wilt , wither}
〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉
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14.1. {bloom, blossom, decay , ferment , fester , flower , rust , tarnish}
〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Pn, with Th〉
14.2. {bow , kneel}
〈Th〉, 〈Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, before Lc〉
14.3. {bulge}
〈Pn, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
14.4. {germinate}
〈Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
14.5. {smoke}




〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉
16.2. {overhear}
〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, that Th〉
17.1. {puke, vomit}
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉
17.2. {spit1}
〈it〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉
18.1. {depart , escape, exit , flee}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
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18.2. {inherit , receive}
〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, from Sr〉
19.1. {perceive}
〈Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Gl, Th〉
19.2. {recognize}
〈Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Gl, Pd/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Gl, Th〉
20. {remember}
〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Gl, Th, to Pd〉
21. {mature}
〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, into Gl〉
22.1. {adhere, cleave, cling1}
〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉
22.2. {chase, trail}
〈Th, Gl/Th〉, 〈Th, after Gl/Th〉, 〈Th, Gl/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc, after Gl/Th〉
22.3. {detect , discern, notice, sense}
〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, that Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, in Lc〉
We’re treating this as non-agentive, for better or worse. Thus the ‘sensor’ (Goal)
receives the sensation (Theme). Alternatively, the Goal is also an Experiencer
22.4. {hear}
〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, of/about Th〉, 〈Gl, that Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, in Lc〉
23.1. {breathe}
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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23.2. {bubble}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉,
〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
23.3. {cascade}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.4. {clump}
〈Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
Levin (1993) only classifies two senses of clump: to make a clumping noise, and to
move about, clumping.
23.5. {come}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
23.6. {crawl}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.7. {creep, hop}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
23.8. {drift , slouch, totter}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
23.9. {drool}
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
23.10. {fall}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, down Lc〉, 〈Th, for Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.11. {go}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
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23.12. {meander , wander}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.13. {plunge, tumble}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, down Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.14. {rise}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, up Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
23.15. {straggle}
〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
23.16. {sweat}
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
23.17. {swim}
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉
24. {sound}
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr, Pp〉, 〈Sr, Pp, to Gl〉, 〈Th, through/in Lc〉
25. {thud}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
26. {climb}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, up Lc〉, 〈Th, Lc/Pa〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
27. {happen}
〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Ex〉
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28. {prickle, reel , smart , tingle}
〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, from Sr〉
29. {seem}
〈Th, Pp〉, 〈Th, Pp, to Ex〉
30. {maintain, mean}
〈Ex, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉
31. {embarass}
〈that Pd, Ex〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
32. {see}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Pd〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉
33. {care}
〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, about Th〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉
34.1. {cherish, relish}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
34.2. {covet}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
34.3. {crave}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, for Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
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35.1. {admire, adore, enjoy , favor , like, love, respect , savor , tolerate, treasure}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ex, that Pd〉
Theme looks like it’s being used as a default here, which we wouldn’t normally
want to do (reserving it instead for things ‘in movement’, literally or figuratively).
Perhaps it could be construed as a Source (of the qualities going to and affect-
ing Experiencer) or Goal (of the valuation applied by the Experiencer); the
Experiencer has in cases like this that dual quality.
35.2. {appreciate}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ex, that Pd〉, 〈Th〉
35.3. {desire}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
35.4. {fancy}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉,
〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉
35.5. {need , want}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉,
〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
36. {miss}
〈Ex, Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, in Th〉, 〈Ex, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ex, that Pd〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
37.1. {affiliate, alternate, amalgamate, associate, coalesce, coincide, compare, con-
federate, conjoin, consolidate, contrast , correlate, criss-cross, entwine, integrate,
interchange, interconnect , interlink , interlock , intermingle, interrelate, intertwine,
rhyme, team, unify , unite}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉
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37.2. {agree, banter , bargain, bicker , brawl , collaborate, collide, combat , commiser-
ate, communicate, compete, concur , confabulate, conflict , consort , cooperate, cor-
respond , dicker , disagree, dispute, dissent , duel , elope, feud , flirt , haggle, hobnob,
jest , joke, joust , neck , negotiate, quarrel , quibble, rendezvous, scuffle, skirmish,
spar , spat , squabble, struggle, tussle, vie, war , wrangle, wrestle}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, with Th〉
These should have Actors. In a few cases, though—for agree, for instance—the
arguments are just objects, or can be, and in those cases Theme seems the best
choice.
37.3. {apprentice, archive, bag , bank , beach, bed , beget , bench, berth, billet , bin,
bottle, box1 , braid , cage, can, canonize, case, cause, cellar , condition, consume,
coop, corral , crate, crimp, cripple, cuckold , curry , devour , dock , drydock , engen-
der , file1 , film, fork , garage, generate, groom, ground , hangar , imbibe, ingest ,
jail , jar1 , jug , kennel , knight , land , lather , manicure, martyr , microfilm, orphan,
outlaw , pasture, pauper , pen, perm, photocopy , photograph, pillory , plait , pocket ,
pot , record , recruit , sheathe, shelve, shoulder , snare, spindle, spit2 , spool , stable,
swill , televise, tin, transcribe, trap, tree, warehouse, widow}
〈Ag, Th〉
37.4. {court , cuddle, embrace, nuzzle, pet , preen, primp}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Th〉
37.5. {entangle, interlace, intersperse, interweave}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Th〉







39.1. {absolve, acquit , bereave, bilk , cleanse, cure, defraud , denude, deplete, de-
populate, deprive, despoil , disabuse, disencumber , dispossess , divest , exonerate,
fleece, free, gull , milk , plunder , rid , rob, sap, unburden, void , wean}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉
39.2. {abstract , delete, discharge, disengage, disgorge, dislodge, dismiss , eject ,
eradicate, evict , excise, excommunicate, extrude, lop, omit , ostracize, oust , reap,
shoo, subtract , uproot , wrench}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
39.3. {burgle, cheat , con, swindle}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, out-of Th〉
39.4. {cull}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
39.5. {decouple, detach, differentiate, disassemble, disconnect , disentangle, disso-
ciate, distinguish, part , segregate, separate, sunder , unbolt1 , unbuckle, unbutton,
unchain, unclamp, unclasp, unclip2 , unfasten, unglue, unhinge, unhitch, unhook ,
unlace, unlatch, unleash, unlock , unpeg , unpin, unscrew , unshackle, unstaple, un-
stitch, untie, unzip}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
39.6. {divorce}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
39.7. {ferret , nose}
〈Ag, Th, out-of Sr〉
39.8. {partition, sever}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
39.9. {shave}





〈Ag, up, Th〉, 〈Ag, at Sr〉, 〈Ag, on Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
40.1. {bail , buff , flush1 , leach, rinse, suction, winnow}
〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
40.2. {distill , erase, expunge}
〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
40.3. {purge}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
40.4. {strip}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Sr〉
41. {intend}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, as Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Pd〉
42.1. {adopt , appoint , elect , nominate, ordain}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
42.2. {employ , reject , represent}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
42.3. {incorporate}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉
42.4. {qualify , rank}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Th, as Pp〉
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43.1. {confirm, disguise, enlist , enroll , establish, induct , recollect , reinstate, visu-
alize}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
43.2. {count}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Th, as Pp〉
44.1. {assassinate, crucify , electrocute, execute, garrotte, immolate, injure, liqui-
date, massacre, murder , slay , sprain, strangle, stub}
〈Ag, Pn〉
44.2. {barbecue, braise, broil , charbroil , charcoal-broil , coddle, deep-fry , french
fry , microwave, oven-fry , oven-poach, overcook , pan-broil , pan-fry , parboil , parch,




〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with Pn〉, 〈Pn〉
45. {bark2 , skin}
〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉
46. {eliminate}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
47. {camouflage}
〈Ag, Pn, as Pp〉
48. {oppose}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, as Pp〉
49. {strain}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
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50. {confuse, muddle}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉
51. {train}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, to Pd〉
52. {curl}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th, around Pa〉
53.1. {asphyxiate, drown, suffocate}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉
53.2. {stifle}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉
54.1. {appraise, estimate, price}
〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉
54.2. {bob}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, before Lc〉
54.3. {hoard}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉
54.4. {house, store}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Lc, Th〉
54.5. {listen}
〈Ag, p Lc, for Th〉, 〈Ag, for Th〉, 〈Ag, for Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, to Th〉
55.1. {accumulate}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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55.2. {cloister , conceal , curtain, hide, isolate, quarantine, screen, seclude, se-
quester}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
55.3. {head , top}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
55.4. {plop}
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
55.5. {pry}
〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, apart〉,
〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
55.6. {puff }
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
55.7. {shelter}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
55.8. {shine}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
55.9. {stem}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
56. {wear}
〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Lc, Th〉
57. {steam}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
58. {revolve, rotate}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, around Pa〉
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59.1. {abate, accelerate, acetify , acidify , age, agglomerate, air , alkalify , amelio-
rate, americanize, atrophy , attenuate, blacken, blunt , blur , brighten, broaden, cal-
cify , capsize, caramelize, carbonify , carbonize, char , cheapen, coagulate, coarsen,
collapse, condense, contract , cool , crimson, crumble, crystallize, dampen, darken,
decelerate, decentralize, decrease, deepen, deescalate, deflate, degenerate, degrade,
dehumidify , demagnetize, democratize, depressurize, desiccate, destabilize, deto-
nate, dim, diminish, disintegrate, dissipate, dissolve, distend , double, dry , dull ,
emulsify , energize, enlarge, equalize, evaporate, even, expand , fade, fatten, fed-
erate, firm, flatten, fossilize, fray , freshen, frost , fructify , gasify , gelatinize, glut-
enize, granulate, gray , green, harden, heal , heighten, humidify , hush, hybridize, ig-
nite, improve, increase, incubate, inflate, intensify , iodize, ionize, kindle, lengthen,
lessen, level , levitate, lighten, lignify , liquefy , loose, loosen, macerate, magnetize,
magnify , mellow , moisten, muddy , multiply , narrow , neaten, neutralize, nitrify ,
operate, ossify , overturn, oxidize, pale, petrify , polarize, proliferate, purple, pu-
trefy , quadruple, quicken, quiet , quieten, redden, regularize, rekindle, reopen, re-
produce, ripen, roughen, round , scorch, sear , sharpen, short , short-circuit , shorten,
shrivel , shut , silicify , singe, sink , slack , slacken, slim, slow , smarten, soften, so-
lidify , sour , splay , stabilize, steady , steep, steepen, stiffen, straighten, stratify ,
strengthen, submerge, subside, sweeten, tame, tan, taper , tauten, tense, thaw ,
thicken, thin, tighten, topple, toughen, triple, ulcerate, unfold , unionize, vaporize,
vary , vitrify , volatilize, waken, warm, warp, weaken, westernize, whiten, widen,
worsen, yellow}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉
Most of these Themes are really Patients, and could be changed to that.
59.2. {hasten}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉
59.3. {shrink}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, at Ag〉
59.4. {tire2}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉
60. {defrost}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, with In〉, 〈In, Sr〉, 〈Sr〉
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61.1. {divide}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
61.2. {drain}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈In, Th〉,
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, of Th〉, 〈Th〉
61.3. {ease}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, out-of Sr〉, 〈Th〉
61.4. {empty}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈In, Sr〉,
〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, of Th〉
61.5. {filter , hoover , hose, mop, plow , sandpaper , shear , vacuum}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉
61.6. {purify}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈In, Sr〉
62. {halt}
〈Ag, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Pd〉
63. {disarm, relieve}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈that Pd, Sr〉
64.1. {annihilate, blitz , decimate, destroy , exterminate, obliterate, ravage, raze,
ruin, waste, wreck}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉
64.2. {crop, dent , fillet , gash, kill , mangle, notch, perforate, slit}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉
65.1. {brown, crisp, heat}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Th〉
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65.2. {bruise, nick}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉
65.3. {crease, crinkle, crumple, rumple}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn〉
65.4. {rupture}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉
66. {extirpate}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
67. {total}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with Th/Pn〉, 〈Th, Pp〉
68. {smooth}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Sr〉, 〈In, Pn〉,
〈Pn〉, 〈Th〉
69. {demolish}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉
70. {shatter , splinter}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
71. {prune}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Sr〉
72. {drill , gouge, mash, mow , spear}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉
73.1. {chop, cube, dice, shred , slice}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉
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73.2. {fracture}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
73.3. {pulverize}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Th/Pn〉, 〈Pn〉
74. {file2}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉,
〈In, Pn〉
75. {sober}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉
76.1. {chill}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉,
〈that Pd, Pn〉, 〈Th〉
76.2. {crush}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉,
〈that Pd, Pn〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
76.3. {devastate}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉,
〈Th, Mn〉
77.1. {clutch, grasp, grip, handle, wield}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, by In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉
77.2. {propagate}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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78. {measure, register , weigh}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Th, Pp/Lc〉
The analysis here suggests that the Theme is being place on a figurative scale
(regardless of whether there is a literal scale or not).
79. {hold}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, by In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Lc, Th〉
80.1. {corrode}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Pn, with Th〉
80.2. {decompose}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉
81. {awake, awaken}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Pn, from Sr〉,
〈Pn, from Sr, p Lc〉
82.1. {blast}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉,
〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉
82.2. {burn}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Pn〉,
〈Pn, from Ag〉, 〈Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Pn, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
82.3. {explode, pop}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Sr/Pn, through Lc〉,
〈Sr/Pn, p Lc〉
82.4. {sprout}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
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83. {rip}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈In, Th〉,
〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
84.1. {crack}
〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
84.2. {split}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉,
〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
85.1. {doll , spruce, tog}
〈Ag, Gl, up〉, 〈Ag, up〉
85.2. {dress}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, up〉, 〈Ag, up〉, 〈Gl〉
86.1. {accompany , conduct , escort , guide, lead , shepherd}
〈Ag/Th, Th〉, 〈Ag/Th, Th, p Gl〉
86.2. {add , append , attach, baste, bond , fasten, graft , network , weld}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉
86.3. {allocate, allot , assign, award , bequeath, bunt , catapult , cede, chuck , concede,
fire, fling , flip, hurl , lob, loft , owe, pitch1 , promise, punt1 , tip1 , will , yield}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
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86.4. {arm, asphalt , autograph, bait , blindfold , board2 , bread , brick , bridle, bronze,
buffet , burden, butter , buttonhole, caulk , chrome, cork , diaper , drug , endorse,
equip, feather , flour , forest , fuel , gag , glove, graffiti , gravel , halter , heel , illumi-
nate, illustrate, initial , invest , leaven, letter , lipstick , mantle, monogram, mulch,
nickel , oil , panel , paper , parquet , patch, pepper , perfume, pitch2 , ply , pomade,
poster , postmark , putty , regale, roof , rosin, rouge, rut , saddle, salt , salve, sequin,
shawl , shingle, shoe, shutter , slate, slipcover , sod , sole, spice, starch, stopper ,
stress, stucco, sugar , sulphur , tag , tar , tarmac, thatch, ticket , turf , veneer , wall-
paper , whitewash, zipcode}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
86.5. {bolt2 , gulp, guzzle, quaff , swig , wolf }
〈Ag/Gl, down, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉
86.6. {buck , gyrate, squirm, wriggle}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉
86.7. {bundle, collate, combine, commingle, concatenate, glom, jumble, lump,
merge, package, pool}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
86.8. {cable, e-mail , fax , modem, netmail , radio, satellite, semaphore, signal ,
telecast , telegraph, telephone, telex , wireless}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, about/that Th〉,
〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
86.9. {charge1}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
86.10. {connect , join}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉,
〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
86.11. {cram}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
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86.12. {daub, pump, spatter , splatter , spray , spritz}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th, on/onto Gl〉
86.13. {drizzle, sprinkle}
〈it〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th, on/onto Gl〉
86.14. {feed}
〈Ag/Gl, on Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉
86.15. {fine, tax}




〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
86.18. {jerk , press, thrust}
〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
86.19. {nod , point , shrug , wink}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉
86.20. {overchange1}
〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
86.21. {pair}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
86.22. {pelt}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈with Th〉
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86.23. {relay}
〈Ag, to Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
86.24. {sign}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, about/that Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
86.25. {slurp}
〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉
86.26. {spare}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
86.27. {splice}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉,
〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉
86.28. {tell}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, of/about Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, that/to Th〉, 〈Ag, of/about Th〉,
〈Ag, that/to Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
86.29. {tip2 , undercharge1}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
86.30. {whirl}
〈Ag, Th, around Gl〉, 〈Th, around Gl〉
87. {analyze, audit , evaluate, review}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, for Gl〉
88.1. {announce, articulate, blab, blurt , claim, confide, demonstrate, explain,
explicate, mention, narrate, propose, recount , reiterate, relate, remark , say , state}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉
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88.2. {banish, deport , evacuate, extradite, recall}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉
88.3. {bawl , carol , croon, drawl , gabble, gibber , holler , jabber , lisp, mumble,
mutter , shout , squall , stammer , stutter , tisk , whisper , whoop, yammer , yodel}
〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉
88.4. {bounce, slide}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉,
〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
88.5. {cackle}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉
88.6. {convey}
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉
88.7. {cough}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉
88.8. {dictate}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉
88.9. {enter}
〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
88.10. {expel , remove}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉
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88.11. {gape, gawk , goggle}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, around/through/into Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉
88.12. {gaze, glance, leer , ogle, peek , peep1 , peer , stare}
〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, around/through/into Gl〉
88.13. {glean, memorize}
〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, from Sr〉
88.14. {gobble}
〈Ag/Gl, down, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉
There might be more homonymy here: the sound of gobbling vs. eating in a gob-
bling manner.
88.15. {heave}
〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
88.16. {hurry}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, with Th〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
88.17. {jump}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Gl〉,
〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
88.18. {learn}
〈Ag/Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, of/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Gl, of/about Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, from Sr〉
88.19. {mulct}
〈Ag, Gl, for Ag〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Ag〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Ag〉
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88.20. {preach, quote}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉
88.21. {pucker}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
88.22. {recite}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉,
〈Ag, that Th〉
88.23. {render}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
88.24. {return}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
88.25. {rush}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, with Th〉,
〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
88.26. {seed}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
88.27. {slosh}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉,
〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
88.28. {sneeze, snore, yawn}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, at Gl〉
88.29. {snort}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉
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88.30. {squint}
〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, around/through/into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉
88.31. {stone, tassel}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉
88.32. {suggest}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
88.33. {teach}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉
89.1. {acclaim, applaud , bless , celebrate, commend , compliment , congratulate,
eulogize, extol , felicitate, greet , laud , thank , toast2}
〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉
89.2. {excuse, forgive, recompense, remunerate, welcome}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉
90.1. {baptize, christen, consecrate, decree, dub, name, nickname, pronounce,
rule, term}
〈Ag, Gl/Th, Pp〉
90.2. {brand , label}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
90.3. {compensate}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
90.4. {crown}
〈Ag, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
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90.5. {repay}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
90.6. {reward}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
90.7. {stamp}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉
91.1. {abuse, backbite, calumniate, castigate, censure, chasten, chastise, chide,
condemn, criticize, decry , defame, denigrate, denounce, deprecate, deride, dis-
parage, fault , impeach, lambaste, malign, mock , penalize, persecute, prosecute,
punish, rebuke, reprimand , reproach, reprove, revile, ridicule, scold , scorn, snub,
upbraid , victimize, vilify}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉
91.2. {dust}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉
91.3. {envisage}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉
91.4. {pardon}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
91.5. {scrub, skim}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
91.6. {swab}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
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92.1. {assert}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
92.2. {bet}
〈Ag, Gl, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, that Pd〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pd〉, 〈Ag, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
92.3. {discover}
〈Ag/Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, to Pd〉
92.4. {grant , guarantee}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
92.5. {show}
〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
92.6. {wager}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pd〉,
〈Ag, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉
93.1. {admit , allow , conjecture, deny , figure, guess , repute}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉
93.2. {boast , brag , complain, kvetch, object}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th, to Gl〉
93.3. {gripe, grouch}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, about Th, to Gl〉
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93.4. {grumble}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th, to Gl〉
93.5. {note}
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Gl, that Pd〉,
〈Gl, Th〉
93.6. {observe}
〈Ag/Gl, that Pd〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Th〉
93.7. {repeat}
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Th〉,
〈Ag, Pd〉, 〈Th〉
93.8. {repudiate}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pd〉
94. {bill}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, to Pd〉
95.1. {address}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉
95.2. {define}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
95.3. {designate}
〈Ag, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, to Pd〉
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95.4. {mark}
〈Ag, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
95.5. {offer}
〈Ag, Gl, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉
96.1. {adjudge}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉
96.2. {believe}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, in Pd〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉
96.3. {certify , characterize, class , classify , describe, diagnose, herald , identify ,
lampoon, portray , stigmatize, treat}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉
96.4. {cite}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Pd〉
96.5. {confess}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉
96.6. {declare}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
96.7. {honor}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pd〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
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96.8. {proclaim}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
96.9. {recommend}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
96.10. {regard}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉
96.11. {report}
〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
96.12. {reveal}
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
96.13. {think}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, of/about Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉
96.14. {warrant}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, Pp〉
97.1. {blanch}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, at/from Gl〉
97.2. {cream}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
97.3. {plank}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉
97.4. {poison}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉
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97.5. {slam}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉
97.6. {swoon}
〈Pn, at Ag〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, at/from Gl〉
98. {dispatch}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉
99. {color , distemper , dye, enamel , glaze, japan, lacquer , shellac, tint , varnish}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Gl, Mn〉
100. {choke}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉,
〈Pn, Mn〉
101.1. {burrow , delve, forage, fumble, grope, leaf , page, root , rummage, scrabble,
thumb, tunnel}
〈Ag, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl, p Lc〉
The Agent takes on the properties of a Theme here, for some verbs, on some uses.
101.2. {canvass , examine, explore, frisk , inspect , investigate, quiz , raid , riffle,
scan, survey}
〈Ag, Lc〉, 〈Ag, Lc, for Gl〉
Goal signifies here the Goal of the inspection, etc.
102.1. {adorn, bestrew , blot , bombard , cap, carpet , contaminate, dapple, deco-
rate, deluge, dot , douse, drench, embellish, emblazon, encircle, encrust , endow ,
enrich, face, fence, fleck , frame, garnish, imbue, impregnate, infect , inlay , inter-
lard , interleave, inundate, lard , mask , mottle, ornament , pave, plate, plug , pollute,
replenish, repopulate, riddle, ring1 , saturate, season, soil , speckle, splotch, staff ,
stipple, stud , suffuse, surround , taint , tile}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
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102.2. {bandage, clutter , dam, pad1}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
102.3. {bind}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
102.4. {blanket , cloak , coat , deck , festoon, garland , line, shroud , swaddle, swathe,
veil , wreathe}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, in Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
102.5. {chalk , charcoal , copy , crayon, doodle, pencil , print , scrawl , scribble,
sketch, stencil , trace, type}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉
102.6. {clap}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉,
〈Th, p Lc〉
102.7. {cluster , group, herd , mass}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉,
〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
102.8. {cover}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, in Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉,
〈Th, Lc〉
102.9. {cross}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
102.10. {edge}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, Th〉
102.11. {extend}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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102.12. {flap, wiggle}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.13. {flutter}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.14. {follow}
〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Gl/Th〉
102.15. {ink}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉
102.16. {jab}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉
102.17. {lodge}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.18. {poke}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉
102.19. {pursue, shadow}
〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th, p Lc〉
102.20. {ripple}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.21. {robe}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, in Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, in Lc〉
102.22. {settle}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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102.23. {spot1}
〈it〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
102.24. {stalk1 , track}
〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Th, Lc〉, 〈Ag/Th, Lc, for Gl〉
102.25. {stick}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉
102.26. {swirl}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉,
〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.27. {wave}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
102.28. {wobble}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
103.1. {assess}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉
Theme here refers to the entity begin assessed at such-and-such a value, as if being
‘put’ at that position (figuratively).
103.2. {balloon, rocket}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.3. {beam}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
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103.4. {bicycle, bike, boat , bobsled , cab, canoe, caravan, chariot , coach2 , cycle,
dogsled , gondola, helicopter , jeep, jet , kayak , moped , motor , motorbike, motorcy-
cle, parachute, punt2 , raft , rickshaw , skate, skateboard , ski , sled , sledge, sleigh,
taxi , toboggan, tram, trolley , yacht}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.5. {bleed}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉
103.6. {block}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.7. {bus , ferry}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Th, Lc〉
103.8. {carry}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
103.9. {click}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉
103.10. {cruise, sail}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.11. {dribble}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, on Gl〉,




〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉,
〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉
103.13. {drive}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.14. {drop}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, down〉,
〈Th, down, p Gl〉, 〈Th, down, p Sr〉, 〈Th, down, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
103.15. {evolve}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
103.16. {flash}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
103.17. {float}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.18. {glare}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, around/through/into Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, p Lc〉
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103.19. {hoist}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, up Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
103.20. {howl}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉,
〈with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
103.21. {issue}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
103.22. {litter}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.23. {lower}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, down Lc, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.24. {oar , pedal , ride, tack2}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.25. {pass}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.26. {raise}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
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103.27. {ransack}
〈Ag, Lc〉, 〈Ag, Lc/Sr〉, 〈Ag, Lc/Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Lc, for Gl〉
103.28. {roar}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
103.29. {row}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.30. {shove, tug}
〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
103.31. {slip}
〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
103.32. {slop}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉,
〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
103.33. {spew}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉,
〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
103.34. {spill}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
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103.35. {spread}
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
103.36. {squirt}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Sr, Th〉,
〈Th, on/onto Gl〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
103.37. {swing}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
103.38. {tail}
〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉
103.39. {vein}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
103.40. {yank}
〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉,
〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
104.1. {anoint}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
104.2. {look}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, around/through/into Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉,
〈Ag, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Pp〉, 〈Th, Pp, to Ag〉
105.1. {disdain}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
105.2. {exalt , idolize, prize, revere, venerate, worship}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
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105.3. {smell}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, for Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, in Lc〉, 〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Sr〉, 〈Sr, Pp〉,
〈Sr, Pp, to Gl〉, 〈Sr, of Th〉
105.4. {taste}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, for Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, in Lc〉, 〈Gl, Th〉, 〈Gl, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Sr, Pp〉,
〈Sr, Pp, to Gl〉
105.5. {trim}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
106. {stop}
〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Pd〉
107. {suspect}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Lc/Th, that Pd〉, 〈Lc/Th, Pd/Th, to Pd〉
108.1. {esteem}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉
108.2. {rate}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉, 〈Th, as Pp〉
108.3. {trust}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, with Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉
108.4. {value}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉
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109.1. {bite, claw , slug , stab, swat}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
109.2. {paw}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉,
〈Ag, for Gl, p Lc〉
110.1. {bash, slap, tap}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
110.2. {batter , butt , tamp, thwack , whack}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
110.3. {belt2 , birch, bludgeon, bonk , brain, cane, clobber , club, conk , cosh, cudgel ,
cuff , knife, paddywhack , pummel , sock , spank , thrash, truncheon, wallop}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉
110.4. {bump}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
110.5. {drum, smack}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
110.6. {hang}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
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110.7. {hit}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Lc/Pn〉
110.8. {peck}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, on Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉
110.9. {smother}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc/Pn〉
110.10. {thump}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
111.1. {dash}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
111.2. {knock}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th/Pn, together〉,
〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
111.3. {paddle}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
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111.4. {splash}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, on/onto Gl〉, 〈Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
112.1. {support}
〈Ag/Sr, Th/Pn, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th/Pn, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, in Lc〉,
〈Ag, Pn〉
112.2. {whisk}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, with Th〉
113. {fly}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, Lc/Pa〉, 〈Th, along Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
114. {turn}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, around Pa〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
115.1. {spraypaint}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Gl, Mn〉
115.2. {stain}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Gl, Mn〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
116. {grease, powder , sand , water , wax1}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In〉
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117.1. {anchor , belt1 , bolt1 , buckle, button, cement , chain, clamp, clip2 , epoxy ,
fetter , glue, gum, handcuff , hinge, hitch, hook , knot , lace, lasso, latch, lock , man-
acle, nail , padlock , paste, pin, rivet , rope, screw , seal1 , shackle, solder , staple,
tack1 , tether , thumbtack , tie, trammel , zip}
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
117.2. {band}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
117.3. {channel , dip, dump, funnel , ladle, scoop, tuck , wedge}
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉
117.4. {close}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉
117.5. {fuse}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉,
〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
117.6. {harness, leash, muzzle, plaster , yoke}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉,
〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
117.7. {link}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉,
〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
117.8. {moor}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉
117.9. {silver}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Gl〉, 〈In, Gl〉
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117.10. {skewer , tape}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
117.11. {throw}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉
118.1. {alter}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Gl〉
This is another case where Theme seems an affected entity, thus ought to be a
Patient; but here Levin specifically notes constructions in which the argument is
transformed from one thing to another—going from one thing to another, so to
speak—thus a clear example of an Identificational Theme.
118.2. {read}
〈Ag/Gl〉, 〈Ag/Gl, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Sr〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Sr, with In〉,
〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, of/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, of/about Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag/Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Sr, Th〉
118.3. {shovel}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉
118.4. {siphon}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉
118.5. {string}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
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118.6. {wire}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, about/that Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
119. {transport}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈that Pd, Th〉
120. {insult}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈that Pd, Gl〉
121.1. {ram}
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉
121.2. {wrinkle}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn〉
122. {brush}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉,
〈Th, on/onto Gl〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉
123. {loop}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Pa〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, around Pa〉
124. {move}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈that Pd, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉,
〈Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉
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125. {mince}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
126. {sicken}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, of Ag〉, 〈Pn, at/from Gl〉,
〈Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉
127. {stagger}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
128. {engage}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉,
〈that Pd, Pn〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
129.1. {bracket}
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
129.2. {caress, pat , prod , stroke}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In/Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with In/Th〉
129.3. {clasp}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, by In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉
129.4. {clog1 , dirty , fill , flood}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl〉, 〈Ag, up, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Gl〉, 〈In, Gl〉,
〈Th, Lc〉
129.5. {nudge}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl, with In〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Th, Gl, p Lc, with In〉
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129.6. {peg}
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉
129.7. {pierce}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉,
〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉
130.1. {advance}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, up Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
130.2. {open}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
130.3. {push}
〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
130.4. {soak}
〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Th〉, 〈Ag, up, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
130.5. {stretch}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
131. {touch}
〈Ag, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Gl/Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Gl〉,
〈Th, Gl, with In〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
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132.1. {lash}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
132.2. {prick}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with In〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉
132.3. {snip}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉
132.4. {strap}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
〈Agent, Goal/Patient〉 is for expressing corporal punishment i. e. using a strap.
133.1. {bang}
〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉,
〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉
〈Agent, Source/Patient〉 is for something like bang the drum, i. e., cause a sound
to be emitted.
133.2. {burst}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
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134.1. {sweep}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn/Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
134.2. {wipe}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn/Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
135. {tear}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
136. {stir}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈that Pd, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
137.1. {clip1}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc, with In〉,
〈Pn, Mn〉
137.2. {punch}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈In, Mn〉
138.1. {chip}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, Mn〉
138.2. {crash}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, together〉,
〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
138.3. {slash}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn, Mn〉
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138.4. {smash}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Th/Pn, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Pn〉
139.1. {break}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉,
〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
139.2. {hew , saw}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, Mn〉,
〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
140.1. {scrape}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc, with In〉,
〈Ag, Sr/Pn, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Pn, Mn〉
140.2. {scratch}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
141.1. {balk}
〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ex, at Ag〉
141.2. {fume}
〈Ex/Sr, over Ag〉, 〈Sr, at Th〉
142. {gush}
〈Ex/Sr, over Ag〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
270
143. {embarrass}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉
144. {abash, affect , afflict , affront , alienate, amaze, antagonize, appal , appease,
astound , awe, beguile, bewitch, bug , chagrin, charm, concern, confound , convince,
cow , daunt , dazzle, deject , demoralize, discombobulate, discomfit , discompose, dis-
concert , disgruntle, disgust , dissatisfy , distress, disturb, dumbfound , elate, elec-
trify , embolden, encourage, enlighten, enliven, enrage, enrapture, entertain, en-
thrall , exhilarate, flatter , floor , gall , galvanize, gratify , harass, haunt , horrify ,
humiliate, impress, incense, infuriate, inspire, interest , mollify , mystify , offend ,
outrage, overawe, overwhelm, pain, peeve, perplex , pique, plague, preoccupy , pro-
voke, reassure, refresh, repel , repulse, revolt , rile, satisfy , scandalize, spellbind ,
stimulate, stun, tantalize, terrorize, threaten, titillate, try , unnerve, unsettle, up-
lift , upset , vex}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
Agent here is often just Cause, and Instrument might be Cause too.
145. {bother}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex, about Th〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
146. {tease}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, out-of Sr〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
147. {jar2}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, on Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
148.1. {aggravate, agitate, agonize, alarm, amuse, annoy , arouse, assuage, aston-
ish, baffle, bewilder , boggle, bore2 , calm, captivate, comfort , console, content , daze,
depress, disappoint , discourage, disgrace, dishearten, disillusion, dismay , dispirit ,
displease, disquiet , distract , enchant , engross, entice, entrance, exasperate, excite,
exhaust , fascinate, faze, flabbergast , fluster , frighten, frustrate, hearten, humble,
hypnotize, intimidate, intoxicate, intrigue, invigorate, irk , irritate, jollify , jolt ,
lull , mesmerize, miff , mortify , nauseate, nettle, numb, pacify , perturb, placate,
please, rankle, relax , revitalize, ruffle, scare, shock , solace, soothe, spook , startle,
stupefy , surprise, tempt , terrify , torment , trouble, wound , wow}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉, 〈Th, Mn〉
As in other families, some of the Agents may be more a mere Cause than an Agent.
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148.2. {delight}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈Ex, in Th〉, 〈Ex, over Th〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
148.3. {thrill}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex, at Ag〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈Ex, to Ag〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
148.4. {tire}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈Ex, of Th〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
149. {grate}
〈Ag, on Ex〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Pn〉
150. {gladden}
〈Ag, Ex/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, at Ag〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉,
〈that Pd, Pn〉
151. {sting}
〈Ag, Ex/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Pn, p Lc, with In〉,
〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, from Ag〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
152. {tickle}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In/Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Pn, p Lc, with In/Th〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex/Pn, Mn〉, 〈Ex, from Ag〉, 〈that Pd, Ex/Pn〉
153. {itch}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, from Ag〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉
154.1. {chortle, chuckle, frown, giggle, glower , grimace, grin, guffaw , jeer , laugh,
pout , scowl , sigh, simper , smile, smirk , snicker , snigger , snivel , sob, titter}
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ex, at Th〉
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154.2. {groove}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ex, on Th〉
More homonymy here, probably: putting grooves in something, vs. acting ‘in a
groove’.
154.3. {sniff }
〈Ag〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ex, at Th〉,
〈Ex, around/through/into Gl〉
155. {gasp}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ex, at Th〉
156. {ache}
〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, from Ag〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉, 〈Pn, Ex〉
157.1. {abhor , deplore, despise, detest , dislike, distrust , dread , envy , execrate,
hate, lament , loathe, pity , regret , resent , rue}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉
157.2. {fear}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉,
〈Ex, for Gl〉
157.3. {mourn}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, over Th〉,
〈Ex, that Pd〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉
158. {feel}
〈Ag/Ex, Lc〉, 〈Ag/Ex, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, p Lc〉, 〈Ex, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ex, Th〉,
〈Ex, Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ex, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ex, Pd〉, 〈Ex, that Pd〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉,
〈Ex, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ex, Gl〉, 〈Ex, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ex, for Th〉, 〈Pn, Pp〉, 〈Pn, Pp, to Ex〉
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159. {stump}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
160. {grieve}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈Ex, over Th〉, 〈Ex, for Gl〉,
〈that Pd, Ex〉
161. {shame}
〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Ex/Th, for Gl, as Pp〉,
〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉, 〈that Pd, Ex〉
162. {strike}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with In〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈that Pd, Ex/Gl〉,
〈Th〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
Some of the Themes refer to the travels of a sound that has been struck.
163. {barter , exchange, substitute, swap}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th, for Bn〉
Agent is also Source or Goal (or both if plural).
164.1. {abduct , acquire, appropriate, borrow , cadge, capture, confiscate, cop,
emancipate, exact , exorcise, grab, impound , kidnap, liberate, nab, obtain, reclaim,
recover , redeem, regain, repossess, rescue, retrieve, seize, snatch, weasel , wrest}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
164.2. {book , cash, catch, charter , fetch, get , order , reach, reserve}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
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164.3. {buy , earn, procure, secure, win}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Bn, Th, from Sr, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn, for Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Th〉
164.4. {extract , winkle, withdraw}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
164.5. {gain}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Th〉
164.6. {purchase}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn, for Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th〉
165.1. {choose, hire}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
165.2. {select}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
166.1. {embezzle, extort , filch, pilfer , pirate, plagiarize, purloin, thieve, wangle}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn, for Bn〉
166.2. {slaughter}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
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167. {steal}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn, for Bn〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
168. {light}
〈Ag, Bn, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉
169.1. {clean}
〈Ag, Bn, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈In, Pn〉
169.2. {clear}
〈Ag, Bn, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈In, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Sr〉
169.3. {iron}
〈Ag, Bn, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn, with In〉
170.1. {blend , mix}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
170.2. {sell}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Th〉
170.3. {set}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
170.4. {toss}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
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171.1. {lease, rent}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Bn, Th, from Sr, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn, for Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th〉
171.2. {phone}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, about/that Th〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
171.3. {pour}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈with Th〉, 〈Sr, Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, through Sr〉
171.4. {save}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr, for Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Gl〉
171.5. {scramble}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
171.6. {smuggle}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
171.7. {sneak}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉,
〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
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171.8. {trade}
〈Ag, Sr/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Gl, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Bn, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Th, for Bn〉
172.1. {accept}
〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag/Gl, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
172.2. {call}
〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉
172.3. {pluck}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
172.4. {vote}
〈Ag/Sr, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Bn, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Bn, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Bn, Th, p Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, p Sr, for Gl〉
173. {boil , fry , grill , hardboil , poach1 , roast , softboil , toast1}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Pn〉
174.1. {knead , wad , work}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
174.2. {twirl}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, around Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, around Gl〉
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175.1. {bake, cook}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Pn〉
Goal here refers to the result of what is being prepared.
175.2. {build , chisel , churn, compile, crochet , fashion, mold , sculpt , shape, whit-
tle}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
Goal here is the result of the building or churning or sculpting, etc.
175.3. {embroider}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
175.4. {knit}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
175.5. {pick}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, on Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
175.6. {sew}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉
176. {make}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,




〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉
178. {coil}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, around Pa〉
179. {fix}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Lc〉
With Theme, the reference is to putting something in a fixed ‘position’; with Goal,
to preparing something.
180.1. {assemble}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
180.2. {gather}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
180.3. {lift}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, up Lc, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
180.4. {run}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉,
〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
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181. {take}
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Gl, Th〉
182.1. {pound}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉,
〈Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, from Ag〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
182.2. {whip}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Th/Pn〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Th/Pn, with Th〉
183.1. {beat}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Th/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
183.2. {blow}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Lc, with Th〉, 〈Th〉,
〈with Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
183.3. {flog}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
Possibly one might view this as homonymy: with a Theme, this is flog as in steal.
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183.4. {forge}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉
The constructions with Theme are for forging e. g. a name onto the surface of
something.
183.5. {hammer}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
183.6. {pull}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, apart〉,
〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
183.7. {roll}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Gl〉,
〈Th, around Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, to Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, apart〉,
〈Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
183.8. {shoot}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl/Pn, p Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Sr/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Sr/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
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183.9. {swipe}
〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn, for Bn〉
183.10. {weave}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
184.1. {twist}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉,
〈Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
184.2. {wind1}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, around Pa〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
185. {coin, compute, concoct , construct , create, design, fabricate, invent , manu-
facture, mint , organize, recreate, synthesize}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉
186. {arrange}
〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p In〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p In, for Bn〉
187. {derive}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉, 〈Gl/Th, from Sr〉
188. {compress, freeze, melt}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Th/Pn〉, 〈Pn〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
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189. {hatch}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn, from Sr〉, 〈Pn〉,
〈Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Pn, from Sr〉
190.1. {change}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Th, for Bn〉, 〈Pn〉,
〈Th, p Gl〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr, p Gl〉
190.2. {fold}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
190.3. {stitch}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, together, with In〉
191. {style}
〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, Pp〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p In〉,
〈Ag, Pn, p In, for Bn〉
192. {squash, squish}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl, with In〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
193. {grind}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Pn〉
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194. {form}
〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Gl〉, 〈Gl, p Gl〉, 〈Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Gl, from Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Gl, from Sr, p Lc〉
195. {bend}
〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Th/Pn〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th/Pn, p Lc〉
196.1. {collect}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉, 〈In, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉
196.2. {develop}
〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p In〉, 〈Ag, Pn, p In, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, from Sr〉, 〈Th/Pn, from Sr, p Lc〉
196.3. {grow}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉,
〈Gl〉, 〈Gl, from Sr〉, 〈In, Gl〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉,
〈Th, from Sr, p Lc〉
196.4. {hack}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, off-of/off Sr〉
Some of the Goals refer to entities that are hacked together; the Theme/Patients
are the entities that get hacked apart.
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196.5. {pinch}
〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with In/Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with In/Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
More possible homonymy: the Themes are things that are stolen, rather than given
a little (literal) squeeze.
197. {carve}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Pn〉
The constructions with Theme are for carving e. g. a name onto the surface of
something.
198. {shake}
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉,
〈that Pd, Th〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉,
〈Th, together〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, with Th〉
199. {cut}
〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, off-of/off Sr〉,
〈that Pd, Pn〉, 〈Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Th, Mn〉, 〈Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
Two of the bare Themes are for Levin’s (1993) Meander verbs, as in the road cuts
through the center of town.
200. {find}
〈Ag/Gl, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th, for Bn〉,




〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, around Gl〉, 〈Ex/Th〉, 〈Ex/Th, from Ag〉,
〈Th, around Gl〉
202.1. {antique, banquet , berry , birdnest , blackberry , brunch, catnap, clam, doze,
drowse, fowl , hay , into, log , luncheon, nap, nest , nosh, nut , oyster , pearl , picnic,
prawn, rabbit , seal2 , shark , shrimp, slumber , snipe, snooze, whale, whelk}
〈Ac〉
202.2. {battle, box2 , consult , debate, fight}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉
202.3. {tilt2}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉
203. {fret , moon, rhapsodize}
〈Ac, about Th〉, 〈Ac, over Th〉
204. {perspire}
〈Ac/Sr〉
205.1. {act , behave}
〈Ac, as Pp〉, 〈Ac, Pp〉
205.2. {masquerade, officiate}
〈Ac, as Pp〉
206. {argue, chat , chitchat , confer , converse, gab, gossip, schmooze, yak}




The construction 〈Actor〉 is for expressing a search for e. g. mushrooms.
208.1. {burr , chink , chir , clomp, crepitate, dong , fizzle, knell , patter , peal , pink ,
plink , plonk , plunk , putter , shrill , squelch, swish, thrum, thunk , tick , ting , tootle,
twang , ululate, vroom, whoosh, whump, zing}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
208.2. {chime, chug , clack , clatter , creak , gurgle, sizzle, sputter , whir}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
208.3. {clash}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉
208.4. {exist , flourish, live, prosper , survive, thrive}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ac/Th, on Th/Sr〉
209. {use}
〈Ac, In〉, 〈Ac, In, p Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ac, In, as Pd〉, 〈Ac, In, to Pd〉, 〈Lc/Pn, In〉
210. {drink , eat}
〈Ac/Gl〉, 〈Ac/Gl, Th〉
211. {seek}
〈Ac/Gl, Th〉, 〈Ac/Gl, Th, from Sr〉
212. {study}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac/Gl, from Sr〉, 〈Ac/Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Gl/Pd〉,
〈Ac/Sr, Gl/Th, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉
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213.1. {advertise, dive, dredge, excavate, patrol , plumb, probe, prospect , scavenge,
scout , search, shop, trawl , troll , watch}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉
Actor was used here to stress that the Agent is doing something in addition to
being the Cause of something; Agent/Theme might have been a better choice.
Advertise clearly seems out of place, but its presence here merely reflects Levin’s
own grouping of the verbs, so we’ve let it be for now.
213.2. {check}
〈Ac, on Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉
213.3. {snoop}
〈Ac, on Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉
214.1. {breakfast , dine, feast , lunch, snack , sup}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac/Gl, on Lc/Th〉
214.2. {fish}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th〉, 〈Ac, Th, p Lc〉
214.3. {hunt , poach2 , scrounge}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Gl〉, 〈Ac, Gl, p Lc〉
214.4. {mine}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th〉
214.5. {quarry}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th〉
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215.1. {drag}
〈Ac, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ac, Gl, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th〉, 〈Ac, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ac, Th, from Sr〉,
〈Ac, Th, from Sr, to Gl〉
215.2. {prowl}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉
215.3. {sing}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ac/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ac/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ac/Sr, for Gl〉,
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
215.4. {speak}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, about Th〉,
〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac, about Th〉, 〈Ac, together〉
215.5. {talk}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, about Th〉,
〈Ac, together〉
216. {scour}
〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Ac, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ac, Th, p Sr〉
217. {chatter}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ac/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ac/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ac/Sr, for Gl〉,
〈Ac/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ac/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac, about Pd〉,
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
218. {scrutinize}
〈Ac/Sr, G/Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ac/Sr, G/Lc/Pn, for Gl〉
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219. {graze}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac/Th, on Lc〉, 〈Th, Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl, with In〉, 〈Th, Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Th, Gl, p Lc, with In〉
220. {comb}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Ac, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ac, Th, p Sr, with In〉
221. {play}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Ac, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ac, Th〉, 〈Ac, Th, for Bn〉
222. {model}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, for Bn〉, 〈Ac, Th〉, 〈Ac, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ac, Th, p In〉, 〈Ac, Th, p In, for Bn〉
223. {witness}
〈Ac/Sr, for Bn〉, 〈Gl, Th〉
224. {react}
〈Ac, to Ag〉
225.1. {cower , cringe}
〈Ac, at Ag〉, 〈Ac, at Th〉
225.2. {exercise}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Th〉
225.3. {mate}




〈Ac, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
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228. {rejoice}
〈Ac, at Ag〉, 〈Ac, about Th〉, 〈Ac, over Th〉, 〈Ac, in Pd〉
229. {sleep}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Ac/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Lc, Ac/Th〉
230.1. {beep, blare, ding , jangle, jingle, ping , tinkle, toll , toot , whish}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
230.2. {clang , clank , clink , clunk , crackle, rattle, ring2}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
231. {chew , chomp, munch}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, on Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉
232. {crunch}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, on Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, through Lc〉
233. {towel}
〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉
234.1. {choreograph, direct , perform, silkscreen}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
234.2. {mingle}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉, 〈Th, together〉,
〈Th, with Th〉
234.3. {shower}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Gl〉, 〈with Th〉
234.4. {swallow}
〈Ac/Gl〉, 〈Ag/Gl, down, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl, Th〉
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235.1. {chant}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉
235.2. {weep}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉
235.3. {write}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl, that Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉
236. {pose}
〈Ac, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉
237.1. {crab}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, about Th, to Gl〉
237.2. {grouse}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that Pd〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that Pd, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, about Th, to Gl〉
238. {nibble}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, on Pn〉
239. {date}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉
Another case one might want to consider homonymous: with a Goal, this is putting
a date on something; otherwise, it’s people dating one another.
240.1. {bathe}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, in Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
293
240.2. {hug}
〈Ac/Th, Th〉, 〈Ag/Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Lc〉
240.3. {plot}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉
240.4. {rage}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, at Ag〉, 〈Ac, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ac, to Gl〉, 〈Ac, to Gl, that/about Th〉,
〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, about Th〉, 〈Ac, over Th〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, that/about Th〉,
〈Ac, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Lc, with Ac〉
241.1. {babble, rumble, splutter}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.2. {bellow , hiss , purr , squawk , squeak}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.3. {blat , chitter , pipe}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.4. {blink}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉
Source is specifically for the case where lights are blinking (i. e. emitting light).
241.5. {boogie, bop, cancan, clog2 , conga, foxtrot , jig , jitterbug , jive, pirouette,
polka, quickstep, rumba, samba, squaredance, tango, tapdance, waltz}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ac/Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
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241.6. {boom, burble, lilt , murmur , rasp, shriek , trumpet , wheeze, whine}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.7. {buzz}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉,
〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.8. {cry}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, on Gl〉, 〈Ag, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.9. {groan, moan}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.10. {growl}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉,
〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.11. {hoot , scream, screech, squeal , trill , wail}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.12. {rifle}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl〉, 〈Ag, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Sr, of Th〉
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241.13. {shuffle}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ac/Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, together〉,
〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, with Th〉
241.14. {sift}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Th, from Sr〉
241.15. {thunder}
〈it〉, 〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
241.16. {whistle}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
242. {serve}
〈Ac, as Pp〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Th, Gl〉
243. {gnaw}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, on Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉
244. {kick}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th/Pn, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, to Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, apart〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, from Sr, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, off-of/off Sr〉,
〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
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245.1. {rub}
〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Th, on/onto Gl〉
245.2. {view}
〈Ac/Sr, G/Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉
246. {rap}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Th〉, 〈Ac, with Th, about Pd〉, 〈Ac, about Pd〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn〉,
〈Ag, at Gl/Pn〉, 〈Ag, at Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Gl/Pn, p Lc, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Pn, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, together〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, against Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉,
〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn〉, 〈Th, Gl/Pn, p Lc〉
The constructions with Actor refer to people conversing, those with Patient refer
to something hitting something else, and the others refer to a locale from which a
similarly characteristic sound is being emitted.
247. {spoon}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, with Ac〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉
248. {kiss}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with In/Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p Lc, with In/Th〉
249. {rake}
〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ac, Th, p Sr, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl, with In〉
250. {lick}
〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, with In〉, 〈Ac, Lc, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, p Lc, with In〉, 〈Ag, at Gl〉,
〈Ag, on Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
251.1. {polish}
〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, G/Lc/Pn, with In〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
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251.2. {wring}
〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Sr〉
252. {bore1}
〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉,
〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Mn〉, 〈In, Pn〉
253. {snap}
〈Ac/Sr, at Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, at/toward Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, to Gl〉,
〈Ag/Sr, to Gl, that/about Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, for Gl〉, 〈Ag/Sr, that/about Th〉,
〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, at Gl〉, 〈Ag, Pn, with In〉, 〈In, Pn〉,
〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Pn〉, 〈Pn, Mn〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉, 〈Th/Sr, p Lc〉
254. {seethe}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac/Ex, over Ag〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Lc, with Ac〉
255. {worry}
〈Ac/Ex, Mn〉, 〈Ac/Ex, about Th〉, 〈Ac, over Th〉, 〈Ag, Ac/Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ac/Ex, with In〉,
〈that Pd, Ac/Ex〉
256. {hurt}
〈Ac/Ex, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Ex〉, 〈Ag, Ex, with In〉, 〈Ex〉, 〈Ex, from Ag〉, 〈Ex, Mn〉,
〈that Pd, Ex〉
Constructions 〈Agent, Experiencer〉 and 〈Actor/Experiencer, Patient〉 are in-
tended to capture the difference between he hurt her and he hurt his foot, respec-
tively; in the latter case he isn’t necessarily the Cause of his injury.
257. {hum}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ex〉,
〈Ex, from Ag〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉




〈Ac/Ex, Th〉, 〈Ac/Ex, Th, in Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, p Lc〉,
〈Th, Lc〉, 〈Th, Lc, as Pp〉, 〈Th, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Th, Lc, for Gl, as Pp〉
259. {butcher}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉
260. {keep}
〈Ac, Pd〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, for Bn〉
261. {rustle}
〈Ac/Sr〉, 〈Ac/Sr, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr/Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Lc/Sr, with Th〉, 〈Th/Sr, through Lc〉
262. {sponge}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, with In〉,
〈Ag, Th, from Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, from Sr, for Bn〉
The construction 〈Actor〉 is for something like we’re going sponging, i. e. looking
for sponges; for the same verb, then, some of the Themes here are for the act of
sponging as a kind of theft (though in our dialect it sounds better with sponge off
of ).
263. {wash}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn〉, 〈Ag, Pn, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Sr, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉
264.1. {dance}
〈Ac/Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ac/Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ac/Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ac/Th, p Sr, p Gl〉, 〈Ag/Th, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl〉, 〈Ag/Th, Gl, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, along Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr, p Gl〉
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264.2. {draw}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, at/on Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉,
〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, apart〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr〉,
〈Ag, Th, off-of/off Sr〉, 〈Th, apart〉, 〈Th, off-of/off Sr〉
The Goals that are direct objects are pictures to be drawn; otherwise, most of
these constructions are more closely related to a very different sense of draw, as in
to draw a sword, i. e. from its sheath.
265. {leave}
〈Ac/Th, Th〉, 〈Ac/Th, Th, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl/Th, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Gl, Th〉,
〈Ag, Gl, Th, p Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, for Bn/Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Lc〉,
〈Ag, Th, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Sr/Pn, for Bn/Gl〉, 〈Th〉, 〈Th, Sr〉
266. {paint}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, as Pp〉, 〈Ag/Sr, Gl/Th, to Pd〉, 〈Ag, Bn, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉,
〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, with Th〉, 〈Ag, Th〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, p Gl/Lc〉,
〈Gl, Mn〉
267. {compose, produce}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, to Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉
268. {dig}
〈Ac〉, 〈Ac, Lc〉, 〈Ac, Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, p Lc〉, 〈Ac, p Lc, for Gl〉, 〈Ac, for Gl〉,
〈Ac, for Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Gl〉, 〈Ag, Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In〉, 〈Ag, Gl, p In, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Gl, p Lc〉, 〈Ag, Th, into Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th, through Gl〉, 〈Th, into Gl〉
269. {squeeze}
〈Ac, Lc/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Sr/Pn, Pp, of Th〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, for Bn〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Gl, with In〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Ag, Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉, 〈Ag, Th/Pn, p Sr〉, 〈Th/Pn, into Gl〉,
〈Th/Pn, into Gl, for Bn〉
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Appendix C
Θ-roles used in each construction family
We supply the table below merely as a kind of index for the θ-roles used in the
construction families—in case one wants to find all the constructions families that
have, say, an Actor in one or more of their θ-sets. Each number in parentheses
refers to a construction family as enumerated in Appendix B (p. 213). The θ-role






















Ac Ag Bn Ex Gl In Lc Mn Pa Pn Pd Pp Sr Th
217 (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2.1–2.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Th
(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sr .
(4.1–4.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sr Th
(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pp . Th
(6.1–6.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pd . . Th
218 (7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pn . . . .
(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pn . . Sr .
(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa . . . . Th
(10.1–10.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lc . . . . . . Th
218–219 (11.1–11.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
219 (12.1–12.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lc . . . Pd . . Th
(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lc . . Pn . . . .
220 (14.1–14.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lc . . Pn . . . Th
(15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . . . . .
(16.1–16.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . . . . Th
(17.1–17.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr .
220–221 (18.1–18.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
221 (19.1–19.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . Pd . . Th
(20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . . Pd Pp . Th
(21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . . . . Pn . . . .
(22.1–22.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . Th
221–223 (23.1–23.17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
223 (24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . Lc . . . . Pp Sr Th
(25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . . Th
(26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gl . Lc . Pa . . . Sr Th
(27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . . . . . . . . Th
224 (28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . . . . . . . Sr .
(29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . . . . . . Pp . Th
(30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . . . . . Pd . . Th
(31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . . Mn . . Pd . . Th
(32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex . . Lc . . . Pd Pp . Th
(33) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex Gl . . . . . . . . Th
(34.1–34.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex Gl . . . . . . Pp . Th
225 (35.1–35.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex Gl . . . . . Pd Pp . Th
(36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex Gl . Lc . . . Pd Pp . Th
225–226 (37.1–37.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . . . . Th
226 (38.1–38.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . . . Sr .
227–228 (39.1–39.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . . . Sr Th
228 (40.1–40.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . . Pp Sr Th
(41) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(42.1–42.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . . Pd Pp . Th








Ac Ag Bn Ex Gl In Lc Mn Pa Pn Pd Pp Sr Th
(44.1–44.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . . . .
(45) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . . Sr .
(46) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . Pp . .
(48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . Pp . Th
(49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
230 (50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn Pd . . Th
(51) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . . Pn Pd Pp . Th
(52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . . Pa . . . . Th
(53.1–53.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . . Mn . Pn . . . .
(54.1–54.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . Lc . . . . . . Th
230–231 (55.1–55.9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
231 (56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . Lc . . . . Pp Sr Th
(57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . . Lc . Pa . . . . Th
232 (59.1–59.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . . . . . Th
(60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . . . . Sr .
233 (61.1–61.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . . . . Sr Th
(62) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . . Pd . . Th
(63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(64.1–64.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn . . . .
233–234 (65.1–65.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn . . . Th
234 (66) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(67) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn . Pp . Th
(68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . . . Pn Pd . . .
(70) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . . . . . Th
(71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . . . Pp Sr Th
(72) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . Pn . . . .
234–235 (73.1–73.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . Pn . . . Th
235 (74) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . Pn Pd . . .
(76.1–76.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In . Mn . Pn Pd . . Th
(77.1–77.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . . . . . Th
236 (78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . . . Pp . Th
(79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . . Pd . . Th
(80.1–80.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . Pn . . . Th
(81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . Pn . . Sr .
(82.1–82.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
237 (83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc Mn . . . . Sr Th
(84.1–84.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . . In Lc Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(85.1–85.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . . . .
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240 (87) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr .
240–244 (88.1–88.33) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
244 (89.1–89.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . Pp . .
244–245 (90.1–90.7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . Pp . Th
245 (91.1–91.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . . Pp Sr Th
246 (92.1–92.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd . . Th
246–247 (93.1–93.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd . Sr Th
247 (94) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd Pp . .
247–248 (95.1–95.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd Pp . Th
248–249 (96.1–96.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
249–250 (97.1–97.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . Pn . . . Th
250 (98) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(99) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . Mn . . . . . Th
(100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . . Mn . Pn . . . Th
(101.1–101.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . .
250–253 (102.1–102.28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . Th
253–258 (103.1–103.40) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
258 (104.1–104.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . Pp . Th
258–259 (105.1–105.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . Pp Sr Th
259 (106) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . Pd . . Th
(107) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . Pd . Sr Th
(108.1–108.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
260 (109.1–109.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . . .
260–261 (110.1–110.10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . . Th
261–262 (111.1–111.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
262 (112.1–112.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(113) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . Pa . . . Sr Th
(114) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc . Pa Pn . . Sr Th
(115.1–115.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl . Lc Mn . . . . . Th
(116) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . . . . . .
263–264 (117.1–117.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . . . . . Th
264–265 (118.1–118.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . . . . Sr Th
265 (119) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(120) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . . Pd Pp . .
(121.1–121.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . Pn . . . Th
(122) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(123) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . . Pa . . . . Th
(124) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . Mn . . Pd . Sr Th
266 (125) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(126) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . Mn . Pn Pd . . .
(127) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . Mn . Pn Pd . Sr Th
(128) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In . Mn . Pn Pd Pp . Th
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267 (130.1–130.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc . . . . . Sr Th
(131) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc . . . Pd . . Th
268 (132.1–132.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc . . Pn . . . Th
(133.1–133.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
269 (134.1–134.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(135) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . . . . Sr Th
(136) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . . Pd . . Th
(137.1–137.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . . .
269–270 (138.1–138.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . . Th
270 (139.1–139.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(140.1–140.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(141.1–141.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . . . . . . . . Sr Th
(142) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
271 (143) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . . . . . . . .
(144) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . . . . Pd . . .
(145) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . . . . Pd . . Th
(146) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(147) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . Mn . . Pd . . .
271–272 (148.1–148.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . Mn . . Pd . . Th
272 (149) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . Mn . Pn . . . .
(150) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In . Mn . Pn Pd . . .
(151) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In Lc . . Pn Pd . . .
(152) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex . In Lc Mn . Pn Pd . . Th
(153) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . . . . . . . . .
272–273 (154.1–154.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . . . . . . . . Th
273 (155) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
(156) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . . . . Pn . . . .
(157.1–157.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . Lc . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
(158) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl . Lc . . Pn Pd Pp . Th
274 (159) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl In . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(160) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl In . Mn . . Pd . . Th
(161) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl In . Mn . . Pd Pp . Th
(162) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag . Ex Gl In Lc . . Pn Pd . Sr Th
(163) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . . . . . . . . . Th
274–275 (164.1–164.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . . . . . . . . Sr Th
275 (165.1–165.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . . . . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
(166.1–166.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . . . . . Pn . . Sr Th
276 (167) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(168) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . In . . . Pn . . . .
(169.1–169.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . . In . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(170.1–170.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . . . . . Th
277–278 (171.1–171.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
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(173) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn . . . .
(174.1–174.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn . . . Th
279 (175.1–175.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(176) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
280 (177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn Pd Pp Sr Th
(178) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . . . Pa Pn . . . Th
(179) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . . . . . Th
(180.1–180.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
281 (181) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
(182.1–182.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . . Th
281–283 (183.1–183.10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
283 (184.1–184.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . Pa Pn . . Sr Th
(185) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . . . . . .
(186) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . . . . . Th
(187) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . . . . Sr Th
(188) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . Pn . . . Th
284 (189) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . Pn . . Sr .
(190.1–190.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(191) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(192) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . Mn . Pn . . . Th
(193) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In . Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
285 (194) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc . . . . . Sr .
(195) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc . . Pn . . . Th
285–286 (196.1–196.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
286 (197) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(198) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn Pd . . Th
(199) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn Pd . Sr Th
(200) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn Ex Gl . . . . . Pd Pp Sr Th
287 (201) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag Bn Ex Gl . . . . Pn . . Sr Th
(202.1–202.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(203) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . . . . . Th
(204) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . . . . Sr .
(205.1–205.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . . . Pp . .
(206) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . . Pd . . .
288 (207) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . . . . Pn . . . Th
(208.1–208.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
(209) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . . In Lc . . Pn Pd . . .
(210) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . . . . . . . . Th
(211) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
(212) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . . . . . Pd . Sr Th
289 (213.1–213.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . .
(214.1–214.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . Th
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(216) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . Lc . . . . Pp Sr Th
(217) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . Lc . . . Pd . Sr Th
(218) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . Sr .
291 (219) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl In Lc . . . . . . Th
(220) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . . . Gl In Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(221) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . Bn . . . . . . . . . . Th
(222) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . Bn . . In . . . . . . . Th
(223) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac . Bn . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
(224) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . . . . . . . . .
(225.1–225.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . . . . . . . . Th
(226) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . . . . . . . Sr .
(227) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . . . . . . Pp Sr Th
292 (228) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . . . . . Pd . . Th
(229) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . Lc . . . . . . Th
(230.1–230.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
(231) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . Lc . . Pn . . . .
(232) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(233) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . . In Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(234.1–234.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . . . . . Th
293 (235.1–235.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . . . . Sr Th
(236) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . . . Pp . Th
(237.1–237.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . . Pd . Sr Th
(238) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . Pn . . . .
(239) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . . . . Pn . . . Th
293–294 (240.1–240.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . . . Th
294–296 (241.1–241.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
296 (242) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . . . Pp . Th
(243) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . . .
(244) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
297 (245.1–245.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
(246) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl . Lc . . Pn Pd . Sr Th
(247) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In . . . . . . . Th
(248) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc . . . . . . Th
(249) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc . . . . . Sr Th
(250) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc . . . . Pp Sr Th
297–298 (251.1–251.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
298 (252) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . . .
(253) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . . Gl In Lc Mn . Pn . . Sr Th
(254) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . Ex . . Lc . . . . . . .
(255) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . Ex . In . Mn . . Pd . . Th
(256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . Ex . In . Mn . Pn Pd . . .
(257) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag . Ex Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
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(259) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . . . . . . Pn . . . .
(260) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . . . Lc . . . Pd . Sr Th
(261) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . . . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(262) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . . In Lc . . . . . Sr Th
(263) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl . . . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
299–300 (264.1–264.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . . . . Sr Th
300 (265) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl . Lc . . Pn . . Sr Th
(266) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl . Lc Mn . . Pd Pp Sr Th
(267) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl In . . . . . . . .
(268) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl In Lc . . . . . . Th
(269) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ac Ag Bn . Gl In Lc . . Pn . Pp Sr Th
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Verbs in the Isomorphism
Verbs included in our isomorphism are listed below; for each verb, the construction
family it belongs to (in Appendix B) is given in parentheses, preceded by the page






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Entries for verbs listed here refer only to pages in the main body of the text; the
full verbs of the isomorphism, as given in Appendix B, are listed starting on p. 319.
Similarly, only references to θ-roles mentioned in the notes of Appendix B, or in the
main body of the text, are indexed here; a fuller indexing of the roles appears in the
table in Appendix C, p. 301.
0-arity predicates, 57
θ-family, 117, 150, 153, 154, 167, 169–
171, 173–175, 178, 180, 181,




θ-role, 23, 73, 75, 78, 81, 94, 98–100,
104, 105, 119, 121, 123, 132,
145, 147, 153, 166–168, 179,
193
Actor, 100, 103, 106, 107, 123, 136,
143, 148, 162, 171, 172, 182,
184, 215, 219, 226, 288, 289,
297–299
Agent, 23–25, 29, 32, 34, 39, 40,
42, 43, 53, 54, 67, 73–75, 77,
79, 81, 92–94, 99–101, 103, 105–
108, 123, 124, 126, 129, 133,
134, 136, 142, 147, 148, 150,
157–159, 161, 162, 167–173, 175,
177, 178, 182, 184, 187, 198,
201, 213–215, 219, 250, 268,
271, 274, 289, 298
Beneficiary, 32, 33, 43, 100, 127,
182, 184
Buyer (specialized), 78, 176
Cause, 100, 103, 106, 107, 123, 146,
162, 271, 289, 298
Event, 100, 106, 107
Experiencer, 100, 103, 107, 146,
182, 184, 221, 225, 298
Goal, 27, 29, 32, 34, 41, 42, 67, 73,
74, 81, 100, 103, 106, 107, 123,
124, 134, 136, 137, 145, 147,
150, 156, 158, 161, 167, 168,
170, 172, 173, 177, 182, 184,
189–191, 196–198, 214, 215, 221,
225, 250, 268, 274, 279, 280,
285, 293, 300
Goods (specialized), 25, 176, 200
Instrument, 106, 107, 127, 182,
184, 271
Location, 100, 101, 103, 107, 170,
173, 176, 182, 184, 196, 197,
219
Loot (specialized), 22, 25, 26, 34,
75, 93, 169, 183
Manner, 106, 182, 184
Material (specialized), 107
Money (specialized), 176
Path, 67, 100, 101, 107, 182, 184
Patient, 23–25, 32, 34, 41–43, 53,
54, 75, 79, 92–94, 99, 100, 103,
106, 107, 123, 136, 140, 146,
158, 169, 175, 182–184, 232,
264, 268, 285, 297, 298
Perpetrator (specialized), 25, 200,
201
Possessor (specialized), 100
Predicate, 107, 182, 184
Property, 100, 103, 107, 145, 182,
184
Recipient, 32, 60, 100, 124, 137,
171, 172, 178, 182
Result, 100, 106, 107, 182, 215
Seller (specialized), 78, 176
Source, 22, 24, 25, 29, 34, 41, 75–
347
77, 79, 92–94, 99, 100, 103, 106,
107, 134, 137, 140, 144, 145,
150, 169, 171, 175, 182–184,
200, 214, 225, 268, 274, 294
Theme, 22–25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34,
41, 67, 73–79, 81, 92–94, 99–
101, 103, 104, 106–108, 122,
124, 126, 129–131, 134, 137,
139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 150,
158, 161, 162, 167–173, 175,
176, 178, 182–184, 189, 190,
196–198, 213–215, 217, 219, 221,
225, 226, 232, 236, 250, 253,
264, 274, 280–282, 285, 286,
289, 299
Thief (specialized), 25, 34, 75, 93,
169
Time, 107
Victim (specialized), 22, 25, 26,
34, 75–77, 93, 169, 183, 200
θ-set, 73, 74, 78, 79, 93, 94, 97, 117,
121, 124, 134, 153, 156, 166–
172, 174–177, 179, 181, 184,
185, 188–191, 193, 198–201
Θv (θ-family for verb v), 171–178
Abney, Steven, 37, 39
across, 53
Actor (θ-role), 100, 103, 106, 107, 123,
136, 143, 148, 162, 171, 172,









Agent (θ-role), 23–25, 29, 32, 34, 39,
40, 42, 43, 53, 54, 67, 73–75,
77, 79, 81, 92–94, 99–101, 103,
105–108, 123, 124, 126, 129,
133, 134, 136, 142, 147, 148,
150, 157–159, 161, 162, 167–
173, 175, 177, 178, 182, 184,
187, 198, 201, 213–215, 219,
250, 268, 271, 274, 289, 298
AI, see artificial intelligence
alternation, 19, 93, 95–98, 101, 102,











conative, 99, 100, 113
dative, 93, 100, 171
locative inversion, 100








raw material subject, 107
reaction object, 106



















AP, see adjective phrase
argument optionality, 177
argument realization, 20, 25, 33, 75,
79, 80, 158, 160, 163–165, 167,
190, 191
cross-language, 19, 20
argument, syntactic, 57, 96
artificial intelligence, 2, 204
as alternation, 100
attribute object alternation, 103
auxiliary phrase, 42
AuxP, see auxiliary phrase
avoid, 142
bag, 30
Baker, C. Lee, 61
Baker, Collin F., 134, 200
Baker, Mark C., 19, 38, 42, 49, 51, 52,
























Bock, J. K., 6

















burp, 8, 11, 86, 163, 164, 187
buy, 77–79, 106, 129, 134, 154, 175,
176, 194
Buyer (θ-role, specialized), 78, 176




Carter, Richard, 33, 160
catch, 107
causative/inchoative alternation, 107
Cause (θ-role), 100, 103, 106, 107, 123,
146, 162, 271, 289, 298
change, 106, 107
charge, 142, 210
Chomsky, Noam, 16, 34, 36, 39, 56, 57,
61, 83, 88, 91, 109, 160, 207
Christiansen, Morten H., 14
circle, 46
circumstantial semantic field, 18, 122,
140
clausal phrase, 36, 42










in divergences, 176, 185
rule of, 10, 172, 174, 176–178, 181,





complement, 37, 39, 41, 52
complementizer phrase, 42
conative alternation, 99, 100, 113
conceal, 142, 144
concept, 2
conceptual structure, 2, 4, 27, 30, 161,
162, 167, 188, 191, 205
for devour, 161
for eat, 161
for fill, 31, 188
for open, 161, 188
for put, 30
condemn, 103
conflation classes, broad and narrow,
87, 164
connectionism, 165, 186
construal, semantic, 18, 43
construction family, 117, 119, 148–150,






cover, 70, 86, 107, 130
CP, see complementizer phrase
crack, 107
cross, 53
Culicover, Peter W., 15, 91, 92




Dang, Hoa Trang, 113, 115, 116, 212
dangle, 107
Darbelnet, Jean, 53
dative alternation, 93, 100, 171
Davidson, Donald, 55
Davies, Ian R. L.






diathesis alternation, see alternation
differ, 135, 144
direct object, 42, 47, 94, 96, 109, 110,
130, 180
discourse, 207
diverge, 103, 135, 144
divergence co-occurrent, 176, 185
donate, 178, 179
Dorr, Bonnie J., ii, 130, 131, 183, 184,
213
double object construction, 63, 154, 156
Dowty, David, 99, 147, 214
DP, see determiner phrase
drain, 87
drip, 8
Drivonikou, Gilda Vicky, 17
drool, 8, 11
dry, 163
Dryer, Matthew, 38, 82















Event (θ-role), 100, 106, 107
eventive sense
of fill, 47
vs. stative, 47, 188
evolve, 100
existential semantic field, 145
Experiencer (θ-role), 100, 103, 107,
146, 182, 184, 221, 225, 298
family relation, 154, 155
fax, 60, 61, 65, 86, 93
feast, 137
Feldman, Jerome





fill, 10, 11, 26, 27, 31, 47, 67, 72, 86,
167, 170
Fillmore, Charles J., 74, 86, 87, 113,
154












of Drivonikou et al., 17
Fregean predicate, 94
French, 53, 86, 184
from, 31
Fromkin, Victoria, 49, 51, 207
Gasser, Michael, 14
generalized synonymy, 74, 80
generative linguistics, 34, 165




of Drivonikou et al., 17
Gildea, Dan
of Palmer et al., 80, 195
Girard, Denis, 53
give, 18, 32, 93, 133, 171, 178
Glenberg, Arthur M., 17
glow, 140
go, 4, 11, 30, 86, 122
Goal (θ-role), 27, 29, 32, 34, 41, 42, 67,
73, 74, 81, 100, 103, 106, 107,
123, 124, 134, 136, 137, 145,
147, 150, 156, 158, 161, 167,
168, 170, 172, 173, 177, 182,
184, 189–191, 196–198, 214, 215,
221, 225, 250, 268, 274, 279,
280, 285, 293, 300
Goldberg, Adele E., 74, 87, 155
Goods (θ-role, specialized), 25, 176, 200
Green, Georgia M., 61
greet, 146
Grohmann, Kleanthes K.




Gruber, Jeffrey S., 17, 23, 121, 205
gush, 8, 141
Habash, Nizar
of Dorr et al., 130, 131, 183, 184,
213
hail, 45, 68, 69, 211
Hale, Kenneth, 16, 91, 147, 153, 164
Hall[Partee], B., 105
Halle, Morris, 16
Haskell, the programming language, 29
head directionality, 38, 83
head final, 38
head initial, 38






Hockett, Charles F., 14






Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 61
Hungarian, 46
hurt, 103




insert, 26, 31, 48, 67, 86
Instrument (θ-role), 106, 107, 127, 182,
184, 271
integrate, 107




isomorphism, 174–176, 181–185, 187,





of Drivonikou et al., 17
of Gilbert et al., 17
jab, 100
Jackendoff, Ray, 2, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22,
23, 27, 29, 31, 34, 36, 56, 64,
83, 91, 92, 121, 124, 130, 133,







Kaschak, Michael P., 17
Kay, Paul, 74, 87
of Drivonikou et al., 17
of Fillmore et al., 87
of Gilbert et al., 17
Kayne, Richard, 57
keep, 134, 142






of Palmer et al., 80, 195
Kinyarwanda, 19, 20, 92
Kipper, Karin
of Dang et al., 113, 115, 116, 212
kneel, 142
know, 182, 219
Kowalski, Robert A., 21
Kratzer, A., 29
Kroch, Anthony, 35
Lakoff, George, 45, 154, 155
Landau, Barbara
of Kim et al., 19
lay, 70, 86
leak, 8
Levin verbs, 9, 65, 66, 68, 84, 114, 115,
117, 119, 121, 123, 124, 129–
145, 147, 151, 155, 158, 181,
183, 185, 195, 198, 199, 201
Levin, Beth, 4, 5, 7–9, 19, 23, 42, 46,
52, 53, 55, 64, 65, 68, 74, 81,
86, 87, 91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 100,
101, 103, 105–109, 111, 112,
120, 139, 149, 151, 154, 156,
163, 180, 181, 195, 199, 207,
209, 222, 226, 286, 298
lexeme, 178
lie, 142
linking, 33, 126, 158, 160, 169, 188
regularities in, 126, 157, 158, 160
listeme, 157
Location (θ-role), 100, 101, 103, 107,
352
170, 173, 176, 182, 184, 196,
197, 219
locational semantic field, 18, 122, 130,
133, 140–142, 144, 145
locative inversion alternation, 100
locative prep. drop alternation, 100
Loot (θ-role, specialized), 22, 25, 26,
34, 75, 93, 169, 183
Lowe, John B.





Manner (θ-role), 106, 182, 184
manner, as semantic component, 53,
73, 114, 123, 163
Marantz, Alec, 16
Marcinkiewicz, M. A.
of Marcus et al., 13, 195
Marcus, M., 13, 195
Mari Olsen, with
of Dorr et al., 130, 131, 183, 184,
213
mark, 100





McClelland, J. L., 186
Mendeleev, Dimitrii, 83
Mervis, Carolyn, 154
middle alternation, 106, 113




Money (θ-role, specialized), 176
Moravcsik, Edith A., 46
morphology, 207
Morrison, Philip, 149
move, 3, 4, 11, 86, 132, 196
Mufwene, Salikoko S., 113
multiset, 172, 173, 177–180
Narayan, Shweta
of Bergen et al., 17
natural language processing, 2, 21, 48,
111, 204, 206
NLP, see natural language processing
noun phrase, 36
NP, see noun phrase
Nunberg, G., 14
Nunes, Jairo
of Hornstein et al., 208
Nupe, 82
O’Connor, M. C.
of Fillmore et al., 87
oblique dative construction, 63
oblique phrase, 63, 99, 102, 130, 145,
179, 180, 190









Palmer, Martha, 80, 195
of Dang et al., 113, 115, 116, 212
parameter
head directionality, 38, 83
paraphrastic causatives, 8
parsing, 45, 195
past tense, 14, 15, 61, 62, 186
pat, 103
Path (θ-role), 67, 100, 101, 107, 182,
184
Patient (θ-role), 23–25, 32, 34, 41–
43, 53, 54, 75, 79, 92–94, 99,
100, 103, 106, 107, 123, 136,
140, 146, 158, 169, 175, 182–




Penn treebank, 13, 195, 197, 199, 204
periodic table of the elements, 83
Perlmutter, David, 57, 105
Perpetrator (θ-role, specialized), 25,
200, 201
Perry, John, 55
Pesetsky, David, 43, 56
Phillips, Colin




Pinker, Steven, 4, 5, 12, 15, 50, 61–63,
87, 154, 157, 158, 163, 178, 186
pitch, 211
poach, 211
polysemy, 43–48, 58, 59, 63–70, 79–81,
84, 86, 88, 117, 132, 137, 147,
154, 155, 157–160, 164, 169,
171, 176–179, 185–188, 191–193,
202, 207
possessional semantic field, 18, 122





pour, 10, 11, 26, 67, 72, 73, 86, 170
PP, see adpositional phrase, 106
pragmatics, 207
Predicate (θ-role), 107, 182, 184
predication
of 0 arity, 57
preposition, 31–33, 41, 51–53, 94, 98,
101, 154, 174, 180, 192




productivity, 59–65, 157, 159
progressive form, 62, 91, 140
pronoun, 35
reflexive, 110
PropBank, 195, 197–199, 201, 202




Pullum, Geoffrey K., 50
punt, 211
push, 107
Pustejovsky, James, 162, 166, 196, 205





of Matlock et al., 17
Rappaport Hovav, Malka, 4, 5, 7, 9,
42, 46, 53, 64, 65, 87, 91, 95,
96, 98, 105, 107, 109, 111, 163
raw material subject alternation, 107
reaction object alternation, 106
read, 196
Recipient (θ-role), 32, 60, 100, 124,
137, 171, 172, 178, 182
reflexive pronoun, 110
Regier, Terry
of Drivonikou et al., 17
of Gilbert et al., 17
relative clause, 90, 93
remain, 141
remove, 132, 175
Result (θ-role), 100, 106, 107, 182,
215
resultative alternation, 105, 107, 109
resultative construction, 105, 109, 110,
155






rob, 11–13, 31, 72, 75–79, 86, 93, 154,
175, 183, 192, 194, 201





of Dang et al., 113, 115, 116, 212
rule of co-occurrences, 10, 172, 174,
176–178, 181, 187, 190, 191,
193, 194, 200, 202
Rumelhart, D. E., 186
run, 142
rushing, 142
S, see clausal phrase
Sag, Ivan A.
of Nunberg et al., 14
Saint-Dizier, Patrick, 86, 184
Santorini, B.
of Marcus et al., 13, 195
Santorini, Beatrice, 35
de Saussure, Ferdinand, 14
save, 142
say, 61, 65, 86, 93
Schönfinkel, Moses, 29




section, built by currying, 29
sell, 77–79, 106, 129, 134, 143, 154,
175, 176, 194
Seller (θ-role, specialized), 78, 176
semantic field, 18
circumstantial, 18, 122, 140
existential, 145
identificational, 18, 122, 135, 140,
144–146



















Source (θ-role), 22, 24, 25, 29, 34, 41,
75–77, 79, 92–94, 99, 100, 103,
106, 107, 134, 137, 140, 144,
145, 150, 169, 171, 175, 182–
184, 200, 214, 225, 268, 274,
294










of fill, 47, 63, 67, 171, 188
vs. eventive sense, 47
stay, 141
steal, 11–13, 26, 31, 72, 75–79, 86, 93,




Stowell, T., 52, 94
strike, 100
string, 46
subcategorization frame, 24, 193, 195
substance/source alternation, 100
suffixation, 61, 186










Talmy, Leonard, 17, 53
the, 37
thematically identical verbs, 78, 154,
167, 175–177, 185, 192–194, 200
thematically similar verbs, 78
Theme (θ-role), 22–25, 27, 29, 31, 32,
34, 41, 67, 73–79, 81, 92–94,
99–101, 103, 104, 106–108, 122,
124, 126, 129–131, 134, 137,
139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 150,
158, 161, 162, 167–173, 175,
176, 178, 182–184, 189, 190,
196–198, 213–215, 217, 219, 221,
225, 226, 232, 236, 250, 253,
264, 274, 280–282, 285, 286,
289, 299
Thief (θ-role, specialized), 25, 34, 75,
93, 169
Thomas, Scott C., 195













treebank, 13, 195, 197, 199, 204
tumble, 142
Tzotil, 38
Ullman, Michael T., 15
unaccusative hypothesis, 105, 130
under, 51





Victim (θ-role, specialized), 22, 25, 26,
34, 75–77, 93, 169, 183, 200
Vinay, Jean-Paul, 53
virtual reflexive alternation, 106
VP, see verb phrase
Walker, Jearl, 149
Wasow, T.















words and rules, 15, 16, 157–159, 165
X-bar theory, 36, 37, 40, 59, 147, 165
yawn, 8
Zepter, Alexandra, 82
Zwicky, Arnold M., 113
356
